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ABSTRACT 
 
This mixed-method analysis of three Nigerian states explores the ways in which a major 
policy shift has produced short-term peace outcomes in a vastly contested terrain entailing 
conflicting interests. The central argument of "Paths to Peacebuilding," is that disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration can create peace in resource-conflicted societies when there is 
governmental will and community and citizen involvement in both the design and 
implementation of the program. The overriding concern was whether the DDR process was 
capable of contributing to tangible improvements in real and perceived safety on the ground as 
well as destroying the structures that both contributed to and sustained insurgency for over two 
decades. The disarmament process yielded over 3,000 semi- and fully automatic weapons and 
other military style hardware. It also resulted in the demobilization of over 26,000 former 
  
fighters. The DDR program generated important but geographically differentiated reductions in 
militant violence across the three states studied.  
The study analyzes survey and interview data from a random sample of 346 combatants 
and ex-combatants and other knowledgeable informants in three Niger Delta states - Rivers, 
Delta, and Bayelsa. The dissertation compared DDR success rates between individuals who 
entered the DDR program and those who did not. An examination of the programming 
determinants, controlling for non-programmatic factors including community exposure to 
pollution reveals some evidence of macro success and micro failure. While the program has 
created a new sense of peace that allows oil corporations to continue oil production unhindered 
leading to increased oil earnings for the Nigerian state, there is lack of local level support for the 
program or its participants. For example, findings of significant association between 
participation in the program and the successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
of ex-combatants are moderated by participation effects. While evidence of some level of macro 
success is clearly indicated in addition to some level of impact on the lives of program 
participants, the failure to adequately link DDR to broad economic and social development 
programs may obviate the tentative gains made and plunge the region into potentially more 
devastating rounds of violent insurgency and counter-insurgency. 
INDEX WORDS: Niger Delta, Amnesty, DDR, Peacebuilding, Nigeria, Oil, Conflict, Resource, 
Triangulation, Pollution, Violence, Greed, Predation, Corruption, intra-state conflict, war.  
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Chapter 1: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the fell clutch of circumstance 
    I have not winced nor cried aloud. 
    Under the bludgeoning of chance 
    My head is unbowed ... 
    It matters not how strait the gate 
    How charged with punishments the scroll, 
    I am the master of my fate; 
    I am the captain of my soul.  
(Henley, 1875). 
1.0 Introduction 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the Niger Delta Amnesty or DDR Program in 
order to see how well or whether it is capable of ending the protracted armed conflict in the 
Niger Delta region and entrenching long-term peace. The region, the heart of Nigeria’s oil 
production activities, contains the largest oil deposits in Africa and some of the highest quality 
oil in the world. Its oil resources has unprecedented economic and geo-strategic significance and 
value (Watts et al, 2004), and is without question the mainstay of the Nigerian economy (Ikein, 
1990; Khan, 1994; Watts, 2009). Since 1956 when oil was first discovered in commercial 
quantities in Oloibiri, a small rural community in Bayelsa state, an estimated $600 billion has 
been generated from oil exports (Okonta, 2002). Yet, the region is home to some of the poorest 
people in the world. The unremitting economic, political, social, and environmental marginality 
of the people has provided the fertile ground for the violent conflict between militant groups and 
government forces. As a result of the conflict, the Niger Delta has become what John Keane 
(1996) calls a “zone of violence,” which describes a gradual but precipitous slide into what the 
US State Department calls “political chaos.” Watts et al (2004) believe that this chaos strikes to 
the heart of Nigeria’s political future; a future blighted by unmitigated environmental disaster, 
dilapidated infrastructure, unremitting poverty and disease, huge debt burden, a legacy of 
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mismanagement and corruption, widespread citizen trepidation, unrest, and countless deaths.  
 Militant violence in the Niger Delta reflects growing defiance of the authority of the 
Nigerian state. The basis of this defiance is perceived injustice in the extraction, distribution, and 
allocation of oil assets by the state and oil conglomerates, a process which discriminates against 
minority groups whose land harbor these huge oil and gas deposits. The intense contestations and 
antagonism between the state and oil corporations on one side and militants on the other side 
mirror contestations and armed conflicts occurring in other parts of the world. In 2009, for 
example, the Niger Delta conflict was one of over 24 significant armed conflicts occurring all 
over the world. The causes of all of these conflicts appear strikingly similar: economic 
deprivation, ethnic and religious rivalry, extremism, resource allocation/appropriation, and 
proliferation of weapons. The results of these conflicts are also tragically similar: countless 
deaths, social displacement, homelessness, poverty, disease, loss of human dignity, destruction 
of vital infrastructure, and political instability.  
Contemporary statistics show that the majority of world conflicts since the end of World 
War II and the creation of the UN collective security systems have occurred among local 
contending forces within states (Marshall and Gurr 2005; De Goor, Rupesinghe, and Sciarone 
1996; Triulzi, Tommasoli, and Montalbano 2003). Between 1989 (which marked the end of the 
Cold war) and 2003, there were only seven interstate armed conflicts, and two of these (the 
US-led coalition against al-Qaeda insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan and the India-Pakistan war 
over Kashmir) continued to be active through 2003 (Erikson and Wallensteen 2004). In that same 
period, however, there were 116 within state armed conflicts involving 78 countries, with at least 
1000 deaths per conflict. In 2005, for example, 19 of the 20 "major armed conflicts" were within 
state. (Marshall and Gurr 2005) This suggests that the number of intra-state armed conflict has 
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risen sharply, now constituting 90 percent of all violent conflict, and accounting for over 4 
million deaths since the end of World War II (Triulzi et al 2003).  
The shift in the pattern of conflict from inter- to intra-state confrontations is posing 
enormous challenges to states, international donor communities, international development 
organizations and peacebuilding advocates. This is because traditional approaches for dealing 
with inter-state violent conflicts are proving inadequate or too ill-suited to effectively address the 
multifaceted causes of intra-state conflict especially in fragile states like Nigeria. According to 
Lederach (1997) “the nature and characteristics of contemporary conflict suggest the need for a 
set of concepts and approaches that go beyond traditional statist diplomacy." For this reason, 
peacebuilding in conflicted divided societies, today, must involve "a wide range of activities and 
functions that both precede and follow formal peace accords," including “processes, approaches, 
and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships." Such 
transformation potentially prevent conflicts from escalating into war and or transforms war into 
peace. In either case, peacebuilding avoids the tragic consequences of war including human 
disasters and socio-political and regional instability.  
 One strategy believed to be effective in this direction and increasingly being employed in 
conflict and post-conflict situations is DDR (Berdal 1996; Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; 
Muggah 2009). Formal programs aimed at disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating 
combatants into civil society started with the operations of the UN Observer Group in Central 
Sudan in 1989 (Humphreys and Weinstein 2007) and have since become a prominent 
intervention strategy of the UN. DDR has achieved some level of success in mitigating armed 
conflict and in sustaining peace in many conflict-ridden or war-ravaged societies including 
Rwanda, DR Congo, El Salvador, Cambodia, Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia, 
4 
 
Russia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Guatemala, India, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Colombia, Rwanda, 
Mozambique, Burundi, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result of its increasingly widespread usage 
and the successes it has recorded in the areas where it has been applied, the UN Secretary 
General concluded that a “process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration has 
repeatedly proven to be vital to stability in a post-conflict situation” (United Nations 2000). This 
strategy is currently being used in hopes of preventing the Niger Delta conflict from escalating. 
If the crisis is allowed to escalate into full-blown war, it may become too costly and dangerous to 
intervene in any form and intervention after war, in any case, has been shown to be the least 
likely to succeed (Annan 1996).  
 Nigeria's version of DDR was initiated in August 2009 by the Nigerian government under 
the title "Amnesty Program” (http://nigerdeltaamnesty.org). The program promised militants 
amnesty and rehabilitation in exchange for the surrender of arms and a pledge to end the 
fighting. In addition to the traditional triad of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
(DDR), the Nigerian DDR incorporates an extra R, which represents economic reconstruction. 
The extra R is an attempt to consider new sources of economic risks such as resource control, 
resource allocation, unequal distribution of assets, differentiated rates of growth, and differences 
in community development, income distribution, unemployment, and poverty. The acronym 
"DDRR" therefore, encapsulates four distinct motions: 1) the surrender of arms by militants and 
the disbandment of armed groups in the region; 2) freedom from prosecution for militants; 3) the 
rehabilitation and economic reintegration of militants into civil society; and 4) the post-conflict 
economic reconstruction of the region.  
The Niger Delta DDR program, therefore, aims to resolve a conflict that at its core 
appears to be resource motivated. Resulting from increased repression by state agents in alliance 
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with multinational oil companies, militants have been successful in framing their cause as a 
struggle for ecological justice, self determination, and resource control. They argue that local 
communities from which natural resource wealth is annexed must have rights to taxation and 
other economic advantages appropriated by a federal government inclined toward a pattern of 
growth and development that privileges the dominant ethnic groups. These communities must 
also determine the minimum standards for oil production as well as the nature, types, and extent 
of oil production and by whom. Those who support the government’s position believe that 
federal control of natural resources as well as its use is the only way to assure of equitable 
resource allocation and even development. These two positions appear antithetical and the 
schisms have led to prolonged violence.  
Until recently, both groups have been unwilling to dialogue or negotiate with the 
consequence that the Niger Delta has become a war zone with devastating outcomes for the 
people, environment, and institutions. For example, the human costs have been very high. 
Human costs refer to the loss of lives, the high levels of disease, poverty, socio-economic 
disparity, rising gender inequality, educational decline, and many less tangible costs. Also, 
because of the conflict, an estimated 750,000 barrels of crude out of the nation’s daily supply of 
2.2 million barrels was shut in and over 300,000 bpd deliberately discharged into the 
environment, further depleting the fragile eco-system of the Niger Delta and causing 
reverberations for the world’s energy security. The “Amnesty” or DDR program is the 
mechanism the government and some other important stakeholders hope will resolve the 
disagreements, end the fighting, prevent the precipitous slide to full scale civil war, and stimulate 
widespread economic, social, and political growth and development.  
But despite the growing confidence of experts, policy makers, and important stakeholders 
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in the ability of DDR to reverse and or retard conflict situations, there have been very few 
systematic efforts to evaluate DDR programs in order to determine whether disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration is effective in ending conflict or in preventing post-conflict 
societies from reverting to war. Also, we do not know the determinants of successful 
demobilization, reintegration, and reconstruction. We do not know, for example, what it is about 
DDR that potentially delivers the outcomes expected. For that matter, because of the 
multidimensional nature of DDR, there has been great difficulty in linking individual 
contributions of specific programs to overall outcomes (Humphreys and Weinstein 2007). 
Moreover, there is little scientific information about the possible interaction of macro structures 
and individual and community level characteristics in producing DDR outcomes. For these 
reasons and because of the huge resources committed to the success of the Amnesty Program, it 
is tremendously important that we examine the program to see whether or how well it delivers 
the benefits that stakeholders hope for and that have been widely attributed to DDR all over the 
world. 
1.1 Objectives of the Study 
This study has three main objectives. First, it is to review the multifaceted causes of the 
Niger Delta conflict. Although there is widespread agreement about the potential consequences 
of the conflict, there is much less agreement about the cause(s) of the conflict. While some 
studies link the conflict to agitation over resource appropriation and ecological damage (Olorode 
1988; Ikein 1990; Ashton-Jones 1998; Iyayi 2000; Okonta 1998; Human Rights Watch 1998; 
Okonta and Douglas 2003; Watts 2009; Oyerinde 1998; and Obi 1997), others link it to political 
marginalization, ethnicity and corruption (Igbinovia, Okonofua, Omoyibo, and Omoruyi 2004; 
Okonofua and Ugiagbe 2004; Osaghae 1998; Saliu, Luqman, and Abdulahi 2007), poverty, 
unemployment and exploitation (Saro-Wiwa 1992; Eteng 1997; Iyayi 2008; Ukeje, Odebeyi, 
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Sesay, and Aina 2009; Peel 2010), and constitutionalism (Akiba 2004; Sagay 2008). These 
scholars and many others have fully explored the connections between the ethnic character of the 
state, formal politics and the violence in the Niger Delta. However, the contributions of 
petrol-capitalism (Watts 2003; Watts et al 2004) and the racialized global institutions that 
support it are either wholly undocumented or grossly under-theorized. Moreover, not much has 
been done to tease out what Ken Saro-Wiwa (1992) calls the “slick alliance” between 
petrol-capital and the Nigerian state - an alliance that has produced bitter outcomes for 
inhabitants of the Niger Delta. My goal, therefore, is not only to anticipate possible 
developments in the conflict dynamics but also to fully explore the causes of the violence as a 
way to understand the nature of the governability crisis that produced the violence in the first 
place.  
Second, based on this review, the study will systematically examine the planning and 
implementation of the Amnesty Program in order to determine whether a gap between outputs 
and outcomes exists. Considering the vast amount of resources committed to the process and the 
great expectations concerning it, it is tremendously important that we gain an understanding of 
how and where these resources are being applied and whether they are achieving the impact 
stakeholders’ desire. This study has the capability to design and develop a formidable and 
potentially useful tool-kit for measuring the impact of this DDR intervention that might be 
applicable to similarly conflicted societies. This implies generating a framework for building 
peace that fully anticipates and engages the causes, contradictions, and consequences of the 
conflict in the Niger Delta. 
  Finally, the study will use the theories of conflict formation (Kaplan 1995; 
Homer-Dixon 1999; Klare 2001; Collier 2000, etc.) and conflict transformation (Lederach 1995; 
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Miall 2004) to understand and assess the performance of the amnesty program. These theories 
will help specify whether or how the program: a) reduces conflict related risks, b) influences 
conflict dynamics, and c) contributes to peacebuilding. This is crucial since a review of relevant 
literature yields very little in terms of systematic theories about post-conflict disarmament, 
demobilization, reintegration, and reconstruction (Nillson 2005; Humphreys and Weinstein 
2009). The study will take a different approach from the ‘paradigmatic benchmark’ (Pugel 2009) 
for measuring DDR success - whether or not a state relapses into war - a linear approach that 
ignores the context and dynamics of contemporary within state conflicts. Instead, this study will 
focus dialectically on the corpus of structural, cultural, relational, and personal changes 
(Lederach 1995) that are critical to post-conflict peacebuilding. Therefore, efforts aimed at 
eliminating the potential for violence and building sustainable peace might begin, at least, with 
making structural, cultural, relational, and personal changes and adjustments. Since the present 
intervention incorporates these as major activities, it is crucial that we gain an insight into how 
this is done and whether, in fact, they address some or all of the grievances that fuel the violence. 
1.2 Problem Statement  
This study addresses a six-part problem with respect to the Niger Delta conflict and the 
DDR intervention. First, the government’s framework for disarmament and demobilization is 
inadequately specified. It is articulated as the return of arms and the dissolution of armed groups. 
One problem with this simplistic conceptualization is that it does not properly anticipate or 
articulate potential risks with disarming and demobilizing ex-militants. For example, it is 
common for ex-combatants to rearm themselves in order to take advantage of expanding political 
opportunities (Alden 2002; Mehlum and Ragner 2002; Spear 2002; Gamba 2003). Re-armed 
ex-combatants may be recruited by combatants existing outside of the peace process (Mehlum 
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and Ragner 2002). This was the case in the Republic of Congo, where a Ninja splinter group led 
by Frederic Bitsangou Ntumi refused to demobilize. He recruited many ex-Ninjas who had 
earlier been demobilized and attacked Brazzaville (IRIN 2004). Ex-combatants may also recreate 
disbanded armed groups and commence post-war hostilities (Gamba 2003; Spear 2002). This 
was the case in Nicaragua in the 1990s where demobilized contra rebels and the Sandinistas 
(government soldiers) recreated parallel armed groups (Recontras and Recompas) from the ashes 
of their old organizations to first force the government to give them reintegration assistance, and 
then to fight each other (Spencer 1997). There is also the potential for ex-combatants to sell their 
military skills to armed actors involved in armed conflicts in foreign countries. This was the case 
in Angola and Sierra Leone where demobilized soldiers of the South African Defense Force 
(SADF) fought as mercenaries in civil wars in Angola and Sierra Leone (Kingma 1999). 
Similarly, ex-fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) have fought in Macedonia (ICG 
2001). Apart from these, there is the potential for ex-combatants to demobilize and reintegrate 
into organized criminality (Alden 2002; Call and Stanley 2003; Mehlum and Ragner 2002). This 
was the case in Mozambique where after the signing of the 1992 Rome Agreement, 
ex-combatants transformed their clandestine military structures into dynamic criminal 
organizations (Alden 2002). Because of these shortcomings, it is likely that the disarmament and 
demobilization of ex-combatants in the Niger Delta may be incapable of contributing anything of 
value to the peace process, unless disarmament and demobilization are adequately 
conceptualized. This study has the potential to develop the framework for conceptualizing 
disarmament and demobilization and the metrics for measuring their impact. 
Second, the conceptualization of reintegration is potentially problematic. There appears 
to be confusion over what reintegration entails and the stages or phases of its implementation. 
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For example, should reintegration stop at economic reintegration or should it include social and 
political reintegration? Economic reintegration (which appears to be the focus of the Amnesty 
Program) is important since unemployment and poverty are central to the Niger Delta conflict. 
Over 75 percent of Niger Delta youths are unemployed and almost half of these youths are 
unemployable because they lack skills applicable to modern industry (Okonta and Douglas 2003; 
Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye, and Okhonmina 2007; Saliu et al 2007; Watts 2009). The 
majority of ex-combatants in the Niger Delta appear to be illiterate, possessing only fighting 
skills that are inapplicable in peace times. Therefore, the economic reintegration of ex-militants 
through vocational training and job creation schemes is important to the peace process. Also very 
important, is their social and political integration, but the program appears to pay little attention 
to these. Because of their tendency towards violence (rape, physical abuse, mutilation, 
kidnapping, murder, etc), the return of ex-combatants may trigger extreme feelings of insecurity 
in their communities of return (Knight and Ozerdam 2004; Spear 2005; Nillson 2005). 
Moreover, ex-combatants have been shown to display difficulties in reconciling with their 
communities especially in cases where such communities were intensely victimized during the 
conflict. This was the case in Angola were ex-combatants belonging to the Jonas Savimbi 
UNITA movement engaged host communities in violence following the implementation of DDR 
(Nillson 2005). Also, after being disarmed and demobilized, some categories of ex-combatants 
(especially women, children, and disabled ex-combatants) constitute a weak and marginalized 
group in need of economic, psychological, and social assistance (Nillson 2005). This situation is 
often exacerbated by wartime illnesses that continue to plague ex-combatants in post-conflict 
periods. This was the case in Uganda and Ethiopia where a large portion of the demobilized 
combatants were HIV/AIDS positive (Kingma 2000). More daunting, perhaps, is the challenge 
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posed by disabled ex-combatants. For example, the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea produced 
about 18,000 disabled ex-combatants in Ethiopia alone (Collier 1994; Colletta, Kostner and 
Wiederhofer 2004). Apart from these, there is also the need to pay serious attention to political 
reintegration. The failure to incorporate ex-combatants into the political mainstream may have 
disastrous consequences. This was the case in Mozambique where demobilized guerrilla fighters 
from the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) were shut out of the political process 
consequently provoking intense violence (Nillson 2005). These reintegration challenges provides 
the rationale for understanding how reintegration is conceptualized and implemented in this 
DDR program and whether these have any impact in altering the conflict landscape of the Niger 
Delta. This study has the potential to develop a useful definition of reintegration that 
encapsulates the entire complex of economic, social, and political reintegration and that 
potentially roadmaps the effective reintegration of ex-combatants in the Niger Delta. 
Third, studies of the Niger Delta conflict implicate economic cleavages (poverty, 
unemployment, resource control, corruption, etc) for the conflict (Osaghae 1998; Okonta and 
Douglas 2003; Saliu et al 2007; Watts et al 2004; Osaghae et al 2007; Watts 2009). Yet, the 
government’s economic reconstruction plan is expressed as activities for ex-militants rather than 
as targeted macro outcomes. This minimalist approach (Muggah 2009) that ignores the wider 
context of the conflict may have little impact in reducing the conflict related risks or in positively 
altering the conflict dynamics. This study will investigate the government’s reconstruction 
agenda in order to determine whether it has the potential to positively alter the economic 
landscape of the Niger Delta region. Before the outbreak of armed conflict, the government’s 
development policies typically involved maintaining “rent-seeking, distributional coalitions” 
(Kang and Meernik 2005) that ossified economic development. Perhaps, the torturous process of 
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armed conflict has destroyed these pre-conflict distributional coalitions permitting the 
implementation of equitable, justiceable, and sustainable economic development policies and 
programs. We need to know. 
Fourth, there have been relatively few systematic efforts to evaluate whether DDR 
programs actually work. What is predominant instead, is literature saturated with ‘lessons 
learned assessments’ that attempt to analyze the factors responsible for the successes or failures 
of DDR programs (Humphreys and Weinstein 2009; Ginifer 2003; Richards, Archibald, Bah, 
and Vincent 2003; Nillson 2005) and even these narratives have failed to incorporate variation in 
the key explanatory variables. For example, at the macro level, DDR studies have not compared 
variation in outcomes for communities that received intervention with those that did not receive 
intervention. At the micro-level, these studies fail to explain why some individuals and not others 
are able to successfully reintegrate after conflict (Humphreys and Weinstein 2009). Because of 
the lack of systematic comparisons, these studies fail to show how participation in DDR 
programs account for variation in outcomes. This study will overcome this shortcoming by 
conducting a natural experiment in which outcomes are compared for a matched sample of 
militants participating in the program (pseudo-experimental group) and militants not 
participating in the program (pseudo-control group). The use of a pseudo-experimental design 
will help to distinguish this study from past efforts and enable me investigate the sources of 
variation in institutional and individual level outcomes. More importantly, it may provide the 
much needed evidence of DDR workability that is critically lacking in the field.   
Fifth, there appears to be gender bias in the implementation of the program. Women 
combatants constitute only about 0.6 percent or 133 out of the 20,192 ex-combatants 
participating in the DDR program. Yet, if we consider that women play an important role in civil 
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wars (IPRI 2002; Nillson 2005; Ortega 2009), we might expect that women are more directly 
involved in the Niger Delta conflict than their representation in the DDR program suggests. For 
example, about 30 percent of the Sandinista army in Nicaragua and between 25 and 30 percent of 
the guerillas in El Salvador were women (International Peace Research Institute 2002). This 
raises the possibility that the Niger Delta program may de-prioritize women who are likely to 
receive less reintegration support than males. There are several likely reasons for this. First, 
female combatants are not considered as posing the same level of threats as male militants. As a 
result, men have always been given priority in terms of reintegration assistance (Colleta et al 
2004; IPRI 2002; Nillson 2005). Second, most female ex-combatants live in masculanized states 
with gendered institutions and symbolic systems. As a result, female ex-combatants are often 
alienated for breaching ‘societal norms.’ Because of this, many female ex-combatants are 
reluctant to disclose their status and fail to reintegrate through DDR. Instead, they often 
reintegrate into prostitution and drug addiction, or reemerge as mercenaries in another conflict 
(Bernard et al 2003). Third, female ex-combatants may be constrained by gender-specific 
obstacles in the post-conflict period. Women combatants tend to have less access to knowledge, 
skills, information, resources, and work opportunities than males (Nillson 2005). As a result, 
males are often better equipped to take advantage of reintegration benefits. Because of these 
gender-specific discriminations, female ex-combatants often feel empowered by war and may 
not want to return to their traditional roles, which in most instances condenses men’s gender 
power over women. This reluctance may pose special challenges in the post-war period as was 
the case in Eritrea were the divorce rate for married ex-combatants rose to 27 percent (Kingma 
2000) or in Chad, Namibia, and Nicaragua where domestic violence rate involving female 
ex-combatants spiked significantly (ICG, 2001). Thus, it is important to probe the involvement 
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of women not just as victims, peace enablers, and peacemakers but also as combatants and 
possible obstacles to the transformation process.  
Finally, Humphreys and Weinstein reports that recent research in social psychology and 
anthropology show congruence between reintegration success and several factors including 
exposure to violence (Dyregrov, Jested, and Rundle 2002), age (Richards, Archibald, Bah, and 
Vincent 2003), and gender (Mazurana, McKay, Carlson, and Kasper 2002). Beyond these, 
however, their review of relevant literature yields little in terms of systematic theories about 
post-conflict DDR interventions. Considering that oil production, the appropriation of oil profits, 
ecological damage, and political and economic participation are driven by a peculiar type of 
extractive logic – petrol-capitalism - it is tremendously important that we develop a theory set 
capable of explaining the Niger Delta conflict context. This is crucial since most efforts to study 
the violence in the Niger Delta have been partisan, sensational, emotional, and lack theoretical 
depth (Ukeje et al 2009). This study will use a combination of conflict formation and conflict 
transformation theories to examine, analyze, and explain the performance of this DDR program. 
This is a novelty since no study has yet incorporated Lederach’s model into the peacebuilding 
DDR infrastructure or for comparing outcomes across matched samples of program participants 
and non-participants.  
1.3 Implications for Policy and Research  
The importance of peacebuilding in a world of constantly emerging and changing conflict 
cannot be overstated. The proposed research will provide the much needed answers to questions 
that vex global headlines: why is resource-related conflict seemingly intractable? Can 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) build long-term peace in 
resource-conflicted societies? Although Nigeria is the geographical focus of this study, the 
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similarity of oil-related tensions in Angola, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, and 
Kazakhstan suggests that this study may be able to address a much wider audience. In that 
respect, the potential contributions of the proposed research are diverse. In terms of theory, the 
research will not only illuminate the theoretical analysis of resource conflicts but also contribute 
new insights into the potential application of a modified conflict transformation theory that fully 
contemplates prescriptive and policy questions about peacebuilding in resource contested 
societies. In terms of practice, the proposed research will demonstrate what works and does not 
work in DDR peacebuilding. It will convey to militants and members of Niger Delta 
communities the relevance of their participation in an intervention that portends to address the 
root causes of the violence in the region. From a policy perspective, this study will help situate 
this multi-component intervention within existing community-based structures such as 
community associations, civil defense groups, community development projects, neighborhood 
environmental protection programs, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NNDC), the 
National Economic Reconstruction Agency (NERA), the National Emergency Management 
Agency (NEMA), and the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) in a cost-effective way 
that maximizes impact to this underserved population. The results will also interest students, 
researchers, activists, and practitioners in the multidisciplinary field of peacebuilding and 
governments facing debilitating internal conflicts, states emerging from resource-based civil war, 
and states facing the dire prospects of resource-related civil war. From a research perspective, 
my comparative approach will shed an important, but hitherto ignored, light on the micro- and 
macro-dynamics of the Niger Delta oil complex more generally, and the conflict and its 
transformation more specifically, that is missing from the scholarly literature. This will lay the 
foundation for more rigorous testing of the intervention using randomized control models in 
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which participants are introduced into DDR programs in more carefully managed stages. Finally, 
the results will be published in peer review journals of broad readership were it will provoke 
critical thinking and debates about the causes and consequences of armed conflict and the 
mechanisms for building long lasting peace.  
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Chapter 2: 
A HISTORY OF NIGERIA 
        Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. 
            Obafemi Awolowo (1947) 
 
       The day when Nigeria becomes a true federation, still more a    
      nation, is still far away. 
         Margery Perham (1947). 
2.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a historical perspective on the Niger Delta violence based on 
empirical trends since British colonial occupation. It begins with a brief analysis of the 
pre-colonial socio-political organization of these independent nation-states and the set of 
political transformations beginning with the British occupation that have taken place since. The 
chapter pays particular attention to the economic and environmental changes beginning with the 
discovery of oil in 1956 that are fundamental to an understanding of the Niger Delta violence. 
The chapter is divided into seven sections. This introduction is the first section and is followed by the 
section that discusses the pre-history of Nigeria. Section three discusses the creation of Nigeria and is 
followed by the section that describes contemporary Nigeria, its federal structure and myriad 
socio-political and economic transformations. Section five discusses the Niger Delta paying primary 
attention to its ecology and oil production. Section six describes the Niger Delta people paying close 
attention to the multi-ethnic composition of the Niger Delta. Finally, section seven examines the 
mainstay of the Nigerian nation: oil. It looks at the transformation of the Nigerian economy from 
agriculture-centered to one dependent on oil mining. 
2.1 A Pre-History of Nigeria 
 
Sagay (2008:350) has observed that in the beginning, there was no Nigeria. According to 
him: 
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There were Kingdoms like Oyo, Lagos, Calabar, Brass, Itsekiri, Benin, Tiv, Bornu, Sokoto 
Caliphate (with loose control over Kano, Ilorin and Zaria etc), Bonny, Opobo etc. Prior to the 
British conquest of the different nations making up the present day Nigeria, these nations were 
independent nation states and communities independent of each other and of Britain. 
Further, he observed that there were Ijaws, Igbos, Urhobos, Itsekiris, Yorubas, Hausas, Fulanis, 
Nafes, Kanuris, Ogonis, Gwaris, Katafs, Jukuns, Edos, Esans, Ibibios, Efiks, Idomas, Tivs, 
Junkuns, Biroms, Angas, Ogojas and so on, but there were no Nigerians. The various states were 
for the most part, remarkable for their size and well developed political institutions. For example, 
Benin Kingdom (present day Edo state) that started as a little city-state on the Benin River rose 
to an extensive empire embracing many tribes. At the peak of its power in the 17th century, Benin 
Empire stretched from Lagos to the Niger and from Idah in the north to the coast. 
The story was not different in Yoruba land, where Oyo rose from a small and 
insignificant Yoruba town on the northern borders of present Oyo state to a great empire. By the 
middle of the 18th century, Oyo Empire stretched from Benin in the East to the Western frontiers 
of Togo in the West, and from Nupe in the north, to the Mangrove swamps to the south. By this 
time, it had become the largest of the forest states of West Africa. As an empire, Oyo achieved a 
very high degree of efficient imperial administration based upon well-fashioned political 
institutions. 
The peoples of the Niger Delta were also independently governed and had states with 
well developed structures. It was the great center of trade with Europe and the principal 
commodities of trade were slaves in the 19th century and palm oil in the 20th century. These 
trades, particularly the slave trade, led to the emergence of city-states along the coast, which 
arose principally as a result of the emigration of people from the hinterlands to the Delta fishing 
villages, to take advantage of trade with Europeans. In this manner arose the city-states of Sapele 
and Warri inhabited by the Urhobos and Itsekiris (part of present day Delta state); Brass, Akoso, 
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Twoa, and Nembe inhabited by the Kalabaris and Ikwerres (part of present day Rivers state); 
Buguma, Abonnema, and Bakana inhabited by the Ijaw (present day Bayelsa state); Bonny 
inhabited by the Ibeno (part of present day Rivers state); and Creek town, Henshaw town, and 
Duke town in Calabar inhabited by the Efiks (present day Cross River and Akwa Ibom states). he 
City-States of the Niger-Delta had remarkably sophisticated structures and institutions that 
regulated commerce, religion, education, health, and family life and ensured group survival. 
Unlike the Niger-Delta States which sprung up following the expansion of trade in slaves 
and palm oil in the 19th century, the occupation of the forest belt area between the Cross River 
east of the River Niger and Benin, west of the River Niger, and between Igala to the north and 
the Niger Delta city-states by the Igbos cannot be known for certain. However, it is estimated 
that the Igbos have occupied this area since the 9th century AD. Onwubiko (1972) argues that 
Igbo land was the most densely populated area of West Africa. This was very much a result of 
the population movement from Benin in the middle of the 17th century eastward, which led to the 
increased population of the Western or Ika Igbo country. Similarly, the migration of people 
fleeing from the Fulani slave raids in the north, led to the increase of population in eastern Igbo 
country. The Igbo political organization was a peculiar one. This was largely due to the 
geographical location of Igbo land in the heart of the tropical forest, which provided immense 
obstacles against invasions from external enemies. As a result, the Igbos could not be conquered 
and hence an empire could not be established in Igbo land. Thus, the Igbos who are by nature 
very egalitarian and independent never evolved a centralized political structure like the Edos or 
Yorubas, but maintained small village republics where every adult male had a direct say in 
governance. Again, the internal political organization of the Igbos took into cognizance, their 
culture, family life, occupation, and geographic conditions, and worked excellently well in the 
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regulation and support of the social behavior of the Igbo people. 
The northern fringes of present day Nigeria is populated by Hausa-Fulani peoples. The 
history of the present day Hausa-Fulani population is intricately linked to the Fulani Jihad led by 
Uthman Dan Fodio in Central Sudan in the 19th century. The Fulani are a nomadic, cattle-herding 
people who due to their nomadic nature were the first among the Hausa states to come into 
contact with Islam and Led by Uthman, sought to Islamize the region through Jihad (holy war). 
The main political consequence of this Jihad was the Fulani conquest of most of what later 
became northern Nigeria. The Fulani conquest of Hausa land started with Uthman’s victory over 
the army of Mohammed Yunfa, king of Gobir, in 1804 (Usman 1979). After his defeat, Yunfa 
warned other Hausa kings of the growing Fulani danger, as the Fulani, excited by Uthman’s 
victory began to rally round him in large numbers. To preempt the Fulani’s, the Hausa kings 
started to attack the Fulani communities within their states. This unprovoked attack served to 
mobilize Fulani support for Uthman. The Jihad thus, apart from being a religious war, was also 
deeply racial. Onwubiko (1982) recounts that in 1805 leaders of Fulani communities all over the 
North came to Uthman who gave them flags that symbolized their authority, enjoining them to 
conquer unbelievers in their areas and to establish true Islam. Consequently, independent Hausa 
states such as Kebbi, Zaria, Katsina, Gobir, and Kano were conquered between 1805 and 1809. 
By 1809, the conquest of the entire Hausa land was almost complete. Following the success of 
the Fulani Jihadist in Hausa land, the Jihad was extended to non-Muslim areas outside Hausa 
land that had considerable concentrations of Fulanis. Adamawa (1806), Nupe (1810), Ilorin 
(1835), all fell to the Fulani Jihadists. Thus, through the Islamic holy war of Uthman Dan Fodio, 
the Sokoto Caliphate (a loose confederation of over 30 emirates) was established in northern 
Nigeria with headquarters in Sokoto. 
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2.2 Colonial Rule 
At the Berlin Conference of 1885, the major European powers established parameters for 
gaining control over independent African states. Not only did the conference allocate areas of 
exploitation, it also enunciated the principle of governance otherwise known as the “dual 
mandate.” The dual mandate makes clear that the colonization of independent African states was 
for the benefit of both Africa and Europe. Under the terms of the mandate, Europe was to have 
unfettered access to Africa for its resources and trade, while Africa would benefit from Europe’s 
superior civilization (Lugard 1965; Perham 1956; 1960; Taiwo 1999). Under these terms, 
Britain’s claim to the territory known today as Nigeria were formally acknowledged and it 
wasted little time in establishing its presence there. 
Immediately following the partition and the settlement of territorial boundaries, the 
British encountered certain problems, including: 
A) Securing native recognition for British authority: The British had difficulties in 
securing native recognition of British authority in areas under their territories. When 
the treaties of protection were signed by native rulers, these rulers did not understand 
the true implication of the treaties they signed. However, when the colonial powers 
began to set up administrations in these territories by appointing and posting officials, 
the real intention of the treaties became clear. Many native rulers unwilling to lose 
their powers to the British, consequently took up arms to defend their sovereignty and 
freedom. An example of such resistance was the Bornu and Fulani resistance to 
British occupation, which took the British six years (1900-1906) to quell (Onwubiko 
1982). 
B) The existence of sophisticated political institutions in the territories: This posed a 
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second major problem for the British. As we have seen from the nation-states such as 
Oyo, Benin, the city-states of the Niger Delta, the stateless societies of the Ibos, and 
the Fulani Emirates of Northern Nigeria, important political institutions (a hierarchy 
of officials, systems of justice, taxation etc) had been evolved. The native people 
were thus, ambivalent about the colonial system as they clearly preferred their own 
system, which evolved rationally from a natural admixture of local conditions and 
contact with other nations and which for centuries succeeded in regulating life and 
death in those societies.  
C) Inadequate Administrative Personnel: Added to the two problems discussed above, 
is the difficulty Britain had with posting adequate British personnel to man the new 
colonial administrations in the face of the meager financial resources available for 
such a venture. This administrative problem was worsened by the multiplicity of 
languages and differences in culture and customs of the new country, Nigeria.  
To manage these problems, the British adopted the indirect rule system of administration in 
Nigeria. This method of colonial administration sowed the seed of discord among ethnic 
nationalities in Nigeria and has continued to fuel embers of hate, suspicion, fear and domination 
in contemporary Nigeria. It also produced a synthetic racial system or what has been called 
“ethno-claimatocracy” (Nwokeji 1994) where Nigerians accessed national opportunities and 
resources through their ethnic locations. 
Indirect rule has been defined as a system of administration whose “essential features 
were the preservation of the traditional political institutions and their adaptation under the 
tutelage and direction of the British administration, to the requirement of modern units of local 
Government” (Coalman 1958). It is a system which allows traditional rulers to rule under the 
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supervision of British officials. The system was first introduced in Northern Nigeria by Lord 
Lugard after he had conquered native resistance to colonial rule between 1900 and 1906.  
However, Lugard was not the initiator of the idea, which by that time had been successfully used 
in such places as India and Uganda. However, Lugard must be given credit for its rigid 
implementation in Nigeria. In 1965, after his retirement from the colonial service, Lugard 
published his book the “Dual Mandate,” which attempted to rationalize the exigency of the 
indirect rule system. According to him, “Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of our own 
industrial classes and of the native races in their progress to a higher plane; that the benefit can 
be made reciprocal; and that it is the aim and desire of civilized administration to fulfill this 
mandate.” Unfortunately, the higher plane for Africans was determined by Europeans who also 
determined the means by which Africans could attain this “higher plane.” In fulfilling Europe’s 
self-imposed mandate, the resources (natural and human) of Africa were plundered and a specific 
genre of development, which guaranteed the perpetual underdevelopment of Africa, was 
imposed. 
The indirect rule system was immediately successful in Northern Nigeria because of the 
institutions of the large Fulani Emirates, which were easily adaptable to indirect rule. The Fulani 
emirs were retained as the governing class but were supervised by British administrative officers. 
The Emir and his court, a native treasury that supervised the collection of taxes, and a native 
court that administered justice were the hallmarks of the indirect rule system in Northern 
Nigeria.   
In the west, indirect rule was not as successful as it was in the north. This was because 
the British administration attempted to restore supreme authority of Yoruba land to the Alafin of 
Oyo, whose influence had diminished considerably in the 19th century. The independent Yoruba 
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Obas resented and resisted this situation. This was further worsened by the failure of the British 
to incorporate the influential western-educated elite in local administration, thus provoking 
serious protest from these people. Finally, the indirect rule system could not achieve the success 
it achieved in the North because the British lamely thought that Yoruba Obas had the autocratic 
powers of the Emirs of the North who could rule without the council of chiefs. This was not 
possible in the west because the Oba existed within a chieftaincy system that strongly 
incorporated chiefs in the decision making process. Without the chiefs, the Obas could not 
control the people. 
In Eastern Nigeria, the indirect rule system failed woefully. This was because the Igbo 
society being a stateless, egalitarian society with a system of village democracy had no 
established centralized traditional authority in the mould of the Yoruba Obas or the Emirs of 
Hausa land, able to command the obedience of their people. Anxious to achieve the success it 
achieved in Northern Nigeria, the British reacted to the stateless, chiefless nature of Igbo society 
by creating chiefs by warrant and vesting them with powers hitherto unknown in Igbo society.  
These chiefs utilizing their arbitrary powers and control of the courts became impossibly 
tyrannical and unpopular. The use of these unpopular chiefs to collect taxes in the East led to the 
famous Aba Women Riot of 1929, which had the chiefs and the native courts as the principal 
targets (Van Allen 1971; Mba 1982). 
Thus, while indirect rule theoretically preserved indigenous political institutions, the 
nature and substance of these institutions were significantly altered. Because the British were 
primarily interested in furthering their economic agenda, local communities and people were 
manipulated to secure British advantage. The system of agriculture was transformed to facilitate 
exports and a new category of wage workers were created that are the precursors of the modern 
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Nigerian civil servant who is essentially parasitic and live off the labor and sweat of the tiny 
minority involved in agriculture, mining, construction, entertainment, and industry. These 
economic changes in turn produced corresponding changes in the social structure of society. 
Overnight, radical demographic changes occurred. For example, there was a rise in rural-urban 
migration, which depleted the villages and overpopulated the cities. Apart from the problem of 
overpopulation, this demographic shift also significantly reduced the area of land under 
cultivation and put great pressures on cities to provide for its expanding populations. Also, 
gender roles shifted as more women were increasingly engaging in paid employment. This 
brought changes in the composition of the Nigerian family and ushered in an era of single 
women uncharitably described as “ladies” or loose women. Finally, it encouraged the 
development of a new class of middle-class elites who were both empowered by the colonial 
system and frustrated by their socio-political emasculation by the British/chiefs coalition.   
2.3 The Creation of Nigeria 
As we have seen, independent states existed in the form of kingdoms and empires (Benin, 
Oyo, and Hausa-Fulani etc), city-states (Niger Delta), and stateless societies (Igbo). But there 
was no Nigeria. In 1849 John Beecroft was appointed as the British consul in Nigeria in a bid to 
protect the lives, properties and trade of British traders. Beecroft’s appointment began the series 
of political and social changes that gradually subsumed the territory that is today known as 
Nigeria under British imperial rule. The appointment of Beecroft was soon followed by other 
policies that unified these nation-states under British colonial rule, including the gunboat 
diplomacy that enforced the one-sided agreements of the protection of British traders and the 
signing of the protection treaty that ceded control to the British. According to Sagay (2008:352), 
a typical protection treaty contained the following clauses:  
The British majesty hereby undertakes to extend to them (protected people) and to territory under 
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their authority and jurisdiction her fraction favors and protection.   
 
Consequently,  
Protected people were prohibited from entering into any correspondence, agreement or treaty with 
any foreign power or nation except with the knowledge and sanction of Britain.  Any disputes 
between the native chiefs themselves or between them and British or foreign traders had to be 
submitted to the British council.  Native chiefs were bound to act on the advice of the British 
officers in matters relating to the administration of justice, the development of the resources of the 
country, the interest of or in any matter in relation to peace, order and good government and the 
general progress of civilization.   
 
Armed with the protection treaties and emboldened by the 1885 Berlin conference of partition, 
Britain invaded, conquered and colonized the independent states of modern Nigeria 
independently, before foisting an amalgamation in 1914. Thus, in 1813, Lokoja and Benue 
became parts of the Niger Coast Protectorate; in 1815, the oil Rivers Protectorate was 
established; and Lagos was annexed in 1861. In 1896, all Yoruba land south of Ilorin came under 
the control of the Lagos Government and was administered as the Colony and Protectorate of 
Lagos. In 1897, Benin became a part of the Niger Coast Protectorate. In 1900, the Niger Coast 
Protectorate was renamed the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and in 1906, the Protectorate was 
merged with the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos and became known as the Colony and 
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (Sagay 2008; Falola and Heaton 2008).  
A chartered company, the “Royal Niger Company” administered Northern Nigeria on 
behalf of the British government before 1900, even though the British government had declared 
a protectorate over areas claimed by the company in 1887. In 1900, however, the British 
government took over direct administration of the area from the RNC and renamed it the 
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria with Lord Lugard appointed its first High Commissioner.  
Consequently, Bida and Adamawa (1901); Bauchi, Gombe, Zaira, and Kano (1902); and Sokoto 
(1903) were conquered by the British. Finally, on January 1 1914, the two separate governments 
(the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria) were 
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amalgamated as the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria with Lord Lugard as its 
Governor-General (Onwubiko 1982). 
 We see, then, that Nigeria was made by Britain. In fact, the name “Nigeria” was chosen 
by Flora Shaw a correspondent of the “Times of London” and mistress of Lord Lugard, the 
founding Governor-General of Nigeria, as a tribute to the Niger, the third longest river in Africa 
(runs for 730 miles through Nigeria into the Gulf of Guinea) and the main artery of commerce 
and communications in the West African sub-region. Justifying her choice of name in the 
“Financial Times of London” of January 8, 1897 she argued: 
The name Nigeria applying to no other part of Africa may without offence to any neighbours be 
accepted as co-extensive with the territories over which the Royal Niger Company has extended 
British influence, and may serve to differentiate them equally from the colonies of Lagos and the 
Niger Protectorate on the coast and from the French territories of the Upper Niger (See Omoruyi 
2002). 
The new unified territory (Nigeria) came to cover 356,668 square miles – roughly twice the size 
of the US state of California and three times the size of the United Kingdom. It is bordered to the 
south by the Bight of Benin and Biafra, on the west by Benin Republic, on the north by the 
Republic of Niger, and on the east by the Republic of Cameroun. It stretches roughly for 700 
miles from west to east and 650 miles from south to north, covering an area between 3o and 15oE 
longitude and between 4o and 14oN latitude (Falola and Heaton 2008).  
 Several of the founding fathers of modern Nigeria attest to the forced creation of Nigeria 
and trace much of the nation’s problems especially those concerning ethnic rivalry and political 
instability to this founding. The British assembled the various nation-states to form the artificial 
political entity Nigeria in a piecemeal fashion that completely ignored the historical, cultural, 
political, social and environmental trajectories of these nation-states. This has created distortions 
in Nigeria’s quest for nationhood leading to conclusions that Nigeria is “a mere geographical 
expression”(Awolowo 1947) comprising of “inconsistent cognitive elements” (Ijomah 1988) 
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lacking clear linguistic or behavioral assertions crucial to maintaining unity and stability. Thus, 
several decades after the "amalgamation," inconsistencies in British colonial policy continues to 
reinforce ethnic cleavages that are antagonistic to the development of nationhood. For example, 
while it is easy to create the facade of a state “within some constitutional or unconstitutional 
frameworks" that is acceptable to the international community and foreign governments, "the 
question of nationhood cannot be created by the fiat of men however powerful. A nation must 
evolve from some tortuous natural process of evolution" (Babalola 2001). Even Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa (the first Prime Minister of Nigeria) considered a direct beneficiary of British 
colonial statecraft argued at the 1948 Legislative Council, that: 
Since 1914 the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the 
Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs 
and customs and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite ... Nigerian unity is only 
a British intention for the country (See David-West 2002).  
The British “intention” was purely economic. British economic policy had three main 
motions: to expand commerce through the exportation of raw materials (cash crops and mineral 
resources) and the importation of finished goods, to integrate Nigeria into the global cash 
economy based on the UK currency, and to force Nigerians to work for that currency (Falola and 
Heaton 2008). The British economic policy also required that Nigeria be self-supporting. This 
meant that Britain was not to invest in the economic development of Nigeria. To ensure that its 
interest would remain protected even after independence especially considering the 
overwhelming success of indirect rule in the north, the British designed a political system that 
put the north firmly in control and gave the British unfettered access to Niger Delta resource 
wealth. According to Lord Harcourt the British Colonial Secretary at the time: 
We have released northern Nigeria from the leading strings of the treasury. The promising and 
well-conducted youth of the north is now on an allowance on its own and is about to effect an 
alliance with a southern Lady of means. I have issued the special license and Lord Lugard will 
perform the ceremony. May the union be fruitful and the couple constant (See Sagay 2008: 365).  
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From the onset of this union, the north was to be the dominant, controlling partner and 
groom, and the south, bride. The plan of colonial Britain was to retain political and economic 
control through local northern surrogates who would protect British interests even after political 
independence. This plan along with other mediating factors has produced the near endless schism 
that describes the failing nature of Nigerian federalism. It is no exaggeration to argue that the 
Niger Delta conflict results partly from the deliberate political manipulation of Britain and 
“strike to the very heart of Nigeria’s political future” (Watts, Okonta and Kemedi 2004). In 
essence, “many of the post-independence socio-political and economic formations are a direct 
consequence of the state-building and economic integration process begun under colonial rule” 
(Osaghae 1998: 1). While it may be counter-intuitive to hold the British fully to account (because 
of what Sultan Ahmadu Bello called the “mistake of 1914”) for the Niger Delta crisis, it is 
crucial, given the “deep roots of post-independence structures and processes, as well as 
continuities between colonial and post-colonial formations” (Osaghae 1998: 1) that we establish 
a direct link between British colonial economic policies and the present Niger Delta crisis. At 
least, it is the economic objectives and policies of colonial Britain that ultimately produced a 
Nigerian economy that is wholly dependent on export and lacking in diversity. If we combine 
this with an inherited political structure designed to institute and sustain northern political 
hegemony even in the face of widespread political, economic, and demographic changes, we see 
that the violence in the Niger Delta today is partly an indictment on the colonial and 
post-colonial statecraft of Britain. 
2.4 Modern Nigeria 
 With a population of 152,217,341 people, Nigeria today is Africa’s most populous 
country and the 8th most populous nation in the world. One out of every four Africans is a 
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Nigerian. It consists of a humongous central government with extensive and excessive powers, 
thirty-six federating states (plus the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja) and 774 local government 
areas loosely organized under six amorphous regions: north east, north west, north central, south 
east, south west, and south south. It has over 250 ethnic groups the most dominant being the 
Hausa-Fulani (29%) in the north east and north west, the Yoruba (21%) in the south west, and 
the Igbo (18%) in the south East. A mix of minority ethnic groups with a smattering of Igbo 
populations populates the south south and north central regions. For example, the dominant 
ethnic nationality in the south south is the Ijaw (10%) with a population of about 30 million 
people. The north central region is home to the middle belt minorities: Kanuris, Tivs, Igalas, 
Junkuns, Nupes, Zango-Katafs and Biroms surrounded by Hausa-Fulani populations (CIA 2010). 
 Historically, the main artery of commerce and communication in Nigeria has been the 
River Niger from which Nigeria got her name. The River Niger is the third longest River in 
Africa and flows about 4000 kilometers. It flows from Guinea through Mali, Niger, and Benin 
and enters Nigeria from the north western state of Kebbi. The River Niger empties into the Gulf 
of Guinea through its many branches and tributaries in the Niger Delta region. A second 
important river is the Benue, which is the Niger’s largest tributary and flows 1400 kilometers 
from Cameroon into Nigeria, where it empties into the River Niger. The Niger merges with the 
Benue in the confluence town of Lokoja in the north central region. Other important rivers are 
the Sokoto, Kaduna, and Ethiope (tributaries of the Niger) and Donga, Katsina Ala, Gongola, 
and Ibi. All of these rivers merge into the Yobe River, which flows along Nigeria’s border with 
Niger and empties into Lake Chad.  
The nation-states or nationalities that make up modern-day Nigeria feature diverse 
geographic, cultural, linguistic, and ethno-religious characteristics (Crowder 1978; Onwubiko 
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1982). For example, while the area around the Niger Delta contains dense mangrove swamps, the 
other parts of the south are heavily forested and these forests open up to the hills and plateaus of 
the middle belt in the north central region. Further north are the plains of the savanna, which lead 
to the semi-desert region known as the Sahel (Falola and Heaton 2008). The eastern region 
comprises dense forests and mountains that for decades provided natural protection for the 
inhabitants of the region.  
The climate in Nigeria is arid in the north, tropical in the center, and equatorial in the 
south. Weather variations are determined by the interaction of moist southwest monsoon and dry 
northeast winds. Mean maximum temperatures are 30O C-32O C in the south and 33O C-35O C in 
the north. High humidity is present in the south from February to November and from June to 
September in the north. Low humidity coincides with the dry season. There are two main seasons 
in Nigeria: the wet season, which lasts from February to November (June to September in the 
north), and the dry season, which lasts from December to January (October to May in the north). 
During the dry season, rainfall is very high in the south ranging from 2000 millimeters in coastal 
zone and 3550 millimeters in the Niger Delta. Rainfall is very light in the north (ranging from 
500 to 750 millimeters) and temperatures are very high, usually in the 90’s and 100’s. The dry 
season begins with the strong cool wind that blows from the Sahara called the “harmattan.” 
Although the harmattan brings relief from the heat, it also brings particles of sand, which causes 
blindness and increases the desertification of the northern savannas (Falola and Heaton 2008).  
 Nigeria is home to a wild array of natural resources some of which have made Nigeria 
famous. Such mineral wealth as crude oil, natural gas, coal, tin, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc, 
silver, gold, and diamonds dot its landscape. However, it is her oil deposits found in small fields 
in the Niger Delta that have made Nigeria both famous and ignominious. Nigeria has proven oil 
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reserves of 36.2 billion barrels and proven natural gas reserves estimated at 182 trillion cubic. 
From the early 1970s, oil has become the single most important cash commodity in Nigeria 
replacing agricultural cash crops like cotton, groundnut and cocoa as the dominant cash earner 
for Nigeria. Today, sale of crude oil constitutes over 90 percent of Nigeria’s export earnings and 
80 percent of domestic revenue (Osaghae 1998; Watts 2009). Dependence on crude oil as the 
main revenue source has contributed immensely to Nigeria’s economic and political instability 
since crude oil is susceptible to the vagaries and fluctuations of world petroleum prices. Also, the 
plunder of oil wealth by local and national leaders have crippled the nation, led to structural 
underdevelopment, and impoverished the vast majority of the population 70 percent of which 
live below poverty lines (Okonofua and Ugaigbe 2004). The lootability of oil has facilitated the 
rise of new billionaire politicians who use their stolen wealth to facilitate entry into politics and 
to perpetuate themselves in power. It has also facilitated the rise of local warlords and chieftains 
who prey on oil and its associated products and challenge the authority of the state and its 
instruments of coercion. The conflict in the Niger Delta results partly from the schisms between 
these groups. 
 Nigeria’s population is very diverse. It consists of over 250 ethno-linguistic groups 
speaking over 400 languages. Because of its ethnic diversity and abundant cultural and religious 
forms, Nigeria is often the theater of violent inter-ethnic and inter-religious confrontations. As 
Ijomah (1988) observes, the British in creating Nigeria focused more on the economic potentials 
of the new state and less on the cultural, spiritual, political, social, and economic needs of the 
people. Very little attention was paid to the almost irreconcilable cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and 
religious differences among the various nation-states that make up present day Nigeria. As a 
result, otherwise minor skirmishes and misunderstandings have blown out of proportion and 
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resulted in violent confrontations that have produced countless deaths, social displacements and 
destruction of properties. 
 For example, Nigeria’s religious population is split between Islam (50%), Christianity 
(40%), and indigenous beliefs (10%). This religious configuration has frequently resulted in 
violent confrontations perpetuated by religious extremists and fanatics especially in the Muslim 
dominated north. Since independence, there have been over 20 cases of severe ethno-religious 
conflicts resulting in over 100,000 deaths, the displacement of millions of people, and the 
destruction of property worth billions of naira. The most horrific of these ethno-religious 
conflicts were those involving the Maitatsine, which started in 1980 in Kano and spread through 
five northern states, eventually ending in 1985. The Maitatsine was a Muslim extremist sect led 
by Mohammed Marwa an immigrant from Cameroun, which went on rampage killing Christians 
in several northern cities. It began in Kano in 1980 and in only several days of fighting resulted 
in the deaths of 4,177 people in Kano alone before spreading to other northern states including 
Kaduna (Zaria), Bornu (Maiduguri and Bukumkutu), Gongola (Jimeta, Dobeli, Zango, Yelwa, 
Va’atita, Rumde, and Nassarawa), and Bauchi (Pantami). By the time it ended in 1985, over 30 
thousand people (mostly Christians) had been killed and property valued at billions of naira 
destroyed. The killings also forced the migration of many Igbo Christians based in the north who 
were the principal targets of the anarchists. Within the last five years, another Islamic 
fundamentalist group “Boko Haram” (meaning no to western education) have ravaged the north 
killing over 10,000 people and displacing thousands.  
 Young people perpetrate most of the ethno-religious killings in Nigeria. The population 
of Nigeria is overwhelmingly youthful. The 2005 provisional census estimated that 64.7 million 
of Nigeria’s 140 million people were under the age of 24, while only 2.9 percent were over 65 
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years. This is not surprising since the average life expectancy has been decreasing now estimated 
at 47 years (CIA 2010) mainly due to poverty, malnutrition, inadequate health care, pollution, 
and the spread of communicable disease including HIV/AIDS. Still, the average population 
growth rate is 1.9 percent, meaning that the ratio of young to middle age and older persons 
continue to rise. While this is a good sign, at least, in terms of the size of the nation’s working 
population and for development, Nigeria has historically been unable to utilize its abundant 
human capital for socio-economic and political transformation. In fact, the problem with Nigeria 
is most noticeable in the arena of politics where successive governments have used the youths as 
weapons of destruction against perceived opponents or for distorting the electoral process 
through rigging, ballot box stuffing, vote snatching, and thuggery. 
 Politically, Nigeria is organized under a federal structure. At independence, the 
nationalist leaders that won independence (Sultan Ahmadu Bello, Tafawa Balewa, Obafemi 
Awolowo, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Anthony Enahoro, Mbonu Ojike, etc) opted to maintain the existing 
colonial parameters, consisting of three regions: north, east, and west, each with a premier and a 
prime minister at the center in Lagos. Following agitations by ethnic minorities for the creation 
of a new region to accommodate their interests and to speed up the development of their 
communities, a fourth region – the mid-western region – was created in 1964. In 1967, General 
Yakubu Gowon (the head of state at the time) in order to resolve the heightened fear of military 
coups and ethnic restlessness and to checkmate the Biafran secession threat, decided to create 
twelve states out of the existing four regions. The new states were: North-Western State 
(comprising Sokoto and Niger Provinces), North-Central State (comprising Katsina and Zaria 
Provinces), Kano State (comprising Kano Province), North-eastern State (comprising Bornu, 
Adamawa, Sardauna, and Bauchi Provinces), Benue/Plateau State (comprising Benue and 
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Plateau provinces), Lagos State (comprising the Colony Province and the Federal Territory of 
Lagos), Western State (comprising the existing Western Region but excluding the Colony 
Province), Mid-Western State (comprising the Mid-Western State), East-Central State 
(comprising the existing eastern Region but excluding Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers Provinces), 
South-Eastern State (comprising Calabar and Ogoja Provinces), and Rivers State (comprising 
Ahoada, Brass, Degema, Ogoni, and Port Harcourt Divisions).  
 In 1976, following more ethnic agitations for the creation of states, more states were 
created by governmental fiat, increasing the number of states to 19 (Anambra, Bendel, Bauchi, 
Benue, Bornu, Cross River, Gongola, Imo, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Lagos, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, 
Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, and Sokoto states). Still more agitations led to the creation of two 
additional states in 1987 (Akwa Ibom from the existing Cross River state and  Katsina from the 
existing Kaduna state). In 1991, 12 more states were created out of the existing 21 state structure. 
The new states were: Abia (carved out of Imo state), Adamawa (created from Gongola state), 
Akwa Ibom (carved out of Cross River State), Delta (created out of Bendel state), Edo (created 
out of Bendel state), Enugu (carved out of Anambra state), Jigawa (carved out of Kano state), 
Kebbi (carved out of Sokoto state), Kogi (carved out of Kwara state), Osun (carved out of Oyo 
state), Taraba (created from Gongola state), and Yobe (carved of Borno state). In addition, the 
federal capital Territory was moved from Lagos to Abuja. Finally, in 1996, five more states were 
created including Bayelsa (carved out of Rivers state), Ebonyi (carved out of Abia and Enugu 
states), Ekiti (carved out of Ondo state), Gombe (carved out of Bauchi state), Nassarawa (carved 
out of Plateau state), and Zamfara (carved out of Sokoto state).  
 The politics of state creation in Nigeria is without doubt the politics of ethnicity. Ethnic 
consciousness continues to play a major role in the political process and in the distribution of 
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political positions, patronages, and rewards. Because of this consciousness, a federal character 
system, which attempts to balance power, opportunities, and rewards across the complex 
geo-political divide has been in place for a long time and has pushed merit to the background. 
Today, the federal character arrangement exists in virtually every aspect of Nigerian life 
including education where students from particular regions are expected to score higher than 
students in other regions to assure of places in the universities. States in northern Nigeria are 
traditionally designated educationally disadvantaged states while many in the south are 
considered educationally advantaged. Also, in politics, a zoning formula was put in place to 
ensure that power (at the center) rotated among the six geo-political regions. The politics of 
zoning is an attempt to resolve longstanding political injustice foisted by a British colonial 
system that took advantage of Nigeria’s ethnic diversity to impose northern rule on the rest of 
Nigeria. This imposition was achieved through the manipulation of census results. 
After reconstructing the geopolitical map of Nigeria, the British proceeded to conduct a 
series of censuses, which were deliberately rigged in favor of the north (Sagay 2008). For 
example, the first ever Nigeria-wide census, which was conducted in 1931, was rigged to give 
the north numerical advantage over the south. Out of a population of 19,930,000 the north was 
awarded 11,434,000, the west at 3,855,000, and the east at 4,641,000., with a plurality of 
2,938,000 people in favor of the north (Sagay 2008). Thus, from the very beginning, a permanent 
majority in population, which was intended to translate into a permanent majority in the future 
federal legislature and consequently a permanent control of power, was programmed for the 
Hausa-Fulani political elite. On the basis of this figure, the north during the 1950 National 
Conference, demanded for at least half the seats in the central legislature as a condition for 
remaining a part of Nigeria. Consequently, according to Sagay, in 1951 the colonial officials 
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distributed seats in the central legislature thus: north – 68 seats, west – 34 seats, and east – 34 
seats. 
In the 1952 census, the scenario of the 1931 census was repeated. This time, the increase 
of population in the twenty-one years between 1931 and 1952, was so carefully and masterfully 
doctored, that the birth and death rates in the three regions were virtually the same, and the 
difference in population between north and south remained very identical to the 1931 figure. 
Thus, out of total population of 31,540,000 the north had 16,540,000, the west 6,369,000, and the 
east 7,971,000. Again, the north had an advantage of 2,500.000 people. With these results, seats 
where distributed that made it possible for the north to gain political control. Even if the west and 
east (collectively known as the south) had polled resources together to challenge the north, they 
would have failed. For example, in the last nation-wide elections before independence, Sir James 
Robertson, the Governor-General, recognizing the strategy they had so carefully worked out, 
invited Sir Tafawa Balewa of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) to form the new 
government even though the counting of votes had only just begun. When the final results were 
announced, the NPC did not have a simple majority in the House of Representatives. It was clear 
from the results that the Nnamdi Azikiwe led National Council of Nigerian Citizens (From the 
east) with 89 seats could have successfully formed a coalition government with the Obafemi 
Awolowo led Action Group (from the west) with 73 seats and put the NPC with (134 seats) in 
the opposition. Professor Omo-Omoruyi explains the preemptive action of Sir James Robertson, 
thus:  
Sir James Robertson was a shrewd implementer of the northern rule earlier fashioned by Lords 
Harcourt and Lugard. Sir James was especially recruited by the British government in 1955 
because of his experience in Sudan with an identical situation to Nigeria’s. He is on record as 
confessing that he did not handle this phase to the satisfaction of Dr Azikiwe and Chief Awolowo. 
Sir James confessed that he invited Balewa to form the government in 1959 by persuading some 
of the southern members to support him and after Sir Abubakar had assured him that he will get a 
southern group to work with him. Sir James did this before the results were announced. He 
confessed that he did this to appease the Sardauna of Sokoto, the leader of the NPC, to stop him 
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from taking the north out of Nigeria (Omoruyi 1999: 25).  
The story of the 1963 census (the first after independence) was not different. The north, 
imitating their British allies, expertly doctored the figures to achieve pre-determined results 
(Sagay 2008). The eastern region particularly challenged the result with such venom that the 
country dangled dangerously on the precipice of anarchy. The unjust manipulation of the census 
to facilitate permanent northern political control was part of the grievances of the east in their 
ill-fated attempt to pull out of Nigeria through the creation of the Republic of Biafra. As a result 
of their declaration (of cessation), a bloody civil war was fought from 1967 to 1970, which 
resulted in the death of over 1 million easterners and the total destruction of all infrastructures in 
eastern Nigeria. At the end of the war in 1970, the east was brought back under direct political 
control and supervision of the north, and permanently shut out of the Nigerian presidency. 
The 1991 provisional census was also condensed to maintain the carefully designed 
colonial program. Out of a total estimated population of 88,504,477, the north was awarded 
47,261,962 and the south 41,242,512 (National Population Commission, 1991), thereby 
maintaining the colonial margin. According to Sagay:  
The most absurd aspect of the announced figures is the attempt to equate Kano State with Lagos 
State.  While Lagos is given a figure of 5,655,751, Kano, in order to match that, is given a figure 
of 5,632,040.  Any honest observer knows that the Lagos population cannot be anything less than 
15 million.  But by the legacy of colonial manipulation, the most populous state in the south must 
not be allowed to have larger population than the most populous state in the north.  That is not 
all, having kept the population of Lagos state down to just over 5 million, the state is allocated 
only 20 local governments whilst Kano and Jigawa states (officially with a combined population 
slightly less than Lagos), are allocated a total of 71 local government councils.  Again, while 
Lagos State has only 24 members in the House of Representatives, Kano and Jigawa (with a 
smaller combined population), have a total of 35 seats (Sagay 2008). 
It follows logically, therefore, that no bill can pass through the House without the concurrence of 
the northern states, even though bills will sail through smoothly even if the whole southern 
representatives oppose them. Sagay concludes that the implication of this is that “the south is the 
object of internal colonialism; that the British merely handed over colonial authority to the 
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Arewa north, and the Arewa north is determined to sustain this colonial relationship with the 
south indefinitely.” 
 Sagay is on point especially when we consider the confessions of Donald Duke, a former 
two-time governor of Cross River state. Speaking before an audience of pro-democracy activists, 
Duke admitted that the 2006 census was rigged. According to Duke (2010): 
When we conducted the census in 2006 or so, the raw figures said we were over two hundred 
million; when they went and processed the figures it came down to 140 million. When you look at 
those figures and compare to those we had in 1991 at a growth rate of 2.1 or something like that, it 
is really just an extrapolation, because we were too embarrassed to admit our true numbers. 
The question is why did the government tamper with the results? If the government could reduce 
the census figure unilaterally by about 60 million people to achieve some untoward purpose, 
could it also have inflated figures for particular communities, states, and regions? Also, how is 
economic policy made in Nigeria? Is it conceivable that those who design our economic, health, 
education, and transportation policies act on purely speculative information? What other 
information about Nigeria and its people are based on this type of fiction? The questions are 
endless. 
 We cannot discuss modern Nigeria or its series of political transformations without 
discussing the role played by the military. Today, Nigeria is in its Fifth Republic and is 
experiencing the longest uninterrupted period of civilian rule in its history. For most of Nigeria’s 
history, the military has been in power. The Nigerian military through history has been 
influenced by two Key variables. The first is the colonial roots of the military, which has had 
tremendous impact on the way the military perceived, or used to perceive, its role, types of issues 
around which defense policy should be structured and its strategic and tactical doctrines. The 
second variable is based on the requirement of law enforcement and territorial defense. These 
two variables made the Nigerian armed forces militaristic in orientation and design as an 
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instrument of control rather than an institution for the development of society. 
 Since 1970 (the end of the Nigerian civil war which was fought between forces loyal to 
the Biafran leader Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu and the federal forces 
led by Colonel Yakubu Gowon, the Head of State and Commander in Chief of the Nigerian 
Armed Forces) all significant political power has been concentrated in Nigeria’s military. 
Following the first coup, which brought General Aguiyi-Ironsi to power in 1966, various 
configurations of military governments have controlled the political destiny of Nigeria. Between 
1966 and 1975, power was concentrated in the Federal Military Government headed by Yakubu 
Gowon (a Christian northerner) whose position as chairman of the Supreme Military Council 
was unassailable. Gowon’s regime was criticized principally for corruption which had become 
widespread, and for inefficiency (which saw the government squandering an oil boom) and for 
growing criminality among the population. Gowon was eventually toppled in a bloodless 
military coup in July 1975 and replaced by Brigadier Murtala Ramat Muhammed, a Muslim 
northerner. Muhammed’s regime was short-lived despite the promise he showed early when he 
was assassinated following an unsuccessful military coup in February 1976. 
 Muhammed was succeeded by a reluctant Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo, a 
southern Christian of Yoruba extraction, who pledged to hand over power to civilians in 1979. 
Obasanjo kept Muhammed’s structure and continued with his reform agenda. In 1979, Obasanjo 
approved a new constitution for Nigeria, which was modeled after the constitution of the United 
States. The constitution provided for a separation of powers among the executive, legislative and 
judicial branches. Thereafter, he presided over the conduct of an election the results of which 
were hotly challenged but which ushered in the Second Republic led by President Shehu Shagari 
a northern Muslim from Sokoto state. Obasanjo also began the plan to move the federal capital 
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(and seat of government) from Lagos to Abuja. 
 The Second Republic was short-lived. In December 1983, the military led by General 
Muhammadu Buhari a northern Muslim, overthrew the civilian regime of Shehu Shagari. The 
principal reason given by the military for the coup was Shagari’s profligacy and the dwindling 
oil fortunes. The military promised several reforms including the reduction of corruption in 
government, a drastic trimming of the federal budget, and “war against indiscipline.” The 
government emphasized hard work, discipline, patriotism, and environmental hygiene. While 
these appeared to be lofty programs, the gains were slow in coming and Buhari’s regime was 
eventually toppled in what many consider a palace coup in August 1985. 
 General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida a northern Muslim headed the new regime. 
Babangida’s regime faced stiff opposition from the military and civil society groups notably the 
National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) and the labor movement. Under Babangida, 
Nigeria’s economic recession appeared to worsen. To address this, Babangida introduced the 
Structural Adjustment Program, which obtained about $4.2 billion in support from the World 
Bank and the IMF and the rescheduling of its foreign debts. These supports were conditioned to 
a series of currency devaluations and trade liberalization. The results of the SAP were declining 
productivity, a decline in real income, rising unemployment, increasing levels of poverty, and 
increases in crime. Apart from these, Babangida presided over a transition program that was 
considered one of the longest in Africa. From 1985 until 1993 when he left office, Babangida 
promised a series of political reforms that would culminate in the handover of political power to 
civilians. Critics insisted that Babangida had no desire to handover and labeled him a “fox” or a 
“Maradona” who was playing soccer with the Nigerian people. An evidence for this charge was 
the 1992 presidential elections that he organized and which was ostensibly won by Bashorun 
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Moshood Kashimawo Olalekan Abiola but was annulled by Babangida for no good reason. 
Babangida was eventually forced to “step aside” in 1993 by a coalition of local and international 
coalition groups. He handed over power to an Interim National Government led by Chief Ernest 
Shonekan, a southern Christian. 
 In November 1993, General Sani Abacha who remained in office till his death in 1998 
toppled the Interim National Government. During his time in power, General Abacha suppressed 
dissent, orchestrated phantom coups (in order to jail or kill opponents) and perpetrated countless 
human rights violations that resulted in the imposition of stiff economic and social sanctions on 
Nigeria. Abacha also presided over a transition program that saw the registration of five political 
parties all of which adopted Abacha as their sole presidential candidate. Under Abacha, 
amorphous groups such as the Youths Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA) dotted the political 
landscape and benefitted immensely from Abacha’s largesse. Corruption was also taken to whole 
new levels such that following Abacha’s death in 1998 he was believed to have siphoned over 
US $10 billion into foreign accounts. Upon Abacha’s death, General Abdulsalam Abubakar a 
northern Muslim and next in command to Abacha took over control of government and 
immediately commenced a transition to civilian rule. To actualize that process, he released all of 
the political leaders incarcerated by General Abacha including General Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd) 
but not before the death of Bashorun M.K.O. Abiola and retired General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua 
in custody. General Obasanjo eventually won the presidential elections and was sworn-in in 
April 2007. He remained in office till April 2007 and was succeeded by Alhaji Umaru Musa 
Yar’Adua (younger brother to the late General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua) who died in office in 
2009.  
 It stands to reason, therefore, that much of the political fissures in Nigeria today results 
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from the structural foundation of Nigeria and particularly from a British colonial legacy of ethnic 
manipulation, and economic and cultural exploitation. This foundation of deliberate distortion 
and manipulation without regards to the cultural, social, political, and economic trajectories of 
the various nationalities in the Nigerian project continues to haunt development in Nigeria. When 
these conditions mesh with a culture of corruption, fiscal indiscipline and recklessness, and over 
dependence on crude oil as the nation’s only economic activity with its own extractive and 
distributive logic, we have a disaster waiting to happen. 
2.5 The Niger Delta People and Environment  
The Niger Delta is the territory that lies between the estuaries of the Benin River to the 
West and the Cross River to the East of the River Niger. It covers a distance of about 270 miles 
along the Atlantic Coast and stretches for about 120 miles inland. The region is described as the 
largest wetland in Africa and the second largest in the world after the Mississippi (Nseabasi 
2005; Saliu et al 2007). It is criss-crossed by an intricate watery maze of marshlands, 
labyrinthine creeks, tributaries, and lagoons, which link together the main rivers: Forcados, Nun, 
Benin, Brass, Bonny (all estuaries of the River Niger), Kwa-Ibo, the Cross and other separate 
streams. The region is inhabited by numerous ethnic nationalities such as the Ijaw, Urhobo, 
Isoko, Itsekiri, Ogoni, Igbo, Kwale, Kalabari, Ikwerre, Okrika, Ibani, Ekpeye, Gokana, Eleme, 
Ndoni, Abua, Ogoni, Odual, Edo, etc (Okonta and Douglas 2003) and comprises the six littoral 
states of Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers (Saliu et al 2007). The highly 
diverse nature of the Niger Delta makes it prone to inter-ethnic hostilities and violence. For 
example, there has been a long-running battle between Ijaws and Itsekiris and between Itsekiris 
and Urhobos in Warri, which has resulted in countless deaths and destruction of properties 
estimated at billions of naira. The region is also home to a wide array of animal and aquatic life, 
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giant ferns and towering mangrove plants and its creeks and swamps lie atop one of the biggest 
reserves of crude oil in the world, currently estimated at 34 billion barrels (Time magazine 
2006).  
The Niger Delta topography poses enormous "first nature" geographic challenges and 
provides a difficult geographical context for its development. These challenges present 
governments, communities, and businesses (including the oil conglomerates) with a range of 
"second nature" challenges in regards to infrastructure, service delivery, and economic 
development (Higgins 2009). However, these first and second nature challenges are not the only 
challenges hampering poverty reduction and development in the Niger Delta. Other forces 
including pollution, political instability, ethnicity, and corruption feature prominently in the 
Niger Delta problematic and until an approach that takes in this context is adopted, peace may 
continue to elude the region. 
 Despite these challenges, the discovery of crude oil in the late 1950s has transformed 
the Niger-Delta region from a primarily fishing and agrarian economy into a complex web of 
economic and industrial activities of unimaginable proportions. Overnight, the serene and 
peaceful creeks and swamps were turned into a convoluted sprawling mass of industrial waste, 
noise, pollution, overpopulation, exploitation, poverty, deprivation, and squalor. Yet, out of this 
utter mess, flow out millions and millions of barrels per day of the world’s most sought after 
natural resource – crude oil. Oil production from the region is the major source of revenue for the 
Nigerian government and has put the Nigerian state at a strategic position in the global 
calculations of industrial states and their multinational oil corporations (Saliu et al 2007). 
Paradoxically, the region that bears these riches is also home to some of Africa’s poorest peoples 
(existing on less than $1 a day), and is the theatre of the continent’s worst environmental 
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destruction (Okonta and Douglas 2003; Time magazine 2006). This is why Agbu (2005:81) 
argues that “Nigeria’s Niger Delta and its human travails are indeed one where what may be 
regarded as potential ‘paradise on earth’ has turned to ‘hell on earth’ for the peoples of the area 
as a result of cumulative practice of environmental degradation caused by oil exploration.” 
Osuoka (2003) and Saliu et al (2007) argue that the indiscriminate manner and lack of 
concern for the environment with which oil is mined and exported and its revenue appropriated 
has disrupted the fragile ecology of the Niger Delta leaving it desolate and decrepit. According to 
Osuoka (2003), all stages of oil activity from exploration and drilling to transportation, result in 
the destruction of the natural environment and the livelihood of the local inhabitants who depend 
on the land and creeks of the Delta for their survival. When these are combined with the 
perennial problems of oil spill and blowouts resulting from the use of outdated and ill-maintained 
facilities and equipment, the ecological disaster in the region becomes the worst in the world 
(ICG 2006) and this has accelerated the deterioration of the socio-economic and health 
conditions of peoples of the region. As Bassey (2009) observes, one consequence of the mindless 
exploitation of oil in the Niger Delta is that the people already impoverished by the economics 
and politics of oil exploitation continue to subsidize the costs of crude oil and augment the 
profits of the oil majors through the personal and collective losses they suffer in environmental 
services, quality of life, and environmental degradation.  
Higgins (2009) reports that disaggregated human development indicators paints a dismal 
picture for the Niger Delta. For example, energy availability is low despite the fact that the Niger 
Delta provides the United States with one fifth of its energy needs (UNDP 2006). Bayelsa state 
which is the second largest oil producing state in the Niger Delta (behind Rivers state) is not 
linked to the national power grid. Also, while the Niger Delta hosts a large number of freshwater 
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distributaries and vast groundwater reserves, no part of the Niger Delta boasts regular supply of 
portable water (UNDP 2006). More damning is the health care condition of the Niger Delta. The 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is among the highest in Nigeria. In fact, some health indicators for the 
region are below the national average (Higgins 2009) including higher than average infant 
mortality and post-neonatal mortality rates (UNDP 2006). According to Higgins (2009), the 
Niger Delta also performs very poorly in terms of health treatment. For example, only 25.1% of 
children with acute respiratory infections and fever sought medical attention from health 
providers, compared with 49.5% in the north central region and 52.6% in the south west region. 
Also, in a 2003 NDHS survey, 34.8% of indigenes reported that the distance between their 
residence and health facilities was a major problem and this was the largest proportion for the 
nation. Similarly, 47.1% of Niger Delta women surveyed reported poverty or lack of money as 
the major barrier they face in accessing healthcare and this was the highest regional figure, which 
was also much higher than the national average of 30.4% (UNDP 2006). 
The implication of this is that the over four decades of consistent oil production in the 
region has brought enormous wealth and influence to Nigeria and its leaders at the same time 
that it has pauperized the local inhabitants and compromised their health. Perhaps, it is for this 
reason that Ken Saro-Wiwa (1992:42), the Ogoni playwright and activist (judicially murdered by 
the Gen. Abacha military junta for his resistance to oil production) describes oil production in the 
Niger Delta as: 
An ecological war in which no blood is (apparently) spilled, no bones are broken, no one is 
(assumedly) maimed, so few are alarmed but men, women and children die, flora, fauna and fish 
perish, air, soil and water are poisoned; and finally, the land and its inhabitants die. 
 
Saro-Wiwa was only half correct. The Niger Delta war has witnessed a tremendous amount of 
bloodshed. 
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2.6 Oil Dependency  
The socio-economic and political fissures created by the British exist to this day and 
continue to prevent the development of a strong national identity for Nigerians. Today, despite 
50 years of nationhood, Nigerians either continue to see themselves as different nations: Edos, 
Kanuris, Hausas, Igbos, Yorubas, Niger Deltans; or bound exclusively by religion: Christians or 
Muslims. These divisions have become sharper following the increasing violence in the Niger 
Delta region, which parallels increasing religious extremism and sectarian violence in northern 
Nigeria. The violence in the Niger Delta has slowed down what has been a rapid expansion of 
the petroleum industry. 
Located almost exclusively in the Niger Delta, petroleum has become Nigeria’s economic 
mainstay and chief export earner (Okonta and Douglas 2003; Osaghae 1998). Instead of 
contributing to the overall development of the country and to improved living conditions for its 
citizens, oil wealth is distributed unevenly in a manner that benefits only those with access to 
state power and therefore, to the licenses, contracts, and revenues accruing to the government 
from the petroleum sector (Falola and Heaton 2008). Also, oil wealth is used exclusively to build 
sophisticated infrastructures in the nation’s capital (Abuja) and many other cities across the 
nation, while the Niger Delta region from where the wealth is derived is neglected and its people 
economically, socially, culturally, and politically marginalized. The result of this is the growing 
dissonance between government and the Niger Delta people; a disconnection that has severely 
weakened the collective conscience or the moral fiber and structural regulatory capacities of the 
state. This has created a mass society of extreme discontentment, extreme disillusionment, and 
collective regional despair. Seen in this way, we could argue that the Niger Delta violence was a 
disaster waiting to happen. 
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Commercial quantities of oil was first discovered in Oloibiri, a small rural community in 
the heart of present day Bayelsa state in 1956 by Shell-BP Development Company (a joint 
venture of Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum) (Okonta and Douglas 2003; Osaghae 1998). 
Two years later, commercial drilling began and since then hundreds of wells have been 
exploited. As more wells were discovered, crude oil excavation increasingly became the nation’s 
primary export commodity, replacing cocoa, groundnut, cotton, palm oil, and rubber (Osaghae 
1998). By the 1970’s crude oil production had grown exponentially as did the revenue generated 
from it. For example, in 1958 (the first year of commercial production), revenue from crude oil 
was a paltry N200, 000. By 1970, revenue from crude had reached N166 million and in 1976, 
Nigeria made N5.3 billion from crude oil sale.  
The growth of the petroleum sector was occasioned by a global scarcity of petroleum 
products, which forced prices up. In 1973, for example, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (Nigeria became a member in 1970) embargoed western countries over their support 
for Israel in the Yom Kippur War. This created extreme scarcity and pushed the price for a barrel 
of crude oil from $3.80 in October 1973 to $14.70 by January 1974 (Falola and Heaton 2008). 
By 1981, the price per barrel of crude had reached an all-time high of US$38.77 and it has been 
increasing since then. Today, Nigeria is rated the fifth largest exporter of crude oil within the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries(Osaghae 1998) producing an average 2.2 million 
bpd and constituting nearly 40 percent of Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product, over 80 percent of 
annual revenue and 95 percent of Nigeria’s foreign earnings (Osaghae 1998; Agbu 2005).  
Corresponding to increases in oil revenue was an increase in the nation’s dependence on 
oil revenue. Petroleum revenue was so constant and relatively easy to derive, that it was 
convenient for government to condition itself exclusively on it. Subsequently, the government 
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increasingly divested itself from exploiting and developing other revenue streams. Even 
traditional mechanisms for generating revenue such as taxation and customs duties were 
neglected and these became exclusive cash cows for corrupt government officials who milked 
them for personal gain. Similarly, agriculture, which was the most dominant economic activity in 
Nigeria prior to the discovery of oil, was neglected and overnight; Nigeria became a state 
dependent upon a single natural source. For example, between 1975 and 1978, the total area 
under cultivation fell from 18.8 million to 11.05 million hectares at the same time that food 
imports rose from US$353.7 million to over US$1 billion (Osaghae, 1998). According to 
Osaghae (1998:97) “the neglect was so serious that oil palm, rubber, groundnut, for which 
Nigeria was once among the world’s leading producers, were being imported to offset local 
shortfalls.” Other sectors that were necessary to stabilize and balance the economy were 
similarly neglected. Manufacturing, which in 1970 accounted for 9.4 percent of GDP fell to 7.0 
percent in 1974 and has been decreasing since. The net result of the dependence on oil was that 
the Nigerian economy became increasingly vulnerable to the “fluctuations and shocks of the 
world market” (Osaghae 1998).  
Mirroring the decline in agricultural and manufacturing activities is the standard of 
living, which has since the late 1970s taken a nose dive following the implementation of the 
recommendations of the 1970 Dina Commission. The commission was set up by the Gen. 
Gowon military administration shortly after the three year Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), to 
among other things review the existing system of administration and make recommendations on 
how to make it better and more acceptable. Its report rejected the historical approach to revenue 
allocation as a constitutional exercise and recommended that it be established as an instrument of 
development planning and national integration. This recommendation sought to establish the 
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centrality of the federal government by giving it control over disbursements of the expanded 
Distributable Pool Account (DPA) and all principal tax receipts and major share of royalties 
from oil. In terms of oil revenue, for example, a distinction was made between onshore and 
offshore oil, dealing a fatal blow to the oil producing states and communities. This meant that 
these states and communities were to be excluded from any share in offshore royalties (the 
federal government was to retain 60 percent, DPA 30 percent, and 10 percent to a special 
contingency account), and were to receive 40 percent less than previously for onshore royalties 
under the principle of derivation (Osaghae 1998). In essence, the proportion of oil revenues 
allocated on a derivation basis “declined from 50 percent of mining rents and royalties in 1969, 
through 2 percent of the Federation Account in 1981, to only 1 percent of mineral revenues in the 
account during the period from 1989 to 1999” (Suberu 2001).  
Because federal might had burgeoned following the oil boom and the Dina commission 
report, the government began to spend heavily on defense and prestige projects to the 
disadvantage of agriculture, housing, manufacturing, water resources, and energy, which had 
direct bearing on the people’s standard of living. For example, defense expenditure rose rapidly 
from 1972 and hit the N1 billion mark for the first time in 1975 (Adekanye 1981). Also, Nigeria 
became Africa’s big brother and gave aid to the following countries for different purposes: 
Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and Mozambique at independence; Mali, 
Senegal, Upper Volta or Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and 
Somalia for drought and natural disasters; and Niger, Zambia, Sudan, Sao Tome and Principe for 
undisclosed purposes (Akinyemi 1979). The total estimated expenditure for the country rose 
from N2 billion in the second National Development Plan (1970-1974) to N43 billion in the third 
national Development Plan (1975-1980). Because the boom was expected to continue in the 
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1980s, the planners of the third national Development Plan footnoted that “finance is unlikely to 
be a major problem during the third national development plan period” (Osaghae 1998).  
While the new structure expanded the federal government’s influence as the sole 
allocative and distributive authority, it heightened concern over the expanding federal 
government role. More importantly, the new structure grossly undermined the oil producing 
communities and paid inadequate attention to problems like pollution and widespread ecological 
damage that destroyed the productive capacities of the Niger Delta peasant and their forced 
conversion to unskilled migrant workers. The new structure was seen by members of 
oil-producing communities as a deliberate policy to oppress minorities since the principle of 
population (which favored the ethnic majorities) took precedence over that of derivation. This 
perceived injustice, which has produced a mass society of impoverished, critically sick, 
unskilled, disenfranchised and powerless people and communities (USAID 2006), is cited by 
militants as one of the primary reasons they are up in arms against the forces of the state and the 
multinational oil companies.  
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Chapter Three: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
    
[There] is in our land, at the moment, what can well [be] described 
   as a whirlwind of violence and which to everyone's  
   discontent is furious, intractable and insuperable. You  
   only need to read the newspapers to confirm how true this is. 
   The headlines have become scary, the top stories have 
   become unrelentingly morbid and stupefying. What we are 
   reminded of as we read such details are intimations of our 
   mortality, how life have become so difficult, and  
   although the events are reported as someone else's  
   experience, the fingers point alarmingly towards us. 
         Rueben Abati (1996) 
3.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the dynamics of the Niger Delta conflict including its causes and 
consequences as well as the DDR intervention. The review addresses two broad constellations of 
causes: domestic and international. While the review of domestic forces systematically links the 
conflict to political, economic, and environmental conditions most notably federalism, ethnicity, 
political instability, corruption, and ecological damage, the review of international forces pay 
close attention to global racism and its linkage to petrol capitalism - an increasingly vicious form 
of global capitalism. Together, these forces have provided the needed veneer for the expression 
of violence and have immense systematic effects on the conflict risk. Along this line, the review 
details the trajectories of the conflict especially its manifestations and the roles various forces 
including the state, oil conglomerates, local communities, community elders and youths play in 
the conflict. It also focuses on the genderization of the conflict especially dichotomizing between 
female and male roles in the conflict. Finally, the review examines the environment of DDR 
peacebuilding, detailing its processes, challenges, and prospects. 
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3.1 Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict 
 The violence in the Niger Delta results from two major forces: domestic and 
international. Without doubt, domestic forces have played and continue to play a major role in 
the Niger Delta violence. In fact, most of the intellectual accounts of the Niger Delta violence 
focus on the relationship between the violence and these domestic forces including 
federalism/constitutionalism, political instability, corruption, resource predation, resource 
control, pollution, poverty, ethnicity and ancient hatreds, and political and social marginalization. 
I will discuss these in some detail, shortly. However, it is important to note that these are not the 
only causes of the Niger Delta violence. For that matter, the contributions of domestic forces to 
the violence is tangential to the more invidious role played by international forces – specifically 
the system of global racism that is the chemical power that drives petro-capitalism and fuels the 
“petrol-insurgency” in the Niger Delta. I will discuss these international forces within 
community contexts where their influence was primarily felt especially in the oil fields of the 
Niger Delta. I will also use the opportunity to begin introducing some of the important concepts 
that are pivotal to our understanding of the Niger Delta conflict context. 
3.2 Domestic Forces and the Development of the Niger Delta Conflict 
A broad array of domestic forces has been blamed for the Niger Delta violence. Domestic 
forces suggest interplay of local conditions, experiences, processes, and relationships that have 
fueled widespread frustrations, resentment, anger and violence. I will briefly focus on these 
forces, at least to show that the violence manifesting in the swamps and creeks of the Niger Delta 
today, are not occurring by happenstance. Instead, like a house is built brick upon brick, the 
violence have been building up for several decades. 
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Economic Exploitation and Exclusion 
 Scholars (Offiong 1980; Ikein 1990; Olorode 1998; Iyayi 2000; Okonta 2000; Okonta 
and Douglas 2003; Ukeje 2001; Watts 2009) have argued that decades of oil exploitation in the 
Niger Delta has transformed Nigeria's political economy making it one of the most 
resource-dependent nations on earth. Yet, instead of turning Nigeria into one of the most 
prosperous states on the African continent, oil production has accentuated the socio-political and 
economic woes of the oil-rich Niger Delta region. These scholars and many others argue that it is 
the disparity between the wealth appropriated from the region and the economic marginalization 
of indigenes of the region that accounts for the conflict. For example, a World Bank Panel report 
on the Niger Delta observed that despite substantial resource flows to the government, and 
significant natural resource endowments, the people of the Niger Delta are destitute. It described 
the Niger Delta as an “iconic representation of destitution amongst the possibility of wealth” 
(World Bank 2007). It observed that the Niger Delta people are excluded from the wealth 
generated by their resource-rich region and the region having the highest unemployment rate in 
Nigeria substantiates this. A 2006 UNDP report also noted that remote rural communities in the 
Niger Delta have limited economic opportunities and often cannot access employment benefits 
from the oil conglomerates because they lack capital resources or skills. 
 Shell, the largest multinational corporation active in the region, disagrees. Instead, it 
implicates political, social, and environmental concerns as the key factors that provoke militancy 
in the Niger Delta (SPDC 2007). Curiously, Shell subsumes economic issues such as resource 
control and resource distribution under political factors arguing that this is complicated by a high 
population growth rate that puts pressure on land through over-farming, deforestation, and soil 
erosion; the emergence of a new generation of well-educated youth attuned to the disparity 
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between urban and rural areas and convinced that multinational oil companies (MNOCs) have 
the capability to redress this gap; and communities that believe that the best way of extracting a 
greater share of oil wealth is by holding MNOCs to ransom. Shell, however, does not address the 
charge of economic exploitation, which many scholars, militants, and rights groups blame as 
partly responsible for the violence. For these researchers, the gap between the billions of dollars 
MNOCs appropriate each year as oil surplus or profit and the privation of the peasants who are 
forced out of their traditional homesteads and economic activity by oil-induced pollution, 
describes economic exploitation. Also, Shell does not address the wide scale corruption among 
Nigeria's political class and the misappropriation and misapplication of oil revenue that has 
bloated the bank accounts of a few while the majority of the Niger Delta inhabitants languish in 
poverty. Finally, it also does not address the role MNOCs play in courting, promoting, 
maintaining, and reproducing corruption and graft as rational business and profit-building 
strategies (Okonofua forthcoming).  
Clearly, the problem in the Niger Delta demonstrates how total dependence on 
export-focused non-renewable resource extraction can stifle human development, impoverish 
local communities, and provoke and exacerbate violent conflict (Osuoka 2003; Higgins 2009). 
According to the UNDP (2006) while the Niger Delta oil wealth accounts for the bulk of 
Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings (amounting to about $231 billion between 1970 and 1999), 
these vast revenues have not translated to positive human development outcomes for the people. 
Higgins (2009) and the International Crisis Group (2006) argue that the slow pace of systemic 
reforms and lack of jobs, water, schools, electricity and clinics in some parts of the Niger Delta 
have not only encouraged militancy in the region but have also boosted support for the 
insurgents among local populations. 
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Higgins (2009) argues that the federal government support for development in the Niger 
Delta (both politically and financially) is in itself problematic. One of the mechanisms through 
which the federal government has attempted to stimulate economic development in the Niger 
Delta is the NDDC. The NDDC along with many other development planning institutions have 
failed because they are impositions from the federal government and adopt a top down approach 
to development planning and implementation. The amnesty program may also suffer same fate as 
local communities and militant groups appear to have had no say in determining the composition 
of members of the amnesty committee. They also appear to have no say in the types of programs, 
activities, and services performed by the committee. Like other institutional responses to the 
problems of the Niger Delta, there is the danger that local communities and militant groups that 
historically have experienced marginalization and deprivation may perceive the amnesty as a 
political party agenda designed to pursue the aims and ends of the ruling People’s Democratic 
Party. 
Social and Political Exclusion 
 Since independence, national political power has revolved around the “big three” ethnic 
nationalities: Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. Thus, political access for minorities until now was 
closed. Moreover, elections since 1999 have been widely rigged in the Niger Delta states and 
most of these fraudulent results are sustained by violence and threats resulting in huge 
democratic deficits. Because the people are economically exploited and deprived of the 
opportunity to alter state economic and social policy through the instrumentality of elections, 
they are bitter and angry. Because many Niger Delta youths are convinced that formal 
institutions and local customary institutions (particularly the system of kingship) have failed and 
are incapable of redressing grievances, they have turned to violence and militancy to challenge 
57 
 
the government and extort money and oil from the oil conglomerates (World Bank 2007). 
Shell (2007) agrees. It notes that at the social level "anger is growing and increasing 
militancy is overthrowing traditional social order in some communities" leading to a situation 
where a "complex and dynamic fragmentation of communities characterized by frequent power 
shifts between factions" makes it virtually impossible to redress some of the grievances of the 
communities including the payment of compensation for damages caused by oil spill and land 
acquisition. Thus, it is the inter-ethnic strife in the region that disrupts the efficient allocation of 
resources and welfare especially to that segment of the population that is in dire need. While this 
may be true, Shell fails to explain what generates inter-ethnic strife in the first place and the role 
it plays in provoking and maintaining such strife. For example, Osaghae (1998), Okonta and 
Douglas (2003) and Okonofua (forthcoming) argue that the oil companies orchestrate the 
inter-ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta in a modern day attempt at "indirect rule." The strategy is 
to encourage oil-bearing communities to dissipate energy in fighting over which community or 
communities should benefit from specific welfare and rehabilitation projects to the point where 
no community benefits. Thus, the Ijaw/Ilaje conflict and the Urhobo/Itsekiri conflict, for 
example, results from MNOCs stoking ethnic fires to facilitate oil production and expand its 
profit base.  
Environmental Degradation  
According to the World Bank (2007), oil exploration and production has generated 
serious environmental damages at several levels: land, water, and air pollution, depleted fishing 
grounds and territories, and the disappearance of wetlands. These serious environmental 
conditions have provoked serious hardships for local peoples whose sources of livelihood has 
been severely impacted. Many local populations have been displaced from ancestral lands and 
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local resources and thrust into dependent relationships in overpopulated cities with no skills, 
craft or vocation to sustain them. The environmental devastation of the Delta has put pressure on 
local communities who continue to suffer from poor or inequitable land use practices (UNDP 
2006). Existing measures to counterbalance the environmental damage are at best haphazard and 
inadequate and grossly underestimate the enormity of damage to the Niger Delta ecology. This 
chronic underestimation which translates to gross nonchalance is a major source of community 
discontent and violence (World Bank 2007).  
Shell agrees that environmental pollution including oil spills is one of the main 
grievances of Niger Delta communities. However, it blames the spills on sabotage. According to 
Shell, between 1988 and 1994, about 28 percent of the spills at its operation areas were due to 
sabotage. By 1994, oil spills caused by sabotage accounted for 35 percent of all oil spills in its 
area of influence and this figure is increasing. Increases in sabotage-induced oil spills results 
mainly from the operations of the militant groups who target oil facilities. While Shell is right to 
highlight damages caused by warring groups, it does not address that percentage of oil spill that 
results from the routine business of oil production. It also does not address pollutions caused by 
effluent and other wastes it deliberately discharges into the environment, or spills caused by 
defective and obsolete equipment. Studies show that much of the Niger Delta violence results 
from grievances over pollution (Naanem 1995; Gbadegesin 1997; Eteng 1996). For example, 
Eteng (1997:4) argues that:  
Oil exploration and exploitation has over the last four decades impacted disastrously on the 
socio-physical environment of the Niger Delta oil-bearing communities, massively threatening the 
subsistent peasant economy and the environment and hence the entire livelihood and basic 
survival of the people. 
 Up to 1.5 million tons of oil, which amounts to more than 50 times the pollution recorded 
in the Exxon Valdez tanker disaster, has been spilt in the Niger Delta over the past 50 years 
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(Brown 2006). Quoting a panel of independent experts from the World Wildlife Federation UK, 
the World Conservation Union, and the Nigerian Conservation Foundation, Brown (2006) 
observed that damage to the fragile mangrove forests over the past 50 years amounts to a 
catastrophic oil spill occurring every year in one of the world’s most important ecosystems. 
Apart from threatening rare species including primates, fish, turtles, and birds, the pollution is 
destroying the livelihoods of many of the 30 million people living in the region, damaging crops 
and fueling the upsurge in violence. The Niger Delta which is home to 7,000sq of the world’s 
remaining 9,000sq of mangrove and some 60 percent of West Africa’s fish stock is now one of 
the five most polluted spots on the planet. Brown argued that the impact of oil and gas drilling 
especially pollution was a significant contributor to the violence and instability in the Niger 
Delta. This situation is worsened by the people’s perception that oil companies are complacent or 
slow to act on legitimate complaints. For example, while local peasants were groaning under the 
yoke of pollution, which is unaddressed by Shell and the other oil companies, Shell alone 
boasted profits of $22.94bn (€13.12bn) and extracted 900,000 barrels of crude oil a day in 2005 
from its activities in the Niger Delta (Brown 2006). Environmentalists accuse Shell of using 
obsolete equipment to rake in billions of dollars in oil profit while paying little attention to how 
its ageing pipes steadily leak millions of gallons of crud oil into the pristine waters of the Niger 
Delta.  
Poor Infrastructure and Service Delivery 
 A World Bank Panel Report (2007) describes the situation of the Niger Delta as “akin to 
a human emergency” and the UNDP (2006:15) describes the infrastructure and social services 
available as “generally deplorable.” The neglect of infrastructure in the Niger Delta is either 
blamed on the difficult terrain or the intransigence of local communities. In either case, the 
60 
 
neglect criminally deprives local populations of access to fundamental social services. For 
example, the International Crisis Group (2007) observes that the town of Edeoha in Rivers state 
lacks basic services such as water, healthcare, education, electricity, and jobs. Also, the presence 
of the state is minimal with no local government office, a primary school that lacks chairs and 
desks, and a hospital that is twenty kilometers away and lacks medicine and equipment. This 
situation exists in the majority of communities in the Niger Delta and draws the flak of 
community leaders and militant organizations who insist that oil majors must contribute to the 
development of the region. 
Oil companies often argue that some of the complaints of the communities, especially 
those that demand that they play more active roles in the development of the communities, are 
illegitimate. They argue that what communities demand is that they become some kind of 
alternative government and provide services the government ought to provide (Ukeje 2001). 
They argue that this would amount to double taxation and erode their profitability since various 
legislations enacted by the federal government particularly the Petroleum Decree No. 51 of 1969, 
the 1978 Land Use Act, and the 1999 Production Sharing Contracts Act established the general 
frameworks for the exploitation of oil resources including the applicable royalties, tax regimes, 
and the manner of allocation of costs between oil companies and government. The law provides 
for the payment of a flat rate of 50% tax on petroleum profits by MNOC's, and sets different 
royalty regimes, depending on the water depth in which the operation is carried out ranging from 
12% for depths of 200-500m to 0% for depths in excess of 1000m. Operations in inland basins 
attract a flat royalty of 10% (Pengassan 2009). Shell also claims it pays compensation to the 
communities for the surface rights of all land acquired in the course of its exploration and 
production activities, and for ecological damage due to its operations. It says its compensation 
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rates are fair and equitable and that all parties including the communities are happy and satisfied 
(Okonta and Douglas 2003).  
This position has been severely challenged by the communities. For example, Shell 
admitted that between 1973 and 1993, it extracted 634 million barrels of oil from its ninety-six 
oil wells in Ogoni alone. It claims that before it withdrew from the area in January 1993 
following community resistance, Ogoni accounted for 1.5 percent of its Nigerian operations. 
Ogoni land is only about 400 square miles and from here Shell is estimated to have extracted oil 
worth over $30 billion. Shell claims that it spends about $20 million each year on community 
development projects in Ogoni and other Niger Delta communities, a claim local NGOs and 
rights groups hotly contest. In fact, these NGOs insist that between 1970 and 1988, Shell spent a 
paltry $200,000, or approximately 0.000007 percent of the value of oil extracted from the region 
on community development projects (Saro-Wiwa 1992). Despite these counter claims, Shell’s 
argument brings into sharp relief the role government (local, state, and federal) play in the 
violence. We can briefly discuss the government's role from three directions: federalism, 
corruption, and poor governance/political instability.  
Federalism 
Sagay (2008) and Akiba (2002) blame the Niger Delta violence on the nature of Nigerian 
federalism. They argue that the crisis in the region is not only over environmental justice and 
resource appropriation and distribution but also a struggle to create a stable and equitable 
socio-political system. The communities through the militant groups and other rights and 
socio-cultural groups seek redress within a federal structure they see as firmly stacked against 
them in terms of revenue allocation and the parlous state of infrastructure in the region. For this 
reason, the crisis in the Niger Delta involves much more than agitations over ecological 
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damages, developmental issues, or security issues. Instead, the crisis results from a combination 
of all these and is complicated by the struggle for a true federal and fiscal structure (Akinyemi 
1979).  
By any standard of assessment, Nigeria's federal system (which has undergone numerous 
changes since independence in 1960) has been unable to manage and contain the nations 
countless ethnic, sub-ethnic, regional, and religious cleavages. Some analysts argue that the 
federal system has never been properly and fully established and therefore remains a work in 
progress. These scholars advocate for the incorporation of fairness, justice, and equity into 
Nigeria's federal structure as a way of dealing with perceived shortcomings (Suberu 2001). To 
these scholars, then, Nigeria's federal structure has not failed; instead, it has never been properly 
or objectively applied. For example, Suberu (2001) argues that various military and civilian 
administrations have manipulated the federal system for their own gains in disregard for national 
development or the reduction or elimination of ethnic, religious, or regional tensions. Instead, 
ethno-religious cleavages have enhanced the power and influence of the federal government 
thereby distorting Nigeria's federal structure.  
Other scholars disagree (Osaghae 1998; Sagay 2008; Akiba 2004; David-West 2002; 
Nwabueze 2001). They argue that Nigeria's federal structure privileges the majority ethnic 
groups, is responsible for Nigeria’s political instability, and exacerbates corruption, nepotism, 
and conflict. David-West (2002) for example, argues that Nigeria's vaunted federalism is at best 
a "parody of federalism. It is to all intents and purposes unitarism dressed out in an elegant 
facade of federalism." One proof of this is the recurring controversy over resource control. 
Another proof is the country's contentious revenue sharing practices. For example, the federal 
government allocates to itself a disproportionate amount of national revenues leaving the states 
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and local governments with barely enough to pay salaries and wages and to maintain political 
patronages. This disparity has the unfortunate effect of increasing the competition by the major 
ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo) for control of the central government and its 
vast resources to the detriment of the minority ethnic groups some of which are the storehouses 
of the nation’s natural resource wealth. Thus, the federal structure with an allocative rather than 
derivative revenue sharing formula is partly responsible for the lack of economic and 
infrastructural development in the Niger Delta region and the political marginalization of its 
people. 
Corruption  
Corruption has been shown to cost the Nigerian government as much as 60 percent of its 
tax revenues and increases with the expansion of the public sector (Okonofua and Ugiagbe 2004; 
USAID 2006). When at the highest level of government power is concentrated in a few hands, 
the corruption bug quickly contaminates the entire society, including the judiciary, legislature, 
police, military, school, and medical workers. For example, following the death of Nigeria's late 
maximum dictator Gen. Sani Abacha, over US$ 5 billion was recovered from secret overseas 
accounts belonging to him and his family. It is estimated that between December 1993 and June 
1998, over $10 billion was stolen by Gen. Abacha and his associates. And these funds were 
revenues accruing to the state from oil production. When Abacha took over the reins of 
government in 1993, he commissioned the renowned economist Dr. Pius Okigbo to examine the 
finances of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) during the Babangida years. The Babangida 
administration (1985-1993) is believed to have turned corruption (and advance fee fraud) into an 
industry and in the process appropriated billions of dollars of oil revenue for himself (Okonta 
and Douglas 2003). While submitting his report, Okigbo accused Babangida and members of his 
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government of gross corruption. According to him: 
Between September 1988 and 30 June 1994, US$12.2 billion of the $12.4 billion [in the dedicated 
accounts] was liquidated in less than six years … they were spent on what could neither be 
adjudged genuine high priority nor truly regenerative investment; neither the president nor the 
Central Bank Governor accounted to anyone for these massive extra-budgetary expenditures … 
these disbursements were clandestinely undertaken while the country was openly reeling with a 
crushing external debt overhang (Fayemi 1995). 
Losses like this that are due to corruption total more than Nigeria's foreign debt and corruption 
diverts foreign investment, reduce valuable expenditure on social sectors (roads, bridges, health 
and education), leads to bogus capital projects, reduced asset life, and undermines the creation of 
a professional, meritocratic civil service (Okonofua and Ugiagbe 2004). Alassane Ouattara 
(2001) argues that an environment prone to corruption is one where public officials are not 
accountable for their actions, where law does not exist, and where the respect for basic human 
rights is breached. This implies the vicious circle whereby poor governance has kept the formal 
private sector small, public institutions weak and corrupt, and rules and regulations complex, 
inequitable, and arbitrarily enforced. In such an environment, social decay spreads and the young 
who have neither political nor economic opportunities become disillusioned. These persons are 
left only with four choices: to join the corrupt, to go abroad, to hide in the informal sector, or to 
violently challenge what they perceive to be the source of their problems. The Niger Delta 
militant appears to fall into the fourth category. 
Political Instability and Poor Governance 
Scholars have argued that political instability in Nigeria is partly responsible for the 
underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region and by implication, the Niger Delta violence (Ake 
1996; Ukeje 2001). Beginning with the Gowon administration (1966-1975) to the present, 
governmental instability, especially the lack of continuity in government policy, has had adverse 
effects on the economic and social development of the region. For example, there has been only 
two recorded civilian to civilian transfer of power in Nigeria since its independence in 1960. 
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Apart from the Obasanjo-Yar'Adua transition in 2007 and the Yar’Adua (Jonathan)-Jonathan 
transition in 2011, every transition in Nigeria has been predicated on a military coup or midwifed 
by a military regime.  
Military governments typically begin by suspending the constitution, closing all airports, 
seaports, and borders, and suspending the policies of the past administration while hastily 
contriving new policy directions. In furtherance of their goals, they dismiss all or key 
government officials responsible for policy implementation and replace them with people new to 
the demands of such offices or too inexperienced to function effectively. This typically disrupts 
the smooth operation of government and kills off vital development projects crucial to the 
nation’s economic and socio-political survival. Changes in policy concerning the distribution of 
oil revenue between the federal, state, and local government provides one example of policy 
disruption due to infrequent undemocratic governmental changes. Another example is the 
various agencies established by different administrations to speed up development in the Niger 
Delta. In every material fact, the functions of these agencies such as Oil Mineral Producing Area 
Development Commission (OMPADEC), Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), 
Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF), the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF), and the 
Ministry of Niger Delta overlap each other and exist most profoundly to launder the image of 
government and act as conduit pipes through which the government purse is drained by corrupt 
officials. 
Ideology 
Niger Delta militants accuse government and oil companies of misapplication and 
misappropriation of oil funds to the neglect of the communities and people. They challenge not 
only the prevailing revenue sharing formula but also the political structure and its mechanisms 
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for the allocation of power. Thus, the agitations of the communities and militants are first and 
foremost based in ideology. Two central issues constitute the ideological basis of the Niger Delta 
struggle: self-determination and resource control (Osaghae et al 2007). Self-determination 
involves the right of the Niger Delta people (or any distinct nationality for that matter) to live 
together in “its own way, determine its own political fate, preserve its own affairs and develop 
itself or even democratize as it may deem fit” (Okwu-Okafor 1994). It relates to the “right or 
freedom of a people that are subordinated, oppressed, dominated, colonized or even marginalized 
to assert and constitute themselves into a separate state” (Osaghae et al 2007). The right to 
self-determination devolves from the Nigerian constitution. In section 3 (c) the constitution 
confers rights to individuals to freely form associations and to take steps to preserve group 
integrity and personal liberty. Self-determination, in this context, implies the right of a people to 
associations that are spatially distinct with clear geographic, social, cultural, and political 
markings. Both the United Nations Charter on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human 
Rights also guarantee this right. The right to self-determination assures that cultural, religious, 
and linguistic minorities and peoples can strive for liberation from structures and institutions that 
subordinate, oppress, and marginalize them. 
The implication of this is that Niger Delta militants consider the Niger Delta people an 
oppressed, dominated, stifled, and exploited group who must be liberated if not by peaceful 
means, then by violence. Self-determination translates to self-existence, self-management, 
self-development, and control over resources that inhere in the region. However, the government 
and other political stakeholders interpret self-determination as a clamor for separate and 
independent existence, and hence, must be brutally suppressed. But self-determination or 
autonomy does not necessarily mean separate and independent existence; rather, it is a desire for 
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cultural autonomy, ethnic rights, political representation and inclusion, justice, and development 
(Osaghae et al 2007). Irrespective of how it is defined, the right or freedom to self determine has 
driven numerous peoples all over the world, to mobilize, solidarize, build nationalism and to 
organize resistance through popular movements and institutions of violence. Also, the world 
over, the issue of self-determination is ideologically linked to the question of group identity. In 
the Niger Delta this identity is deeply etched in collective experiences of oppression, 
marginalization, and discrimination. And as has happened in other parts of the world, 
discrimination-defined difference or “otherness” have provoked fierce and violent agitations and 
led to the likelihood of a potentially devastating civil war in Nigeria. 
 The second ideological motion concerns resource control. The concept of resource 
control as it applies to the Niger Delta conflict has three main components: a) the power and 
right of a community to raise funds by taxing people, services, and materials within its territory; 
b) the executive right of ownership and control of resources (natural and created) within the 
territory; and c) the right to customs duties on goods destined for its territories and excise duties 
on goods manufactured in its territories (Sagay 2008). This implies a complete reversal of the 
revenue sharing formula from an allocative strategy to one of complete and unconditional 
control. Militants argue that because of the primacy of resource control to the survival of whole 
groups and societies, their clamor is non-negotiable. The most articulate presentation of this 
clamor is the “Kaiama Declaration” (Okonta and Douglas 2003). This declaration proclaimed by 
the Ijaw (the dominant ethnic group in the region and fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria) on 
December 11 1998 has several important articles. Article 1 asserted that all “land and natural 
resources within the Ijaw territory” belongs to the “Ijaw communities” and are the “basis of our 
survival.” Article 2 defended the rights of the “peoples and communities” to “ownership of and 
68 
 
control of our lives and resources” and Article 4 advised all oil companies operating within Ijaw 
territory to “withdraw from Ijawland” pending the resolution of the issues of “resource 
ownership and control in the Ijaw area of the Niger Delta.” 
 Like its disagreement with the concept of self-determination, the Nigerian state and 
MNCs disagree with this interpretation of resource control. As observed earlier, MNCs see the 
agitation as nothing more than a clamor for a share of the oil profit. Therefore, their answer is to 
surreptitiously court some of the more influential power brokers in the region with juicy security 
contracts and more direct cash payments. The government on the other hand sees the agitators 
particularly the militant groups as a bunch of criminals and renegades interested only in profiting 
from the clandestine oil trade. They see resource control agitations and the clamor for 
self-determination as the desire of unpatriotic forces to break up Nigeria and therefore, the 
agitators must be treated as rebels and violently suppressed or crushed (Osaghae 1998). 
 One conclusion that we can draw from these cocktail of causes is that there is a 
governability crisis in Nigeria that is morbidly stupefying. In one form or the other, the scholars 
examined above have made intimations of a morally decrepit government aided and abetted by 
money-hungry international corporations who themselves are backed by the full strength and 
force of western capitalism and its racist institutions and practices. The governability crisis 
begins as food and other necessities have disappeared from the shelves and food barns of Niger 
Delta peasants. The governability crisis is on full throttle as life-saving medicines have vanished 
from local hospital dispensaries, as white chalks have become unavailable to write on black 
boards in local schools, as roads harbor huge pot-holes that have become man-holes, and as 
scarce resources find their way into European and American banks and purchase million dollar 
homes in European and American streets. The governability crisis speaks to us from 
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disagreements over Nigeria’s federal structure, its constitution, the nature of party politics, 
resource control, self-determination, and peace. Even as violence continues to run rampant in 
Niger Delta swamps and creeks, a tiny few who occupy command positions within government 
and the oil industry, continue to be oblivious to the horrors that is daily unfolding and that 
threatens to consume all in this battle of the fearless dispossessed and the happy delirious. 
3.3 International Forces and the Development of the Niger Delta Conflict 
 The above analysis has focused on some of the domestic or indigenous causes of the 
Niger Delta conflict. Without doubt, domestic forces have played and continue to play a major 
role in the Niger Delta conflict. However, they are not the only direct or indirect causes of the 
conflict. For that matter, the role domestic agents play in the conflict is tangential to the more 
invidious but largely obscure role international forces play – specifically, the system of global 
racism that is the unseen hand that drives western capitalist expansionism that is more often 
directly linked to the conflict.  
Racism and the Niger Delta Conflict 
 All through modern history, racism has and continues to frame the organization of human 
society. Slavery, discrimination, segregation, unequal rights, ethnic cleansing, deportation, 
cultural defamation, and outright extermination are some of the characteristic hallmarks of 
racism and these are intricately linked to the global capitalist system that maximizes these for 
economic gain. Contrary to contemporary neo-liberal argument following James Wilson’s (1978) 
publication of the book, the “Declining Significance of Race,” the effect of racism has been 
shown to be enduring and significant in contemporary society (Feagin and Feagin 1978; Feagin 
1991; Omi and Winant 1994; Shapiro 2004; Brown, Carnoy, Currie, Duster, Oppenheimer, 
Shultz, and Wellman 2003; Royster 2003; Bonilla-Silva 2001; Harvey-Wingfield and Feagin 
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2009). The same vicious racism that was responsible for the slave raids of the 17th and 18th 
century and that produced much of the development in Europe and North America and the 
underdevelopment of Africa, is still festering strong and producing untoward outcomes in many 
parts of the world. The conflict in the remote Niger Delta region of Nigeria is one consequence 
of the global system of racism. Racism, first, creates the conditions for the fragmentation of 
Niger Delta ethnic communities, weakening local resistance to the emerging and increasingly 
vicious petrol-capitalism. Next, it creates the conditions for the exploitation and rape of Niger 
Delta oil wealth, without regard to her fragile eco-system; and finally, it permits and facilitates 
the complete dehumanization of Niger Delta peasants who are increasingly alienated from their 
community, means of subsistence, ethno-religious and cultural institutions, family, and 
ultimately themselves.  
 Modern global racism first manifested with European capitalist expansionism. Capitalists 
hijacked whole nation-states in Africa and Asia and enslaved free citizens of these nation-states. 
From Dahomey to Dakar and from Bini to the Gold Coast, slaves were forcefully exported to 
Europe and North America, where they were forced to work in plantations, factories, and 
construction without compensation while facilitating a “breakthrough to industrialism and global 
hegemony” for the west (Blackburn 2010). While the west publicly upheld the equality and 
“rights of man,” whole African populations were held in captivity and in many instances, their 
“humanness” was denied. The black man or “negro” was less than human – he was primitive, 
barbaric, and atavistic. Because he was less than human, he and his resources were superfluous. 
These resources, including gold, diamond, oil, and human labor were needed to build western 
industry and to enhance the white man’s superiority and domination over the 'inferior' races. The 
exploitation of slave labor and of the colony consequently produced development in the west and 
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underdevelopment in Africa (Rodney 1972). Thus, racial exploitation is at the heart of 
capitalism, which expresses the relationship of racial exploitation in economic terms. In the same 
way that the west exploited the slave labor and resources of its colonies, so is the Niger Delta 
exploited by the west through agents such as Shell, Chevron, and ExxonMobil backed by the 
political and economic force of western democracy. In place of the overt “official racism” of the 
17th and 18th century is the 21st century western imperialism. According to Offiong (1980:76): 
 The international system upon which Africa depends implies a ‘structure,’ that is, a structure of 
institutions, classes, and power arrangements. The dynamic process that takes place within that 
structure is called “imperialism.” “Imperialism,” then is an institutionalized system of control 
which systematically shapes the institutions and structures of dependent dominated countries and 
limits their freedom of action, if they are to avoid the systems sanctions, to system-defined 
alternatives. 
As Iyayi (1998) argues, the idea of a structuring international system implies a center of power 
and of parts where the center “remote-controls” the parts. This system is arranged in order that 
they function automatically and naturally. According to him “it is true that there is an 
international capitalist system but the key question is: what are the driving forces of the system?” 
For me, racism is the preeminent driving force of western capitalism. The racist tendencies of the 
west are expressed locally through the actions and inactions of corrupt pseudo-capitalist 
oligarchs brandishing religious and military capital. Internationally, it is expressed through 
imperialism, which today subjugates not just black people (and their bodies) but also their 
economies, cultures, and idea systems. 
While it is seductive to believe that racism plays no role in international capitalism or in 
contemporary trade between nations, the reality is that racism is an indisputable feature of global 
capitalism and of the modern capitalist state. If as Theo Goldberg (2002) has argued, racism and 
the state are mutually constituted, then contemporary racism approximates to a structuring 
structure, which takes its reality from the practices, actions, principles, and ideas of the state, 
supranational organs like the UN, IMF, Paris Club, and World Bank, and from multinational or 
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transnational corporations like Shell, Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP, Agip, Texaco, etc. The 
practices and actions of the modern state (or these supranational and transnational organizations), 
in turn, creates and reproduces racist structures, practices, and ideas within which local and 
international politics and economics are, in fact, imbedded. Racism and relations (economic, 
political, social, etc.) between states, transnational, and supranational organizations are, 
therefore, co-articulated since racial classifications and exclusions (and inclusions) are the 
primary motive force of modern international capitalism or the capitalist project of globalization. 
International relations (or politico-economic relations), thus, becomes the major center for 
human categorization and classification and for allocating opportunities and resources. As a 
consequence, western industrial states (including the supranational and transnational bodies 
through which weak states are manipulated and controlled) or their economic interests in weak 
states have become the main site of growing racial/imperial contestations in contemporary 
society.  
Within the context of this argument, Nigeria was founded by Britain upon the principle of 
racial difference and continues to be maintained by deep racial imaginations. This means that 
Nigeria has developed conceptually and materially through the process of racial differentiation, 
exclusion, and exploitation. Through this process, Nigerians (especially in the oil rich region of 
the Niger Delta), are governed in explicit racial terms, in that, they are identified legally and 
administratively by the coalition of petrol-capital and the Nigerian state (controlled by ethnic 
nationalities with loyalties to western capital) as “inherently inferior” and naturally expendable. 
This implies that the human and ecological needs of the people of the Niger Delta will be 
sacrificed on the altar of oil profit. An example is in order. For decades, Niger Delta 
communities complained about massive oil spills and the almost irreversible devastation of the 
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Niger Delta eco-system by oil-induced pollution without any relief. For decades, thousands of 
people in the Niger Delta have died from oil-induced sicknesses and diseases without any 
remediation. For decades, Niger Delta peasants were uprooted from their land and means of 
economic subsistence and thrust into hostile urban environments without the skills, experience, 
and resources to survive, and without any remediation. For decades, Niger Delta communities 
demanded compensation for lost income, deaths, and damaged homesteads without positive 
response from the oil corporations or their allies in government. Yet, in only one month of oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the American government was able to extract $20 billion from BP 
(owner of the damaged platform) as possible compensation for people impacted by the spill apart 
from other sundry payments for direct cleanup, which amount to over $200 million.  
The disparities in the response to the situations in the US Gulf of Mexico and the 
Nigerian Delta region, translates to racism. Black people who historically are the objects of 
global discrimination inhabit the Niger Delta. The Gulf of Mexico serves areas inhabited by 
predominantly white populations. Not only do discriminations exist within defined national 
boundaries like the United States, they exist outside of state boundaries especially within the 
structures of shadowy transnational organizations like Shell and Chevron and in supranational 
organizations like the UN, World Bank, and IMF established to protect the interests of white 
societies. What this means is that historically, blacks and whites have unequal access to social, 
political, economic, and juristic protections. This unequal access is based on skin pigmentation 
as well as cultural differences that branch off skin color. Another term for these differences is 
racism. Wellman, (1993: 55) defines racism as “a structural relationship based on the 
subordination of one racial group by another.” Thomas (2000) in response to Wellman’s 
definition argues that the determining feature of racism is not “prejudice towards blacks (or other 
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racial minorities), but rather the superior position of whites and the institutions – ideological as 
well as structural – which maintain it.” Embedded in these definitions is the fact that racism 
involves ideas and practices that not only create but also maintains, sustains and reproduces the 
system of white privilege in contemporary society. Thus the Gulf of Mexico spill will be 
promptly addressed and recompensed while organizations that represent the economic interests 
of white societies can escape without any sanctions or warning for the decades of environmental 
despoliation that they unleash on hapless black communities such as the Niger Delta. 
In light of the Gulf of Mexico oil disaster, BP was desperate to show itself a responsible 
social person. It sponsored million dollar adverts in the US and across the world to bolster its 
image. In some of these advertisements, BP promised to “pay compensation” to anyone whose 
business or livelihood was impacted by the spill. To show it meant business, BP voluntarily paid 
$170 million to four US states (Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida) impacted by the 
spill excluding direct payments to local contractors and individuals engaged to mop-up spilled 
crude. This also excludes the $20 billion it agreed to keep in an escrow account to address 
litigation. The Chief Executive Officer of BP also appeared before the US legislature to explain 
the crisis and to show what efforts BP was making to plug the leak, clean up the spill, and pay 
compensation to victims of the spill including employees who died when the oil platform 
collapsed. Yet, the US government have been unwilling to hold Chevron (a US company) to 
account for spill-related damages to the Niger Delta ecology. Similarly, European oil giant Shell 
has mined oil in the Niger Delta for decades without regards to the Niger Delta ecology. When 
spills have occurred, Shell and the other oil corporations have disputed either their existence or 
their magnitude. In many instances, they refuse to pay compensation preferring instead to bribe 
government officials and local chiefs or to sponsor interethnic hate amongst adjacent 
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communities in a bid to avoid payments (Saro-Wiwa 1992). In other instances, oil companies 
have sponsored state terror against victims of spill including the 1995 judicial murder of the 
Ogoni playwright and environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa.  
A more nuanced term useful in explaining differences in response to spills occurring in 
the Niger Delta and the west is environmental racism. Environmental racism is a complex web of 
discriminatory policies, practices, activities, and inactivity that results from racial differences. It 
involves racial discrimination in environmental policy making; in the enforcement of regulations 
and laws; in the deliberate targeting of certain communities for the establishment of polluting 
industries, toxic waste dumping, deliberate discharge of effluent into the environment, and 
indiscriminate exploration and exploitation mechanisms that leave land and water resources 
devastated; and in the official sanctioning of the life-threatening presence of poisons and 
pollutants in certain communities. More importantly, environmental racism is racial 
discrimination that ensures the exclusion of members of oil producing communities from the 
decision making boards, commissions, and regulatory bodies that pertain to oil production 
(Chavis and Lee 1987). The situation of Niger Delta communities and people stand on all fours 
with this definition. 
Environmental racism as it involves the Niger Delta does not just end at the exploitation 
of the delta's oil resources; it extends to the establishment of allied industries such as lead, 
pesticides, and petrochemical plants that negatively impact Niger Delta people but about which 
very little is spoken. Also, environmental racism broadens to include lack of sustainable 
development, job blackmail and blackout, discriminatory public policy, and strategies for 
resolving oil-related disputes in the Niger Delta. In the light of this, we might begin to 
understand the emergence of militant groups as last ditch efforts by Niger Delta communities to 
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salvage what is left of their "sacrifice zones"(Lerner 2010). These sacrifice zones have become 
"toxic doughnuts"(Chavis and Lee 1987) because they are surrounded by polluting industries or 
cancer creeks because of the labyrinth of toxic materials dumped indiscriminately in these areas. 
In a sense, therefore, militancy in the Niger Delta is resistance to formal and informal 
institutions that advantage western societies and people at the same time that they perpetrate and 
perpetuate underdevelopment and poisoning or "genocide” of Niger Delta communities. As I 
have observed earlier, one of the root-causes of the environmental problem of the Niger Delta 
concerns the imperial ethics and values of British colonial policy as well as the glorification in 
the west of the entire colonization process. Rather than let natives determine local use of 
resources, the colonialists chose to dominate, control, tame, and cultivate the land and people for 
its own material comfort and profit. When the colonialists left, they ensured the perpetual control 
of these natives and their resources through the grooming and installation of a northern feudal 
oligarchy in political control. Thus, modern day conflict between militants and the state 
generally arises from the conflict of values surrounding British imperial statecraft. 
A growing body of evidence reveals that Niger Delta people are subjected to a 
disproportionately large number of health and environmental risks than the general population 
(Higgins 2009; ICG 2007; UNDP 2006; World Bank 2007). Worse, they face higher 
environmental and health risks than even communities of color (who, historically, are victims of 
racist discriminated) face in America. Compared to white communities in the west, the health 
and environmental risks of Niger Delta communities is much higher. Despite this, successive 
governments in Nigeria have either been unwilling or unable to do anything about the problems 
of these communities. Instead, governmental action (or inaction) has often exacerbated these 
environmental threats to Niger Delta communities. The "slick alliance" between government and 
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oil majors has forced arrangements that place Niger Delta communities at greater risk than 
general populations (or even comparable populations in the west). For example, one logical 
outcome of porous federal environmental regulations has been the increased vulnerability of 
Niger Delta communities to the location of hazardous industrial facilities such as toxic waste 
dumps, lead smelters, incinerators, and pipelines in the Niger Delta. Moreover, porous 
regulations have increased water, land, and air pollution by oil companies in the normal routine 
of oil mining. Giving the prevailing political and economic climate, pollution will continue 
unabated at the same time that moratoriums on oil drilling and compliance to established 
regulations are strictly enforced in oil rich western societies like the USA. 
The practice of targeting weak African states to unleash the rabidly racist economic 
agenda of the west through high-powered conglomerates like Shell and Chevron does not attract 
very much international opprobrium. One reason for this is race fatigue (See Will 2007; Steel 
2007; Reeves 2008). International organizations and societies have been unwilling to critically 
engage these environmental breaches partly because of the denial of the continuing significance 
of race by governments and international organizations. Thus, race makes “negligible human 
difference” in a world that has matured to the level where it is now free from the “collective 
chauvinisms” (Steele 2007) and political, economic, cultural, and ideological constraints of race. 
The other reason they will do nothing is because they benefit directly and indirectly from the 
environmental disasters that these companies create. Thus, while the benefits of environmental 
racism are internationalized, the environmental and human costs are localized. In this sense, risk 
increases with proximity to the source and is borne exclusively by those living nearby. Niger 
Delta communities that host oil mining sites and other hazardous oil-related industries receive 
fewer economic benefits (jobs, contracts, improved living standards, etc.) than do communities 
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that generate the waste or that are responsible for the expropriation of oil. The people who 
benefit the most are more distanced (they live in comfort in Europe and America driving huge 
fuel consuming SUVs) from the direct negative effects and consequently bears the least burden 
or no burden at all.  
In essence, Niger Delta people who live in the contaminated creeks and swamps of the 
Niger Delta are victims of a "double whammy"(Bullard 1994). Not only are they exposed to 
elevated risks; they also lack access to medical and health facilities. Increasing sicknesses due to 
pollution and lack of access to healthcare are catastrophes that will not be tolerated in the west if 
they were to occur in predominantly white communities. For example, the liberal media is awash 
with scientific evidence of the long-term effect of the Gulf of Mexico oil spill and other spills 
that have occurred in the west on human and animal populations and the ecology. Justin Gillis 
and Leslie Kaufman (2010) writing for the New York Times x-rayed the long term effects of 
spills that occurred in the Exxon Valdez, France, and the southern gulf coast in Mexico. They 
observed that though spills are different in quantity and effect, there is a growing scientific 
awareness of the persistent damage that spills can do. For example, following the 1969 oil spill 
in the Buzzards Bay, fiddler crabs at the nearby Wild Harbor today still act drunk by “moving 
erratically and reacting slowly to predators.” They argue that the “odd behavior is consistent with 
a growing body of research showing how oil spills of many types have remarkably persistent 
effects, often at levels low enough to escape routine notice” (Gillis and Kaufman 2010). Yet, not 
much pressure is exerted to study how spills have impacted lives in rural villages in the Niger 
Delta.   
Clearly, therefore, Niger Delta peasants are an endangered human species. They are 
endangered because the forces of global racism and petro-capital using dated logic define Niger 
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Delta people as completely expendable and its resources superfluous. This racial logic, which 
held blacks in America in bondage for over 200 years have been roundly defeated by 
science-backed legislations and the global forces for good. Forced to change its form and 
contexts, it has found a home in the global financial institutions including the World Bank, Paris 
Club and the IMF and in transnational businesses including Shell and Chevron through which it 
engages in destructive preemptive warfare with indigenous peoples, cultures, and environments.  
Within this context, therefore, it can be argued that changes within the Nigerian polity 
(including the violence in the Niger Delta) are not authored from within. The west through 
petrol-capital actively instigates, stimulates, and superintends over these changes. For example, a 
2010 Wikileaks release showed that Shell was more active in the politics of the Nigerian state 
than the government or Shell was willing to admit. The release showed Ann Pickard, then Shell’s 
Vice-president for sub-Saharan Africa in a meeting with US ambassador Robin Renee Sanders, 
boasting about its ability to influence every single government policy in Nigeria because of its 
well-oiled contacts within the government itself. She boasted that Shell had seconded employees 
to every relevant ministry and as such knew “everything that was being done in those ministries” 
(Smith 2010). From examples such as this, we can argue that actions from within, such as the 
violence in the Niger Delta, are defensive collective actions or reactions to the onslaughts of 
race-backed petrol-capitalism. These are actions meant to defend not only the economic identity 
of Niger Delta peoples but also their cultural, spiritual, and social identities. The Niger Delta 
identity is deeply woven into the militant identity and these contrasts sharply with the white 
identity that is masked by petrol dollar. These identities are place bound where relations between 
races are relations between places (Pulido 2000; Lipsitz 2011). They are called into existence 
and maintained by the fact that the devastated ecology of the Niger Delta and its oil wells exist as 
80 
 
nodes in a network of economic, political, and cultural practices that skew opportunities and life 
chances along deeply etched racial lines. Because of the global practices that inspire and 
reinforce the racialization of space and the spatialization of race, whiteness through petrol profit 
is legitimated, perceived as natural and immutable. Blackness, on the other hand, is silhouetted 
within dominant forms of exploitation, socio-political exclusion, and unfairness.  
Lipsitz (2011) argues that racialized space shapes nearly every aspect of contemporary 
life. The global racial imagination that relegates people of different races to different spaces 
produces grossly unequal outcomes. In the west, it is responsible for more affordable housing, 
healthcare, education, transportation, and better infrastructure. In the Niger Delta, it produces 
economic devastation and socio-political marginalization that exposes Niger Delta communities 
and people to severe environmental hazards, social nuisances, impaired health, and diminished 
economic opportunities. As Lipsitz (2011:6) argues, the “lived experience of race takes place in 
actual places while the lived experience of space draws its determinate logic from overt and 
covert understandings of race” (Lipsitz  2011). 
In sum, the increasing economic, political, social, and cultural disparities between 
peasant communities in the Niger Delta and western agglomerations cannot be overstated. These 
disparities arise from the racial discursive framing of Niger Delta peasants as "other" and of their 
resources as "superfluous." As a consequence, they are marginalized politically, emasculated 
economically, and stigmatized socially as "troublesome" and/or "militant." The categorizations 
and compartmentalization of Niger Delta peoples and communities foster and legitimize the 
genocidal impulses of the racist west masked as economic necessities. Consequently, resistance 
to oil production and the ideological legitimations of whiteness is, in fact, redefined as resistance 
to western economic progress and must be crushed. For example, between 2005 and 2010, 
81 
 
America provided Nigeria with military assistance to quell militant insurgency. Not only were 
Nigerian military officers trained abroad on modern techniques of counter-insurgency, 
sophisticated military hardware including fighter jets and war ships were provided at no cost to 
the Nigerian military. It was fully understood, that these equipment would be fully utilized to 
whip the renegade and recalcitrant militants into line. The support of the US bolstered the 
flagging morale of Nigerian soldiers and led to the carnage in Ayakoroma and other Niger Delta 
villages and towns, were hundreds of people were killed by rampaging federal forces. 
However, this racist structure of exploitation and oppression is not without its antithesis. 
At the same time that the full racial viciousness of petrol-capitalism is unleashed on the Niger 
Delta, people from these communities have forged alliances of resistance and employed 
strategies to extricate themselves from the vice grip of Europe and America. Thus, all of the 
long-term benefits to whiteness that accrue from petrol-capitalism are potentially damaged by the 
same spatial relations that supposedly benefits whites. Native (or militant) resistance to the 
constraints and confinements of race-based petrol-capitalism and its socio-economic pressures 
potentially produces new ways of envisioning that liberates everyone. These new ways of 
envisioning re-imagines race, purging it of its viciousness and oppressiveness. In doing so, it 
re-represents the Niger Delta militant as a global force for good. 
Capitalism and the Niger Delta Conflict 
The Niger Delta conflict is in large measure a consequence of economic exploitation (See 
Offiong 1980; Ikein 1990; Olorode 1998; Iyayi 2000; Okonta 2000; Okonta and Douglas 2003; 
Ukeje 2001; Watts 2009). The exploiters are the oil companies in “slick alliance” with the 
Nigerian state (Saro-Wiwa 1992). This alliance has produced oil-state enclave economies that 
shut out local populations (Watts et al 2004). In essence, the exploited are the millions of natives 
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who have lost agricultural and ancestral lands, vast fishing territories and reserves, means of 
subsistence and revenue, and their self-esteem and self-worth. The oil/state alliance is a specific 
product of petrol-capitalism - an increasingly vicious form of global capitalism that is anchored 
on oil profits. While it yields billions of dollars in profits yearly, its residues are irreversibly 
devastated ecologies and unremitting misery for millions of local peoples. 
Petrol-capitalism is an increasingly influential and vicious arm of global capitalism. Like 
the capitalist system itself, petrol-capitalism is occasioned by human agents. Under capitalism, 
human agents are individual capitalists who establish, control, and maintain institutions that 
advance and protect the interests of the capitalist class over the interests of other classes in 
society (Iyayi 2008). Beginning from the early days of capitalist penetration of other systems of 
production, individual capitalists supported always by the awesome power of the state, have been 
the bulwarks of capitalist progress. With regards to the penetration of Africa, there are numerous 
examples to show the alliance between individual capitalists and the state. One example is the 
triangular trade in slaves, which Rodney (1972) argues led to the underdevelopment of Africa 
and the development of Europe, the United States of America, and Canada. That trade was 
established and conducted by private companies and individuals including East India Company, 
Baker and Dawson, Richard and John Barclay, etc backed by the force power of the state. During 
the colonial period, there was an expansion of private interests to include a large number of joint 
stock companies. In Nigeria, the Royal Niger Company and later the United Africa Company 
was the primary corporate agent (supported by the British Crown) in capitalist penetration and 
expansion (Iyayi 2008).  
Sklair (2001: 4) argues that in the neo-colonial or post-colonial period, “the dominant 
forces are the TNCs, the characteristic institutional form of transnational practices, the 
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transnational capitalist class in the political sphere and in the culture-ideology sphere, the culture 
ideology of consumerism.” Racism exists within the culture-ideology sphere and serves the 
specific function of devaluing the humanity, culture, and institutions of African societies. It helps 
to weaken local resistance to individual capitalists backed by the full force of the advanced 
capitalist state, ultimately resulting in the exploitative destruction of their economies and 
societies. As Iyayi (2008) argues, although the capitalist is supported by the state, the structure of 
the state through which the capitalist is enabled to plunder unchecked is in fact the creation of 
the capitalist class itself for the benefit of the capitalists themselves. In that sense, it is not 
surprising that capitalist state structures in underdeveloped societies are occupied by professional 
politicians and bureaucrats who share the “worldviews, orientations, attitudes, preferences and 
practices” of international capitalists (Iyayi 2008). 
In Nigeria, the job of capitalist accumulation and exploitation is undertaken by 
transnational or multinational corporations. The most important of these transnational 
corporations function within the arena of oil mining. Thus, there is a strong connection between 
capitalist accumulation and petrol-profit. In this respect, Shell, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Texaco, 
Agip, etc are transnational corporations serving the rational interests of global capitalism. I use 
the term “transnational corporation” interchangeably with the term “multinational corporation.” 
A TNC refers to “forces, processes, and institutions that cross borders but do not derive their 
power and authority from the state” (Sklair 2001:2). The UN Economic and Social Council 
describes TNCs as “all enterprises, which control assets – factories, mines, sales offices and the 
like – in two or more countries” (UNCTC 1978: 158). Jenkins (1987: 1-2) adopts a broad 
definition of TNC to include “firms that control production in at least one foreign country.” As 
broad as this definition appears, Iyayi (2008) argues that it excludes global financial institutions 
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from consideration as TNCs even though both finance and production capital work as two sides 
of a coin to support and enlarge the global capitalist system. 
I agree with Iyayi and see strong connections between global finance power houses like 
the IMF, Paris Club and the World Bank and transnational oil corporations like Shell, Chevron, 
and ExxonMobil, whose operations in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region yields billions in profits for 
shareholders geographically dispersed from the site of oil production. As a result, 
petrol-capitalism has resulted in the peripherization of the Niger Delta and the concomitant 
deprivation and marginalization of its peasants. We can explicate the development of the 
periphery in terms of internal and external exchange relationships. According to Bunker 
(1985:20): 
Recent theoretical literature on national development has compounded the distortions inherent in 
this bias to production models. Its primary focus has been a fruitless debate about whether the 
causes of underdevelopment occur in a global system of exchange dominated by industrial nations 
or within specific regional systems of production. 
I use the term peripherization here to mean the increasing political, infrastructural, and economic 
dislocation of rural oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta. This approach (like Bunker's) 
feeds off the core/periphery, world systems and dependency debates in the social sciences, that 
enables us analyze spatially-structured and spatially-perceived dependencies as a specific form 
of social injustice. For example, Eteng (1997:21) argues that: 
What currently prevails in the Nigerian Southern oil enclave is a specific variant of internal 
colonialism…. The specific, highly exploitative and grossly inequitable endowment/ownership - 
exchange entitlements relations between the Nigerian state and the oil-bearing communities in 
particular ... explains why the enormous oil wealth generated is scarcely reflected in the living 
standard and life chances of the peasant inhabitants of the oil-bearing enclave.  
Thus, the underdevelopment and/or peripherization of the Niger Delta region and the resulting 
violence is induced by (1) the unequal exchange in the value of oil resources in the international 
market and (2) the contradictions and resulting conflict inherent in the production-exchange 
relations between the oil/state alliance on one hand and the oil bearing communities on the other 
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hand. Eteng (1997:113) argues this point well when he observes that: 
The fundamental contradiction is indeed most pronounced in the oil-bearing communities of the 
Niger Delta minority enclave from where the country’s oil wealth is generated. This fact is well 
known and highly acknowledged by the appropriating Nigerian state in power, the expropriating 
multinational oil companies and the expropriated oil bearing communities…. The privileged 
groups who directly benefit from the wealth include: the multinational oil companies, Nigerian 
managers of state power, and members of the country’s ruling class for the majority ethnic groups 
and their cohorts from various social classes and communal groups.  
In the course of fifty years, petrol-capitalism has evolved a specific economic logic anchored 
primarily on the capture and control of state and cultural power that in turn permits, preserves, 
and extends its aggressive economic agenda. This occurs in spite of resistance to both its logics 
and actual dominance. The establishment of petrol-capitalism over and against the resistance of 
Niger Delta peasants stands in a relation of “circular causality” (Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage 
1994) with the development of the Nigerian security systems to force compliance and quiescence 
from the suffering masses. The oil TNCs in the Niger Delta operate through the logics of 
petrol-capitalism. Korten (1996: 131) discusses several key elements of this ideology: 
X The world’s money, technology, and markets should be controlled and managed by gigantic 
global corporations; X Corporations should be free to act solely on the basis of profitability 
without regard to national or local consequences; X There should be no loyalties to place and 
community; X People are motivated primarily by greed; X The relentless pursuit of greed and 
acquisition leads to socially optimal outcomes. 
 
The logics of petrol-capitalism contains within it, the legitimation of internal war waged 
by the agents of the state/MNOC alliance against the resistance of subjects, who through their 
suffering have discovered themselves as victims of an unjust political and economic system. 
Using these logics, several degrees of repression were instituted to facilitate oil extraction and to 
protect the unjust system of oil profits allocation. This strategy facilitates the implementation of 
an inequitable revenue allocation formula, conflictual oil company/community relations, 
intensive inter- and intra-communal conflicts, acute ecological degradation, ineffective 
environmental regulations, promulgation of exploitative and repressive legislation that 
legitimates exploitative access to oil resources, and violent state suppression of legitimate 
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dissent. Iyayi (2008) observes that the willingness with which TNCs or MNCs exploit 
undemocratic and corrupt processes in underdeveloped societies arises from the entrenched 
petrol-capital culture. Underneath this culture, is a racism-based framing that expressly defines 
underdeveloped societies and peoples as expendable and through this, oil profit is elevated to a 
superhuman form, and reified. Ashton-Jones (1998: 130) observes that the culture of 
petrol-capitalism is predicated on five assumptions: 
a) That profit maximization is the only basis upon which a company can run, so that any 
expenditure beyond what is required to get out the oil is resisted; b) That a deal can be made with 
governments only, regardless of the government’s legality or morality; That once an arrangement 
has been made with a government, a mining company can do what it likes, in fact, to act as if it is 
a government agency; c) That the “market,” has a right to have the resources it wants, at the lowest 
price, and regardless of the costs to local people who are obliged to play host to mining 
companies; and d) That “we”, the mining companies, know best and are acting responsibly.  
As Ashton-Jones (1998: 31) argues, neither the government nor the TNCs with which 
they associate are willing to accept any divergence from petrol-capital “culture”, which is 
“reinforced with a mixture of cynical public relations and intimidation.” He concludes that the 
“adverse impacts of mining upon the lives of host communities arise from this immoral culture 
than from anything else.” It follows, therefore, that the question of the legitimacy of oil 
production and distribution could not be raised without provoking extreme repression, and this 
raises the more important question: the legitimacy of the fictive body called the Nigerian state 
that would side with international capital against its own people. In order words, militant 
insurgency in the Niger Delta may be understood not as disobedience to national and local 
ordinances but as a morally legitimate defense of the rights of Niger Delta people to protect their 
material existence. It is a legitimate defense of their means of livelihood, their health, their rights 
to education, and their rights to develop the infrastructures capable of delivering peace and 
progress to the peoples and communities. The militant’s challenge of the state’s control of the 
capital of physical force may be interposed as a reminder to the long series of peaceful protests 
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intermixed with sporadic violence that only succeeded in worsening the condition of the Niger 
Delta peasant. The current armed conflict in the region, therefore, might be interpreted as action 
intended not only to redress past injustices or to stop further injustice, but also to demonstrate the 
capacity of a chain of small groups, often poor and ill-equipped, to activate and reactivate 
violence when the state abdicates its responsibility to protect natives from the excesses of 
international capital. 
Michael Peel (2010) touched on this when he observed that Nigeria is a “brittle motor of 
twenty-first century capitalism.” According to him, the supply of crude and by implication the 
violence in the Niger Delta is anchored on the technological developments and tools oil wealth 
has helped to create. The sophisticated technological devices that historically have set rigid 
boundaries between the west (or oil majors) and locals are increasingly becoming available to 
non-oil actors (including locals) in the Niger Delta. And this has removed the veil from 
racialized space (Lipsitz, 2011) which in all material facts is contrived to aid economic 
exploitation. More and more, Niger Delta peasants who live adjacent to the oil fields are noticing 
differences between their circumstances and those of the people who exploit their resources. 
These differences are huge and cannot be explained away to differences in culture, ethnicity, 
socio-political capital, or religion. The people are alluding these differences to the venality of 
corruption and profiteering (by-products of capitalism) and are becoming more determined to 
demand and seize recompense. Peel (2010:xvi) suggests that Nigeria is a lesson on the 
“arrogance of a fossil-fuel obsessed world.” In their arrogance, they fail to see how the 
“unfettered global cult of crude hurts not just the countries that produce it but as relentlessly as in 
any Greek tragedy, the nations that consume it, too.” According to him, the volatility of oil prices 
caused by even small disruptions in the Niger Delta oil fields is proof of the reverse effects of 
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mindless oil exploitation (Peel 2010). 
Between 2004 and 2008, the world oil price increased very steeply. Corresponding to 
these increases, was increasing socio-political marginalization of oil producing communities and 
the economic emasculation of indigenes of these communities. Paradoxically, at this same 
period, Nigeria was assuming greater importance and influence in the energy security policies of 
the United States and Britain who are anxious to unravel oil deposits in Africa in the face of 
hostilities from the Arab Gulf. Over the last several decades, Nigeria has emerged a central 
player in US oil exports accounting for about 10 percent of US total imports. Peel observes that 
the US National Intelligence Council estimates that African countries led by Nigeria and Angola 
have the capacity to supply 25 percent of US total oil imports by 2015.  
The craving for Nigerian oil, which is particularly prized because of its low sulfur 
content, goes beyond the west and this reflects contemporary shifts in the global economic 
balance of power (Peel 2010). China, which had been shut out of the continent historically held 
in the jugulars by western capitalism, has become active in the region since it became capitalist. 
Through mouth watering promises of infrastructural development, China is capturing exploration 
contracts in the region especially in Equatorial Guinea, Angola, and Ghana where oil in 
commercial quantity has just been discovered. Similarly, Russia in September 2008 signed an 
agreement with Nigeria for a joint venture with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC). Within a fortnight after that announcement, the European Union offered Nigeria 
financial support for a €15 billion pipeline that would directly link Nigerian gas to European 
markets. All of this is guaranteed to benefit the west and a tiny click in Nigeria while the 
majority of residents who bear the scars of oil production are left with only their scars. Violence 
is inevitable in the circumstance. 
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For example, the UNDP notes that Nigeria is the world’s 13th largest oil producer, and the 
6th largest in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). From 1970 to 1999, oil 
constituted between 21 and 48 percent of GDP and generated about $231 billion for the Nigerian 
economy. Between 2000 and 2004, oil accounted for 79.5% of total government revenue and 
about 97% of foreign exchange (UNDP, 2006). Yet, increases in oil wealth have not translated 
into increases in the standard of living for Nigerians. Instead, increases in the poverty and 
inequality rates coincide with the discovery of oil and with increases in oil production and oil 
earnings. According to Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), in 1965 when oil revenue was 
about $33 per capita, GDP per capita was $245. But in 2000 when oil revenue had increased to 
$325 per capita, GDP per capita remained at the 1965 value of $245. Higgins (2009) argues that 
evidence such as this leads to the conclusion that Nigeria had suffered from the “resource curse.” 
Waste, corruption, fiscal irresponsibility, political instability, poor policy formulation and 
implementation, and above all racism and a hybrid capitalist system – petrol-capitalism - have 
conspired to bring the “resource curse” upon those who call the delta home and the nation at 
large. 
3.4 The Niger Delta Conflict 
 In his book "Nigeria: The Challenge of Biafra" written after the Nigerian Civil War 
(1967-1970), Arthur A. Nwankwo (1972) noted that: 
It is true that the basic problems that caused the Nigerian crisis remained unresolved ... and there 
seems to be no consideration for the health of the federation in the pursuit of individual or group 
interests - from the smuggling rackets to the huge payoffs in bribery and corruption. But it is also 
true that the traumatic bitterness of the war is rich with lessons for toleration and understandings. 
These lessons are our only guarantee against instability for they will serve as a buffer to cushion 
us through the rough times ahead. The mention of rough times ahead may have set some political 
noses twitching. But if it is realized that the contradictions in Nigeria are yet to be resolved, we 
will agree that Nigeria has anything but quiet to look to.  
He was right. Yet, as Alexis de Tocqueville observes "never was any such event, stemming from 
factors far back in the past, so inevitable yet so completely unforeseen." While the Niger Delta 
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conflict may not have taken analysts by surprise, the new manifestations of the violence 
particularly the spaces within which they are occurring, is to say the least, unfathomable. For 
example, since the end of the Biafran war, indicator after indicator have shown that the deep 
fissures that produced the war are lurking in shadowy spaces in the Nigerian clime, restless to 
produce another round of blood bath, only this time, with repercussions for the world’s economic 
security and African regional stability. However, while the Biafran war was waged between 
clearly defined social units and armies, the current war is waged between a state army with 
identifiable landmarks, territory, and assets and a faceless, amorphous group of fighters with no 
clearly marked territory and assets, but with a lot of violent rage and the means to do incalculable 
damage. It is this new war frontier with its own internal and external logics that is posing new 
challenges to peacebuilding advocates across the world. 
 The struggle over control of the Niger Delta resources has not always been violent. Niger 
Delta communities from the very beginning were interested in negotiating and dialoguing the 
contentious politics of oil production. Osaghae et al (2007:10) reports that the struggle over 
resources was pursued by two set of actors: the elders/elites and the youths. They describe the 
elites as “businessmen, retired civil servants, traditional leaders, and political leaders in the Niger 
Delta.” Their influence results from their roles as intermediaries between the people of the region 
and the state/corporations extracting oil from the region. They generally adopt a peaceful, 
non-violent approach that maximizes negotiation and dialogue to resolve grievances. These elites 
pursue their demands through two types of movements: socio-political movements and 
ethno-cultural movements. Both of these movements abhor violence and use their political and 
cultural influences to press for changes in resource allocation and the provision of basic 
infrastructures including roads, schools, and health centers in the Niger Delta. 
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 Niger Delta youths have always featured in the politics of oil production in the region. 
However, their involvement took a violent turn in reaction to the extreme repression they 
suffered during the Abacha military regime. Following the annulment of the June 12 1993 
presidential elections and the parlous state of the Nigerian economy that was characterized by 
unemployment, poverty, and discrimination (all outcomes of the IMF/World Bank inspired 
policy of structural adjustment fastidiously implemented by the Gen. Babangida administration 
from 1985-1993), Niger Delta youths began to challenge the Nigerian state, oil companies, and 
elites in the region. The youths became increasingly suspicious of their elders and elites who 
they accused of being weak, fearful, greedy and generally ineffective in obtaining concessions 
from government and the oil companies on behalf of the people. They therefore resolved to seize 
the bull by the horn by mobilizing and engaging the state and the oil companies (Ikelegbe 2005).  
 Emboldened by their December 1998 convention in Kaiama, Bayelsa state, the youths 
began to make serious demands on the oil companies and the Nigerian state. For example, 
following the Kaiama declaration, the youths gave the MNCs a two-week ultimatum to pay 
compensation for the ecological damages caused by oil production or face militant action. They 
also asked the government to reverse itself on the revenue allocation formula or face violent 
resistance from the youths (Osaghae et al 2007). At the expiration of the two weeks deadline, the 
youths under the nickname “egbesu boys” staged a peaceful demonstration to the seat of 
government in Yenagoa, Bayelsa state but were brutalized by agents of the state. To avenge the 
unprovoked killing of their members, the youth reconvened in the evening and attacked military 
checkpoints and police stations, seizing weapons and ammunition. The action of these youths 
spread quickly and was replicated by youths in Odi and other communities such that in only a 
couple of weeks, violent resistance had become the creed in the Niger Delta forcing many oil 
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companies to halt production and evacuate staff. Operation Climate Change (a series of activities 
designed to raise environmental awareness all over Ijaw land) had begun. 
 In response to the spreading insurgency, the federal government deployed two war ships 
and about 15 thousand troops comprising mainly northern soldiers to the region, particularly 
Bayelsa state, which had become the hotbed of insurgency. On the morning of December 30, 
1998, about two thousand youths dressed in black marched through the streets of Yenagoa, 
singing and dancing. Soldiers armed with machine guns and rifles opened fire on them killing 
three protesters - Amy Igbila (19yrs), Engineer Frank (28 yrs), and Goodluck Wong (29yrs) - 
and arresting thirty others (Okonta and Douglas 2003). The youths retreated but staged another 
march to demand the release of those arrested. Again, this new set of demonstrators was repelled 
by the fire power of the state and three additional demonstrators including Nwanchuku Okeri and 
Ghadafi Ezeifile were killed. A state of emergency (the first of its kind) was imposed by the 
military throughout Bayelsa state and all forms of congregation even for church or worship were 
banned. Citizens were incessantly harassed and brutalized at military check-points and many 
reports of rape and extra-judicial killings were recorded. 
 The killings and maiming continued in the new year and whole Ijaw villages were leveled 
by the invading soldiers. Kaiama, Yenagoa, Odi, and Oloibiri were besieged resulting in the 
death of hundreds of people and the displacement of thousands more. Also, two Ijaw 
communities (Opia and Ikenya) in Delta state were invaded by hundreds of soldiers. Of the 
approximately 1000 people living in the two villages, sixty-two are still missing and several 
scores of dead bodies were recovered. The villages were burnt to the ground killing livestock and 
destroying fishing equipment and religious places. Nonetheless, "Operation Climate Change" 
continued with the formation of die-hard militant groups including the Niger Delta Peoples 
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Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), 
Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta (COMA), and the Martyrs Brigade (MB) 
(Okonta and Douglas 2003; Hanson 2007). 
 These organizations along with others comprise thousands of well armed youths trained 
in covert military operations and determined to engage the forces of the state in prolonged 
warfare. Two of these groups - NDPVF and MEND - deserve some more detailed discussion. 
The NDPVF was formed in 2003 as the militant wing of the Ijaw Youth Council. Its leader is 
Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo, erstwhile controversial president of the Ijaw Youth Council. 
According to Omojola (2009), the NDPVF was formed in reaction to the underdevelopment of 
the Niger Delta, the exclusion of Niger Delta peasants from the benefits of oil production, the 
ecological devastation of the Niger Delta area as a result of oil production, and the wide scale 
socio-political and economic marginalization of people of the Niger Delta. Thus, its primary goal 
is the mobilization and organization of the youth against oil conglomerates and the state, which 
is in alliance with the oil multinationals.  
 The conflict between the NDPVF and the state has its roots in broader political scheming 
and arrangements. Following the 2003 nationwide elections, a turf war between the NDPVF 
leader Asari Dokubo and the leader of the Niger Delta Vigilante, Tom Ateke, over support for 
candidates to elective offices in Rivers state, escalated due to Dokubo’s perception that the state 
was aligned with Ateke. Miffed by this, Dokubo decided to engage agents of the state and oil 
corporation in an all out war. He served quit notices to the oil companies active in the Niger 
Delta and raised an army he claimed was 10,000 men strong to “reclaim the resources of the 
Niger Delta.” Amongst other demands, Dokubo and the NDPVF sought “resource control and 
self-determination” “by every means necessary,” including kidnapping of oil workers, seizure of 
94 
 
oil facilities, looting of crude oil, and physical engagement with security forces. It would appear 
that Dokubo’s opposition to the state is a complete turnaround from the very cozy relationship 
that he had with the managers of the state prior to the conclusion of the 2003 elections. In fact, 
both Ateke’s NDV and Dokubo’s NDPVF along with many of the other militant groups 
operating in the Niger Delta got their start from the financial (and arms) support they received 
from politicians in the oil-producing states. Thus, their insurgency was fuelled by the localization 
of corruption, the rise of powerful machine politicians, and the liberalization of violence prior to 
the 2003 national elections. State and local politicians engaged and deployed ethnic militias and 
warlords as political thugs to intimidate voters, snatch ballots, and generally forcefully 
manipulate the results of the general elections which were marred by large scale violence. Also, 
these violent political campaigns were financed with proceeds from looted crude, wherein 
warlords were deliberately inserted into the oil theft expedition organized through an elaborate 
state-centered syndicate involving top military, political, corporate, and local leaders (Watts 
2008).    
 In contrast to the NDV and NDPVF, which arose from the deliberate manipulations of 
political gladiators, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) originated 
in response to a different but interrelated set of challenges. It arose specifically from the fallout 
of Dokubo’s violent engagement with the state as well as political developments in Bayelsa state. 
In 2005, Dokubo was arrested by the Obasanjo government in an effort to stop the escalating 
violence in the Niger Delta area. His arrest created a vacuum in the blossoming militant 
movement which was worsened by a split among the leadership of the Federated Niger Delta 
Ijaw Community. Also, in that year, the governor of Bayelsa State Chief D.S.P Alamayesiegha 
was arrested in a federal government inspired sting in London, impeached, tried, convicted, and 
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imprisoned on corruption charges. At that time, Alamayesegha was the highest ranking Ijaw 
public official and popular among the Ijaws who gave him the title of “governor-general” of 
Ijawland. His disgrace and incarceration was, therefore, seen as an affront on Ijawland and a 
calculated attempt to continue the political emasculation of Ijaw speaking peoples. 
 Thus, MEND from the unset, sought to wage both an ideological and a tactical war with 
the state. It mobilized support from the Ijaws be consistent reference to the decades-long quest 
by Ijaws for political and social relevance. It tapped into the ecological despoliation of Ijaw land 
and the concomitant impoverishment of peasant Ijaw farmers. It idealized the failed Isaac Boro 
12 day revolution calling on Ijaws to stand firm in defense of their “God-given resources.” 
MEND parades a very sophisticated organizational structure similar to the more successful rebel 
organizations in other parts of the world. This is because it is led by "more enlightened and 
sophisticated men than most of the groups in the past" as its leaders are educated and have 
studied militant movements in other parts of the world (Obasi 2007). Its great strength is that its 
structure is difficult to fathom because of its very nebulous nature. This is why MEND is seen as 
an "idea" more than an organization (Hanson 2007). Owen (2007) compares MENDs 
organizational and operational model to a franchise operation that must adapt to local conditions. 
According to him "Nigeria is a fluid and difficult place to operate, so you need to choose the 
organizational structure that allows you to operate best." MENDs structure permits the group 
greater flexibility and confounds efforts to incapacitate them.  
 Central to the extractive logic of petrol-capital is the willingness and preparedness of the 
state and its MNOC allies to wage conventional war against non-state actors including 
environmental rights groups, student organizations, and militant movements. This determination 
to brutally suppress groups that directly or indirectly threaten Nigeria's oil production capacity 
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resulted in the extra-judicial murder of the Ogoni activist and playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa and 
eight others by the Gen. Sani Abacha military junta. This resolve, as we have seen, was also 
demonstrated when Odi (the second largest city in Bayelsa state) and other Niger Delta 
communities were invaded by federal forces beginning in November 1999. However, militants 
have shown equal resolve to violently challenge the prevailing extractive logics and the local and 
international coalitions that sustains them. Since Nigeria is almost entirely dependent on this 
industry, prospects of a prolonged warfare in the region are especially troubling. The present 
DDR intervention aims to peacefully resolve the conflict and end the violence. 
3.5 Peacebuilding  
The breadth and reach of conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives has increased 
in the twenty-first century. These increases, themselves, reflect increases in armed conflict in 
society. Since the end of the cold war, over 90 percent of contemporary armed conflict are 
believed to occur within states, replacing conflict between states that had predominated prior to 
the end of the cold war (De Goor et al 1996; Rothstein 1999; Triulzi et al 2003Marshall and Gurr 
2003; Erikson and Wallenstein 2004). Rothstein (1999), for example, associates the spike in 
within state armed conflict with the end of the Cold War. He argues that the end of the war had 
contradictory effects as it pushed some states towards conflict and others towards peace. There 
appears to be agreement, not about the post Cold War effect on contemporary conflicts, but that 
there has been an enormous increase in within state warfare since the end of the cold war. 
According to Marshall and Gurr (2005) and Gawerc (2006), since 1990, more than one-third of 
the world's countries have experienced serious intra-state warfare and nearly two-thirds of these 
conflicted states were in sustained armed conflict situation for seven or more years. Marshall and 
Gurr (2005) and Annan (1996) argue that one unmistakable trend about contemporary conflict 
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dynamics is that intra-state wars are resistant to traditional peacebuilding approaches and are 
difficult to resolve in any form. 
Thus, contemporary conflicts, especially their causes and processes, have a certain 
"newness." These "new wars" (Kaldor 1999) are deep-rooted (Burton 1987), protracted, (Azar 
1990), and intractable. Deep-rooted conflicts result from the deliberate non-satisfaction of certain 
non-negotiable human needs such as security, identity, recognition, and participation. He argues 
that identity groups will use any means necessary to satisfy their needs, which often are framed 
as basic survival needs. In the long run, the armed clamor for the satisfaction of these needs tend 
to intensify instead of being suppressed, contained, or resolved, when force, coercion, or 
negotiated settlements are deployed. Like Burton, Azar (1990) argues that contemporary 
conflicts are protracted because they are the "prolonged and often violent struggle by communal 
groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political 
institutions and economic participation." He argues that intra-state conflicts are typically 
between communal groups and the state, especially in states where a dominant ethnic or religious 
group controls the "machinery of the state" and uses it to dominate, oppress, and suppress other 
less powerful groups. Gidron et al (2002) essentially agree with Burton and Azar. They argue 
that contemporary conflicts are protracted, continual, violent, perceived as irreconcilable, 
zero-sum, central to the lives of the identity groups involved, and total because they involve 
questions of group survival.  
Because these conflicts are rooted in local communities, they have often been 
characterized as "ethnic conflicts." Lederach (1997), however rejects this categorization. He 
argues that there is nothing ethnic about these conflicts preferring the term "identity conflicts" 
instead. Identity conflicts highlight the needs and interests of communal groups such as needs for 
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security, political access, economic participation, and social recognition. Unless the needs of 
groups are adequately addressed, conflicts will remain protracted, even in the face of peace 
processes including peace agreements, peacekeeping, and peacemaking initiatives.  
Lederach (1997) observes that within the last two decades corresponding to the end of the 
Cold War, over 80 peace accords have been signed. This implies that peace processes have 
proliferated such that Bell (2003) calls the 1990's the "decade of the peace agreement." Yet, as 
Gawerc (2006) argues, most of the peace processes have failed and only a few have led to 
durable settlements. This means that the vast majority of intra-state conflict are intractable or at 
least, are resistant to resolution. This suggests that (1) the struggle for sustainable peace is 
inevitably a struggle for political power, and (2) the design and implementation of official 
negotiations to end intra-state conflict have contained inherent shortcomings and contradictions 
(Rasmussen, 2000). One of the more significant shortcomings of contemporary peace processes 
is their failure to "address the bitterness including the memories and images, and the sources that 
generate it" (Gawerc 2006).  
Peacebuilding scholars and advocates are divided about the sources of much 
contemporary conflicts. While some trace armed conflicts to structural conditions including state 
failure, economic cleavages, and political disenfranchisement, others blame armed conflict on 
psychosocial/psychocultural factors including ancient hatreds, extremism/fanaticism, and greed. 
The direction of blame also have implications for policies, strategies, and mechanisms to end 
conflicts. For example, structuralists tend to focus on political issues including justice and rights. 
In contrast, psychoculturalists tend to emphasize relationships, communication, and individual 
and group responsibility and encourage work on eliminating ignorance, misperceptions, 
misrepresentations, fears, and hostility between groups (Gawerc 2006; Fitzduff 2001). The above 
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dichotomization of peacebuilding approaches suggests that the various approaches are mutually 
exclusive and at times antinomic. Thus, the presence of one set of causes implies the absence of 
the other sets. This also suggests that the implementation of one set of strategies necessarily 
warrants the absence of the others. This idea of the exclusiveness and incompatibility of 
peacebuilding approaches has been repudiated by Lederach and other contemporary scholars 
including Galtung (1996), McCandless (2001), and Miall (2006). They argue that both 
approaches are complementary and useful not only for gaining deeper understanding of conflict, 
but also for designing effective interventions. As Lederach (1997) argues, there is need to 
develop a wide range of activities and approaches that recognize the need for both systemic and 
relationship change. It is only when this is done, that society can hope to address what Gawerc 
(2006) calls the "bitterness" that generates conflict or what Zartman (1989) calls the "legacy of 
bitterness" that hampers conflict resolution (Zartman 1989). 
3.6 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) 
While many contemporary approaches including multilateral and bilateral agencies 
continue to prioritize democracy and governance as key to long-term stability, many shorter term 
mechanisms for conflict prevention and peacebuilding are assuming growing importance 
(Muggah, 2009). Selective amnesties, smart sanctions, and interventions such as disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) are increasingly being used to keep post-conflict 
societies from slipping back into conflict and to stimulate economic growth and development 
(Doyle and Sambanis 2002). Paradoxically, as investments in such conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding initiatives is growing, there is increasing doubts about whether they achieve what 
is attributed to them. For example, critics claim that DDR programs are too often narrowly 
conceived, inflexible, technocratic, bureaucratic, and detached from the political transition or 
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broader recovery and reconstruction strategies (Muggah 2009). Because of these concerns, 
scholars seek more evidence that DDR can achieve what is expected and often is ascribed to it.  
DDR comprises a cluster of activities designed to contain arms, dismantle armed groups 
and prevent the reoccurrence of war or violent conflict (Muggah 2009). Collier (1994), Berdela 
(1996), Stedman (1997), and Muggah (2009) argue that DDR is more often undertaken by a 
constellation of international agencies and national governments. From a political economy 
perspective, DDR encapsulates the strategic and bureaucratic priorities of the security and 
development sectors of a state. Because of this, the Nigerian Amnesty program stimulates the 
discourse on the policy priorities of the Nigerian government and particularly its political class or 
governing elites. According to Duffield (2007), DDR is at the heart of neo-liberal forms of 
power and governmentability. This means that DDR does not emerge spontaneously from below; 
rather, it is part of what Muggah (2009:2) describes as a “broader ‘Weberian’ project of securing 
the legitimate control of force" from combatants on behalf of the state. 
Contemporary DDR approaches typically consist of a series of carefully designed and 
phased activities aimed at creating a suitable environment that would encourage stability and 
development. Advocates of DDR believe that the three components of the program 
(disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) interlock and are mutually reinforcing 
activities. Disarmament has been defined as the collection of small arms, ammunition, 
explosives, and light and heavy weapons from combatants and at times from civilians (UN 1999; 
Nillson 2005). The focus of disarmament is the reduction of the number of weapons (especially 
illegal weapons) in order to create a safer society. Because the relinquishment of weapons have 
often been traumatic for combatants, the disarmament process is first and foremost a 
confidence-building exercise (Hithcock 2004). DDR advocates argue that disarmament is a 
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critically important component and emphasize the generation of visible and tangible evidence of 
success in terms of arms and munitions collected. However, they recognize that this component 
alone is incapable of providing the desired outcomes and must be complemented with parallel 
activities such as demobilization, reintegration, economic reconstruction, confidence and security 
enhancing activities, and the promotion of democracy and the rule of law (Muggah 2009; Spear 
2006). Although disarmament when undertaken with concrete verification mechanisms and when 
arms are destroyed has the potential for building confidence in the peace process between 
erstwhile warring parties as was the case in Northern Ireland, it is more beneficial for 
ex-combatants (due to improved socio-economic and political conditions) to abandon their desire 
to resort to arms in order to solve grievances. 
Demobilization on its own like disarmament can potentially generate unintentional 
security dilemmas (Collier 1994). Demobilization is seen as the process of disconnecting 
combatants from their armed groups or units or significantly reducing the number of combatants 
serving in armed units (Berdal 1996; Hithcock 2004; Nillson 2005). The goal of demobilization 
is to give back to the state, its monopoly of violence by disbanding non-state armed groups and 
paramilitary forces. This activity or phase is critical to the process of reintegration, which is 
defined as the political, economic, and social integration of ex-combatants, their families, and 
primary support network into civil society (Nillson, 2005). This definition includes several 
components including 1) political integration wherein ex-combatants, their families, and support 
structure become part of the decision making process of their community; 2) Economic 
integration in which ex-combatants, their families, and support system are enabled to develop 
their livelihoods; and 3) Social integration wherein local communities accept ex-combatants, 
their families, and primary support system as members of the community. 
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Governments emerging from war frequently demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants 
into existing security structures and or civilian populations. Muggah (2009) argues that the 
challenges accompanying reintegration into either category are immense. Depending on the 
context, the process is often heavily politicized and the absorptive capacities of areas for civilian 
reintegration are often greatly limited (Azam et al 1994). Also, there is the possibility that 
ex-combatants that remained partially organized within their existing command structures could 
potentially play the role of spoilers as happened in Sierra Leone in 2000 (World Bank 2002). 
Along this line, Knight and Ozerdam (2004) observes that in some cases, ex-combatants 
unintentionally reinforced latent command structures especially when precautions to prevent this 
from happening were not adopted in advance. In contrast, if ex-combatants were too hastily 
demobilized especially when the process failed to adequately dismantle command and control 
structures as happened in Angola, they could trigger insecurity in the communities of return 
(Muggah 2009; Spear 2006).  
 Conventional DDR envisions a continuum that extends from a narrow minimalist 
(establishing security) to a broad maximalist (incorporating development) perspective (Jennings 
2008). The minimalist approach according to Muggah (2009:23) is “focused on expedience, 
where the program aspires less to creating a lasting impact on the lives of ex-combatants and 
more to time-limited gains.” These approaches focus on removing weapons, cantoning 
ex-combatants and generally fulfilling the terms of peace agreements. While the strategic goals 
of the minimalist approach includes a reduction of the likelihood of war reoccurrence, the micro 
objectives focus on de-linking the command and control of armed groups. In contrast, the 
maximalist approach “implies a more ambitious, transformative reintegrative agenda (Muggah 
2009).” The focus is on interventions that have more ambitious focus and scope. Their objectives 
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include the rehabilitation of ex-combatants and the reinforcing of public institutions and their 
legitimacy by promoting markets, property rights, and socio-economic and political 
infrastructures. These objectives are partly achieved by redressing distortions in state spending 
and promoting policies and activities that stimulate economic growth and enhance human 
capacities and endowments.  
 Despite the great enthusiasm about its utility in conflict prevention or post-conflict 
intervention, a body of critical literature that questions and challenges core DDR assumptions is 
emerging (Jennings 2008; Pouligny 2004). One of the main concerns is that DDR glosses over 
the complexity of conflict and artificially grafts DDR programs onto volatile conflict and 
post-conflict societies. Case studies (Humphreys and Weinstein; Pugel 2009) for example, 
demonstrates the genuine risks that accompany the imposition of DDR interventions from the top 
especially if they are divorced from the political, social, and economic context in which violence 
or conflict is imbedded. Muggah (2009:3) observes that DDR is “too often resorted to in a 
knee-jerk fashion and launched in such a way that it is isolated from the broader clutch of 
processes associated with governance, state consolidation and economic recovery.”  
 Apart from this, critics also quarrel with the conceptual dimensions of certain aspects of 
DDR especially the aspect that concerns the reintegration of former combatants. The concern is 
that generic approaches to reintegration are inadequate for dealing with the heterogeneous and 
differentiated motivations of armed groups. Some critics worry that combatant-centric 
approaches to reintegration misfire completely and that investment should be directed instead to 
more inclusive or area-based programs focusing on employment, infrastructural development, 
and economic growth (Pouligny 2004; Jennings 2008; Willibald 2006). These critics specifically 
target the rational choice models and monetary incentives (such as payments to combatants) 
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dominating the field. Finally, critics and practitioners worry that DDR lacks clear benchmarks or 
metrics to determine success. Muggah (2009) argues that while this is also true of other 
development interventions initiated by multilateral and bilateral contributors in complex 
environments, the “fact that DDR deals specifically with weapons and armed groups suggests an 
extra layer of caution is warranted.”   
3.7 Women Militants and DDR 
 Women militants or combatants, like their male counterparts, have essential roles to play 
in the Niger Delta amnesty program. Yet, women generally are frequently excluded from the 
planning and implementation of DDR programs or in peacebuilding processes in conflicted 
societies. The Niger Delta Post-Amnesty Committee in June 2010, released figures of militants 
enrolled in the amnesty program. Of the 20,192 ex-militants registered to participate in the 
program, there are only 133 females representing about 0.6 percent of the population of 
registered ex-militants. As has happened in many other conflicted societies where DDR has been 
implemented, female militants make up a very small number of the forces to be demobilized and 
reintegrated. Thus, there is the possibility that they will be de-prioritized because they are not 
considered as posing the same level of threat as male ex-militants. Demobilizing female 
combatants in the Niger Delta especially were vital institutions are lacking or have been 
impacted by the conflict and which also have a history of excluding women who in most cases 
are the key providers in the family, is fraught with enormous challenges for the future of peace 
(or violence) in the Niger Delta. 
 For example, even if the amnesty program is committed to achieving gender equality in 
the peacebuilding period, there may be a lack of capacity to deal with issues that pertain directly 
to women including a lack of funds specifically earmarked to support women ex-militants as a 
105 
 
special group with peculiar challenges and needs. Because the amnesty program may lack this 
gender-sensitive focus, it may inadequately address the needs of women in the disarmament and 
demobilization phase, or to effectively support their rehabilitation and reintegration, and to 
adequately target them for economic and political empowerment at the economic reconstruction 
phase. The inattention to the details and specifics of female involvement in organized violence 
may severely undermine the ability of the Niger Delta Amnesty Program to build sustainable 
peace in the region. 
 The role women play in peace negotiations and in post-conflict reconstruction has been 
well documented in the peacebuilding literature (Ortega 2009). However, the focus has been on 
their roles as victims, peace enablers, and peacemakers; not as combatants and possible obstacles 
to the peace process. As Ortega (2009) points out, this may be a consequence of the portrayal of 
women as nurturers, caregivers, and positive social actors who abhor violence and support peace 
processes. These stereotypically gendered notions about ideal female roles compared to their 
male counterparts have severe implications for how women ex-combatants are treated by 
processes and programs that aim to build peace in conflicted societies and ultimately the 
outcomes of peacebuilding programs. Thus, acknowledging the range of female ex-combatants’ 
experiences and recognizing their potential for complicity and agency in organized violence is an 
important step toward deconstructing prevalent stereotypes of gender-appropriate behavior in 
conflict contexts (Ortega 2009). 
 Still, it is doubtful that the Niger Delta amnesty program incorporates special procedures 
and considerations for women combatants based on their special needs. According to Bernard et 
al (2003), these considerations are based on their gender, age, and condition including their 
circumstances as girl mothers and pregnant women combatants. There is also the concern that 
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the amnesty process may not incorporate a significant proportion of eligible women combatants. 
The planning documents do not appear to discriminate between men and women or to focus on 
critical female needs that often are ignored in DDR programs and processes. They do not appear 
to consider the special needs of women who, due to the stigma attached to being identified as 
combatants, are deterred from participating in the DDR process (Bernard et al 2003).  
As Bernard et al (2003) argues, unless the special needs of women are addressed, many 
of the female ex-combatants will fall through the cracks and re-integrate onto the streets, 
degenerate into prostitution or crime, or return as mercenaries or paid combatants in another war 
– a more deadly campaign that may be difficult to halt once it begins. We cannot overstate these 
needs which vary in intensity and severity based on their experiences. For example, some of the 
women have committed great atrocities that may haunt them for a long time. Some of these 
women have abused drugs. Many have little or no education and have enjoyed the power they 
wielded through the barrel of the gun. Some have been sexually abused both by fellow 
combatants and by government forces. Some are mothers and many are wives or have become 
wives. Because many of these women may be inaccessible to the amnesty committee due to the 
gendered nature of cultural interpretations of male and female roles and behavior, their actual 
condition, number, and specific needs may remain unknown. Recognizing these needs may help 
prevent a return to armed struggle in the Niger Delta. 
 This study, therefore, is intended to provide the much needed evidence for DDR success 
or failure that has been lacking in the field. It will provide evidence of how and why combatants 
are mobilized and what ultimately happens when they are disarmed and demobilized. It will 
answer questions about whether reintegration is an effective strategy for preventing conflict or a 
return to conflict after peace has been established. It will provide evidence on how DDR 
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interventions can be made more contextually appropriate, accountable, and effective and 
promote genuine safety and security. Appropriate metrics of success that takes the totality of 
indicators, impacts, and outcomes into cognizance are greatly needed and this work is dedicated 
to satisfying that need.  
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Chapter 4: 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
I seek to locate my analysis of the Niger Delta violence and the amnesty intervention in 
relation to two distinct bodies of theoretical work. The first operates under the rubric of conflict 
formation and contains within it four theoretical postulations that draw attention to the formation 
of the violence in the Niger Delta. The second operates under the sign of conflict transformation 
and extends the concerns of the conflict formation school to include mechanisms for building 
peace in the Niger Delta. Thus, using both approaches, I argue that the amnesty program is 
wedged in the middle of a major conceptual rift: change versus stability. In order for change to 
produce peace, it must vibrantly engage the structural fissures that produced the Niger Delta 
conflict in the first place. 
4.1 Conflict Formation Theory 
 I examine four distinct ideas related to the formation of the Niger Delta conflict. I first 
examine the issue of environmental security. Since the 1990’s, interest in the environment as a 
source of political conflict and as the cold war security problematic (Watts et al, 2004) has risen 
sharply. Interest in these issues peaked after the publication of Tad Homer-Dixon’s (1999) 
“Environment, Scarcity and Violence,” Robert Kaplan’s (2000) “The Coming Anarchy,” and 
Michael Klare’s (2001) “Resource Wars.” These works and many others which focus on the 
environment raise questions concerning environmental degradation, rehabilitation, and 
conservation. For example, Kaplan in “The Coming Anarchy” argued that "eco-demographic 
pressures" have created numerous emergencies within African states including poverty and 
malnourishment, and these challenges have forced many African societies into acts of violence. 
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In essence, the violence in the Niger Delta results from environmental changes including 
oil-induced pollution that have immense negative effects on the local economy. By this analysis, 
Niger Delta militants use violence not only to force environmental rehabilitation and 
conservation, but also as a means of economic subsistence. 
The second strand of conflict formation theory focuses on the tension between resources, 
politics, and civil conflict. Khan (1994), Karl (1997), Coronil (1997), Collier, (2000), Watts et al 
(2004), and Robinson (2006) examine polities dominated by oil revenue and the mechanisms 
through which rent-seeking produces what Watts et al (2004) call “petrol regimes.” Watts et al 
(2004:4) for example, observes that oil rent in Nigeria have historically sustained a “parasitic 
ruling elite” and enabled the state to fraudulently purchase political consent from exploited 
minorities while maintaining the “delicate northern hegemony within a competitive multi-ethnic 
polity.” Okilo (1980), Ikporokpu (1996), and Watts et al (2004) argue that consent is obtained 
through a derivation principle that distributes oil rents and royalties to states and this is 
complicated by massive institutional corruption.  
Similarly, Collier (2000) uses resource-dependency to analyze and explain rebellion in 
Africa. According to Collier, oil is a lootable resource that engenders intense antagonisms 
amongst competing socio-political forces. The predatory nature of these diverse forces within 
and outside of government produces armed conflict and civil wars. Thus, people rebel not 
because of the existence of grievance but because of the abundance of opportunities available to 
do well through war. Colliers economics of war thesis has found support from Keen (2005) and 
Reno (2000). Keen argues that the objective of warfare is not to win but to create conditions and 
opportunities for the plundering of vital resources without the requirement of accountability. In 
this sense, internal warfare does not approximate to the breakdown of law and order or of 
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rationality; instead, it creates a new type of order and rationality. Keen argues that civil war 
stimulates “another system of profit, power and even protection, granting actors the opportunity 
to loot, and exploit civilians” (Keen 2005:51). Reno (2000) also attaches little significance to 
grievance. He argues that corruption, the privatization of the state, and the personalization of 
power weakens state institutions and leads to state collapse with warlords superintending over 
vast fractious territories that have lootable natural resources. Injustice and social grievance, 
therefore, exist only as ideological tools utilized by greedy persons to access lootable resources.  
The third strand of conflict formation theory addresses ethnicity, ethnic mobilization, and 
ethnic conflict (Ijomah 1998; Mandani 2000; Sagay 2008; Watts et al 2004). These works help 
us understand Nigeria’s pre-colonial and post-colonial political formations and its nascent 
federalism. Sagay (2008), observes that before colonialism there was no Nigeria. Nigeria is a 
British creation and consists of over 400 fiercely independent and often acrimonious 
nationalities. These societies would fight over territory, food, culture, religion, trade, and 
opportunity. Ijomah (1998) describes these nationalities as "inconsistent cognitive elements" 
which were forced together to pursue British economic interests. He accused the British of not 
"creating clear behavioral assertions" to foster nationhood. Mandani (2000) shows how cultural 
indegeneity became the basis of ethnicity and the specific ways in which ethnicity is invented, 
reinvented, and mobilized within the arena of oil politics, often provoking violence. Watts et al 
(2004) examine local forms of community and ethnic mobilization that are vital aspects of the 
social relations of oil extraction. How these relations are forged, negotiated, and reconfigured 
including land use and reform, customary laws, territoriality, contact with oil companies and 
forms of identification (ethnicity, gender, age, chieftaincy, clanship) around traditional authority 
and locally specific forms of capitalist development have important implications for the violence. 
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The fourth strand of conflict formation theory associate oil neither with incumbent 
politics nor predation proneness. Instead, it focuses on the link between violent intra-state 
conflicts and state/corporate enclave politics. Watts et al (2004: 5) note the striking “lack of local 
level dynamics … and the total invisibility of both transnational oil companies (which typically 
work in joint ventures with the state) and with the intersection of local politics and 
petrol-capitalism." Instead of pursuing oil extraction as a source of predation or state military 
power, Watts et al (2004) focuses on how petrol-capitalism produces particular kinds of enclave 
economies and governable spaces that are characterized by instability and armed violence.  
It is easily seen, then, that theories of conflict formation are immensely useful for 
explaining the causes of the Niger Delta conflict and the mobilization of insurgency. However, 
they have limited application in explaining the peacebuilding process or the transformation of 
destructive conflict to constructive conflict. They also have limited applicability in regards to the 
larger conceptual quarrel between change and stability and their connection to the 
implementation of the Amnesty Program. Lederach’s conflict transformation theory addresses 
peacebuilding and the processes through which violent conflict is transformed to a peaceful 
situation amenable to all parties to a conflict. 
4.2 Conflict Transformation Theory 
Conflict transformation theory is relatively new in the field of peacebuilding. However, 
the core of the theory draws on many of the familiar concepts of conflict management, conflict 
resolution, and conflict formation. Because of its ideological linkage to these, conflict 
transformation theory is not entirely seen as a new approach but as a re-conceptualization of the 
field in order to make it more relevant to contemporary conflict situations (Miall 2004). This 
re-conceptualization is imperative owing to changes in the nature of contemporary conflicts. For 
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example, most contemporary conflicts occur within national boundaries impelled asymmetrically 
by crescive economic and political fissures including inequities of power and status. Also, as 
Smith (2004) observes, many contemporary conflicts are protracted, marked by sporadic periods 
of violence and peace. In this case, conflict occurs in waves - rising precipitously until some 
accommodation is reached and then falling off dramatically (almost to the point that there is a 
marked absence of conflict) and then rising again (Koopmans 2004). Protracted conflict not only 
upsets the social equilibrium but ultimately distorts the society, creating complex emergencies. 
 Conflict transformation embodies three distinct theoretical motions: conflict 
management (Bloomfield and Reilley 1998), conflict resolution (Deutsch and Coleman 2000), 
and conflict transformation (Lederach 1999). Conflict management theory has been defined by 
Bloomfield and Reilly (1998:18) as the:  
positive and constructive handling of difference and divergence. Rather than advocating methods 
for removing conflict, [conflict management] addresses the more realistic question of managing 
conflict: how to deal with it in a constructive way, how to bring opposing sides together in a 
cooperative process, how to design a practical, achievable, cooperative system for the constructive 
management of differences. 
 
For conflict management theorists, violent conflicts result from differences in values and 
interests embedded within the structures of society. Because these differences are entrenched 
within macro- and micro-social structures (historical experiences, institutional relationships, 
resource appropriation and distribution, existing power coalitions, etc), they cannot be 
eradicated. The best society can do is to manage the conflict and prevent it from escalating in 
such a way that it potentially disrupts the smooth running of society. Occasionally as Miall 
(2004) points out, it may be possible to arrive at a historic compromise wherein violence is 
temporarily abandoned and peace vigorously pursued. The goal of conflict management, 
therefore, is to achieve political settlements leveraging the resources of certain key actors 
powerful enough to exert pressure on the conflicting parties to settle or to guide the inevitable 
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conflict into appropriate channels. 
 Conflict resolution theory, unlike conflict management theory, focuses on intervention by 
skilled but powerless third parties (operating outside of the political system) that enables 
conflicting parties understand, explore, analyze, question, reframe, and synthesize their positions 
and interests. Conflict resolution theorists denounce the systemic approach of conflict 
management theorists as ineffectual and incapable of resolving conflicts because they ignore the 
communal and identity depths from which conflicts spring. They argue that people involved in 
identity-induced violent conflicts are often unwilling to negotiate compromise; instead, the roots 
of the conflict must be explored in order to evolve creative resolutions that the conflicting parties 
may have missed in their commitment to their entrenched positions. Therefore, conflict 
resolution essentially involves helping the parties of conflict transition from zero-sum destructive 
patterns of conflict to positive-sum outcomes (Deutsch and Coleman 2000).  
Conflict transformation extends conflict management and conflict resolution theories 
beyond the mere reframing of positions and the identification of positive outcomes. Lederach 
(2003) defined conflict transformation as envisioning and responding to “the ebb and flow of 
social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce 
violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life 
problems in human relationships." In this context, transformation transcends the mere resolution 
of an episode of conflict and involves an examination of the epicenter of conflict or the relational 
patterns from which episodes emerge. Although the language of resolution provided the initial 
framing structure for conflict transformation, conflict transformation has moved decidedly away 
from conflict resolution in response to emergent challenges. According to Lederach (2003:29) 
“the language of resolution implies finding a solution to a problem.” Implied in this 
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understanding is a certain “definitiveness” and “finality” that suggests that the conflict or 
conflicts have been amicably resolved. In this sense, the focus of resolution is the “presenting 
problems” or the “substance and content of the problem.” The content-centeredness implied 
above explains the sense of “finality” that resolution theorists and practitioners bring to 
particular conflict situations and the predominance of negotiation techniques within the conflict 
resolution literature (Lederach 2003). In a sense, therefore, conflict resolution is not oriented 
toward change; rather, it is concerned with how to “end something that is not desired” (Lederach 
2003:29). 
In contrast, the basis of Lederach’s conflict transformation is change. Here, the concern is 
the process by which conflict assumes different shapes across time or how conflict moves from 
one form to the other. He observes that “by its nature, when we add “trans” to “form” we must 
contemplate both the presenting situation and a new one.” In essence, unlike conflict resolution, 
which asks the question “how do we end something that is not desirable,” conflict transformation 
asks “how do we end something that is not desirable and build something that we desire” 
(Lederach 2003: 29-30). The implication here is that unlike conflict resolution that focuses 
exclusively on the content of a problem, conflict transformation incorporates a concern for 
content into its interest in the “context of relationship patterns.” 
To make the differences between resolution and transformation clearer, Lederach 
distinguished between the processes of both approaches. Whereas resolution builds process into 
the relationship of the conflicting parties at the exact point where the “symptoms of the crisis and 
disruption” occur, conflict transformation sees the conflict as an “opportunity to engage a 
broader context, to explore and understand the system of relationships and patterns that gave 
birth to the crisis” (Lederach 2003:30). Resolution is considered problem-centered or 
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crisis-driven because it focuses on the “symptoms of the crisis or disruption” and not the 
underlying cause of the problem. It is animated by the impulse to resolve or deescalate conflict 
and hence can achieve only modest short-term, non-permanent fixes. In contrast, conflict 
transformation is crisis-responsive and is imbedded in a constructive change system that uses a 
“variety of roles, functions, and processes” to open up conflict to permanent fixes that are rooted 
in structures, processes, culture, relationships, and persons. 
Thus, for Lederach, transformation responds both to episodes of conflict (visible or overt 
expressions of conflict) and the epicenter of conflict (web of relational patterns including the 
history of lived episodes from which new episodes and issues emerges). Transformation offers 
an expanded view or what Lederach (2003; 2005) calls the “big picture of conflict” by situating 
issues and crisis within a framework of relationships and social context. Its lenses are specially 
configured to see both “solutions and ongoing change processes” (Lederach 2003:32). In 
transformation, the opportunity for constructive change (anchored on a responsive and adaptive 
platform) results directly from the episode of conflict and the “episode of conflict becomes an 
opportunity to address the epicenter of conflict” (Lederach 2003:32).  
 In making this point, Lederach suggests that peacebuilding is both a process and an 
outcome. The idea of peacebuilding or conflict transformation as process was initiated by Laue 
and Cormick (1978) to delineate an array of conflict intervention roles (including activists, 
advocates, mediators, and enforcers). Peacebuilding as process, therefore, consists of roles and 
functions instead of an activity pertaining to a mediator or team of mediators. This approach, in 
more recent times, has been expanded by Mitchell (1992) who developed a much broader 
typology of roles and functions of external peacemakers including explorers, conveners, 
decouplers, unifiers, enskillers, envisioners, guarantors, and facilitators. Similarly, Kriesberg 
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(1991) suggests a series of intermediary activities to be performed by different people at different 
times that signifies the peace process. Also, Keashly and Fisher (1990) observe that intermediary 
work are strategies that are matched to different stages of escalation and de-escalation of a 
conflict. Thus, different strategies are needed at different stages of conflict development. 
Lederach (1997:67) supports this line of thinking. His idea of peacebuilding does not rely on “a 
single individual or team to sustain and broaden the process of constructive conflict 
transformation in divided societies” like Nigeria. Instead, peacebuilding involves and engages “a 
variety of people working at different levels and focusing on various aspects of the conflict.” 
Irrespective of whether it focuses on “roles,” “functions,” activities,” or “strategies,” conflict 
transformation sees conflict as a “dynamic process” and peacebuilding as a “multiplicity of 
interdependent elements and actions that contribute to the constructive transformation of 
conflict” (Lederach 1997: 67).  
As outcome, conflict transformation implies a qualitative change from a condition of 
violence to a condition of peace with little or no opportunities for reversal. It is a change system 
that transforms: (a) the conflict itself; (b) some aspects of the socio-historical and political 
system in which the conflict occurs; (c) the persons involved in the conflict; and (d) the 
relationships between adversaries. It is transformation at these multiple levels that ultimately 
produces peace. This conclusion should not obstruct the investigation of the schism between 
change and stability. While stability may be the outcome of change, stability is often resistant to 
change, hence conflict. Stability, which is generally regarded in contemporary discourse as the 
logical outcome of every peace program or as an end itself, is not coterminous with peace. 
Stability in the Niger Delta context may imply the reproduction of oppressive socio-political 
structures, inequality, lack of legitimate economic access, pollution, grinding poverty, illegal oil 
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bunkering, and class and ethnic disparities in human development - all of which are either 
sources or aggravating factors to the protracted armed conflict. Thus, imbedded in the conflict 
transformation model are tensions of structural conduciveness, strain, new beliefs, precipitants, 
mobilization, and social control (Foran 2005). 
 
Figure 1: Lederach’s pyramid of leadership 
Lederach’s structure consists of a pyramid with elite leaders (policy and decision-makers) at the 
top, socio-religious leaders, academics and media executives at the middle, and grassroots 
community leaders at the lower level. Lederach believes that a comprehensive peacebuilding 
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initiative must address complementary changes at all three levels. The conflict intervention 
model suggested here is shaped primarily by the ideologies and theories of those at the top of the 
pyramid - the elites. Those at the middle must validate and approve the ideas and theories 
propounded by the elites to instigate and entrench peace. It is the responsibility of the leaders at 
the grassroots as well as the ordinary people that they lead to implement the changes proposed at 
the top. The peace process suggested in this model is negotiated and activated through activities 
(including documents, meetings, conferences, workshops, consultations, agreements, contracts) 
involving an entire population irrespective of their positions within societies gradated structure.  
In essence, his conflict transformation theory is attuned to the broader dialectics of 
peacebuilding wherein transformation plugs into the conflict dynamic ultimately producing a 
type of peace (or conflict) amenable to all parties. Using this logic, the Niger Delta Amnesty or 
DDR program could interact with the conflict in a number of constellations leading to the 
transformation of the conflict over time, across space, and in many different directions. It could 
cause changes to the political structure of society (reorganize the federal structure, strengthen 
democratic institutions, civilianize the political system, strengthen the electoral system), 
transform the economic space (develop socio-cultural infrastructures, invigorate agriculture, 
stimulate employment, reduce poverty), bring about demographic shifts (stop the rural-urban 
drift and encourage urban-rural migration), redress the ecological damage (reduce or eliminate 
spills and pollution), and cause personality modifications (increase cooperation between 
militants and society, encourage citizen capacity training and vocational education). Or, the 
Amnesty Program could reinvigorate the same tensions and pressures responsible for the 
conflict, effectively maintaining the status quo as well as the conflict. 
In figure 2, I visualize the Niger Delta conflict and the amnesty intervention through 
 Lederach’s “big picture of conflict transformation,” which consists of three main elements: the 
presenting situation, the horizon of the future, and the development of change processes. 
Lederach discusses each as a point of inquiry in the development of effective responses to 
conflict. The three distinct components corresponds to the totality of the transformation of 
conflict from its etiology to its escalation and ultimately to its resolution.
 
Figure 2: Lederach’s big picture of conflict transformation 
Inquiry 1: The Presenting Situation  
 The first level of inquiry presents a set of embedded spheres, which are shown in the 
diagram as ellipses. Lederach (2003: 34) used spheres 
“spaces of exploration, meaning, and action.” The metaphor of spheres, therefore, represents 
evolving space. In the Niger Delta context, the sphere of armed conflict including the spiraling 
 
 
 
as metaphors to stimulate thought around 
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waves of kidnapping, pipeline vandalizations, oil bunkering, and destruction of valuable oil 
assets is labeled “issues.” This sphere is itself embedded in the sphere of ancient hatreds, 
colonialism, resource deprivation, pollution, socio-political marginalization, imperialism and 
capitalist exploitation. This sphere is labeled “history” showing that the Niger Delta conflict is 
rooted in the historical context of exploitation, injustice, global racism, corruption, and pollution. 
Put differently, the violence is based on patterns of exploitative relationships and structures that 
dates back through history. 
 According to Lederach, central to unraveling the presenting issues (or armed conflict) is 
the tension between the past and the present. The patterns of past exploitative and unjust 
relations provides the veneer for the present ethnic agitation and armed conflict. Therefore, the 
existing armed conflict provides the opportunity to recognize and appreciate the past and the set 
of factors that individually and collectively have produced the amnesty or DDR intervention. 
Although the violence and its consequences can bring forth this consciousness, they do not have 
the ability by themselves to positively alter or change that history. The potential for constructive 
change begins with our ability to “recognize, understand, and redress” the past and proceeds with 
our “willingness to create new ways of interacting” and to “build relationships and structures” 
that are geared towards the future (Lederach 2003: 34). 
 Lederach would argue that the violence in the Niger Delta (actual experience of conflict) 
along with its consequences (deaths, social displacement, declining oil profit, etc) and the energy 
released over these issues, defines the “episodic” dimension of the conflict. He would argue that 
moving from the violence (and its consequences) towards the spheres of relational and historical 
patterns (colonialism/imperialism, corruption, pollution, resource control, political exclusion, 
etc) brings us to the “epicenter” of the conflict, which is always capable of creating new episodes 
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of conflict that are based either on similar or on completely different issues. The goal of 
transformation is to understand both the episode and the epicenter of conflict. How well the 
Niger Delta amnesty program anticipates and responds to these ambitions may determine the 
programs outcomes or effectiveness. 
Inquiry 2: The Horizon of the Future 
 Lederach used the metaphor of horizon to articulate the ambition for a future of 
non-violence. According to him, a “horizon can be seen but not touched. It can provide 
orientation, but it requires constant journeying each day. The future we can visualize but not 
control” (2003: 36). In regards to the Niger Delta conflict, we can represent the future as a set of 
spheres. Lederach (2003: 36) used spheres to “suggest an open and dynamically evolving 
future.” Embedded within this sphere are smaller spheres: immediate solutions (the ceasefire 
agreement, disarmament and demobilization, payment of stipends and allowances to militants, 
increased oil production, etc); relationships (cooperation between militants and government, new 
lines of communication between the oil industry and host communities, mediation by the 
amnesty committee, etc.) and; structures (establishment of committees to deal with the conflict 
such as the Presidential Committee on the Modalities for the Involvement of Host Communities 
in the Ownership of Petroleum Assets in Nigeria, Disarmament, Rehabilitation, and 
Reintegration Sub-committee, Oil and Gas Asset Protection sub-committee, Environmental 
Clean-up Remediation Sub-committee, Infrastructural Development Sub-committee, etc.). 
According to Lederach (2003: 37) inquiry into the future engages questions such as “what do we 
hope to build” and “how can we address all levels - immediate solutions as well as underlying 
patterns of relationships and structures?” 
 Lederach argues that a combination of the two spheres of inquiry (the presenting situation 
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and the horizon of the future) produces a linear model of change - a output/outcome condition 
involving the movement from the present to the desired future. Instead of this linear 
conceptualization, Lederach advocates a dialectic involving change, dynamics, processes, 
relationships, and people. Viewed as a dialectic, each part of the trinity creates energy that feeds 
off the other parts. This is why the image Lederach draws is that of an interconnected circle 
defined and energized by pointed arrows. The violence in the region (presenting situation) 
creates an impetus towards non-violent change. Thus, the violence is a specific kind of 
destructive energy that sets off other chains of energy. This is depicted by the forward moving 
arrows. The horizon of the future responds to this destructive energy by showing the possibilities 
of what could be salvaged, modified, or constructed. Lederach argues that the horizon 
“represents a social energy that informs and creates orientation.” It is reflexive - capable of 
looking back towards the past, comprehending the present, and setting clear priorities for the 
future. It is for this reason that the arrow points towards the presenting situation (a combination 
of past and present) and forward toward the array of change processes that may result from the 
amnesty intervention. Because the totality of arrows yields a complete circle, Lederach (2003: 
37) describes his big picture as “both a circular and a linear process” or a “process-structure.” 
Put differently, Lederach’s model is both linear (especially in terms of its progression from stage 
to stage or past, present, and future) and dialectical (involving a mesh of interactions, 
interactants, relationships, structures, and processes). 
Inquiry 3: The Development of Change Processes 
 Lederach (2003: 37) discusses the design and support of change processes as a sphere 
with embedded components. This metaphor encourages thinking about the response to conflict as 
the “development of processes of change that attend to the web of interconnected needs, 
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relationships and patterns on all four levels: personal, relational, cultural, and structural.” Thus, 
response to conflict is not an isolated event, activity, or condition; rather, it is a change process 
involving “multiple independent initiatives” that are different but not incompatible with one 
another. Transformation requires the integration of multiple change sources and processes; not “a 
single operational solution.” These change processes must address both episodic challenges and 
the epicenter of the conflict. They must address the immediate problems as well as create 
concrete platforms for long-term relational and cultural change. 
 For Lederach, therefore, conflict transformation is a complete change system comprising 
three elements. The presenting situation and horizon of the future occupy opposite extremes of a 
continuum. At the middle of these two change systems (each element can be contemplated as a 
complete system) is the development of change processes, which functions as the link between 
the presenting situation and the future. According to Lederach (2003: 38) the movement from the 
present to the desired future is not a straight line. Instead, change is midwifed by a “dynamic set 
of initiatives that set in motion change processes and promote long-term change strategies” at the 
same time that it provides “responses to specific, immediate needs.” However, Lederach (1995) 
is adamant that the transformation process must be mid-wifed by forces located within the 
conflicted society rather than by outside mediators. According to him: 
Conflict transformation must actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and 
cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which 
we do not ‘primarily see the setting and the people in it as the problem’ and the outsider, as the 
‘answer.’ Rather, we understand the long-term goal of transformation as validating and building 
on people and resources within the setting. 
In other words, Lederach advocates for a close interaction between parties to the conflict and 
civil society in which the entire context of the conflict is understood and problems addressed. He 
argues that they must develop the capacity to: 
Situate oneself in a changing environment with a sense of direction and purpose and at the same 
time develop the ability to see and move with the unexpected ... With the peripheral vision 
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change processes have a flexible strength, never find dead ends that stop their movement, and 
relish complexity precisely because complexity never stops offering new things that may create 
ways forward, around, or behind whatever jumps in the way" (Lederach, 2005:119). 
 
The transformation of the conflict in the Niger Delta must anticipate, solicit, and engage the 
active contribution and participation of all parties to the conflict including militant, oil 
conglomerates, governments (federal, state, and local), communities, traditional institutions, 
peace advocates and rights groups, and the Niger Delta peasants. Unless all of these interests are 
incorporated into the mechanism for conflict transformation, all that is hoped for may not only 
remain elusive but upset the fragile balance already created in a way that does incalculable 
damage to the indivisibility of the Nigerian federation. 
In conclusion, this study will use the principle components of conflict formation and 
conflict transformation to assess the impact of the amnesty program on the Niger Delta violence. 
I will use these models as the theoretical foundations for resolving my research questions and to 
build context into my analysis. They are certainly useful for contemplating the formation of the 
conflict and the transformative process beginning with the implementation of the amnesty 
program and ultimately, its outcomes.  
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Chapter 5 
 
METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE 
 
 
   If you turn on our taps, oil will flow like water.  
   Yet, there is not a drop of water to drink in this place.  
   Not one drop. 
       (Niger Delta peasant). 
 
5.0 Research Design 
 
The overarching hypothesis of this study is that a convergence of disarmament, 
demobilization, reintegration, and reconstruction by themselves cannot end the Niger Delta 
violence. In order for these to succeed, they must be imbedded within local structures that are 
attuned to the contexts (relationships, institutions, and persons - corporate and individual) that 
are active in the conflict. It is the task of this research to identify and explicate how DDR 
concatenates these structures and contexts to build peace in the Niger Delta. This project utilizes 
a mixed-method approach, which combines quantitative and qualitative methods during different 
phases of the research process (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003; Creswell 2002). The simultaneous 
use of quantitative and qualitative methods is one way to address the deep complexities involved 
in the implementation of this DDR program. Neither method is sufficient by itself to capture the 
context, trends, and dynamics of the Niger Delta violence as well as the DDR intervention. 
Combining both methods draws on the strengths of each method and permits a more complete 
analysis.  
Quantitative research involves the use of structured questions on a large number of 
respondents to generate statistical information about a population of interest. Strictly speaking, 
quantitative research calls for measurement to be objective, quantitative, and statistically reliable 
and valid. Researchers who use quantitative research employ experimental and quantitative 
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measures to test hypothetical generalizations (Hoepfl 1997) and to measure and analyze causal 
relationships between variables (Denzin and Lincoln 1998). It enables the researcher engage with 
the problem or concept of interest and generates hypotheses to be tested. According to Golafshani 
(2003), quantitative research is generally predicated on a positivistic or scientific paradigm that (1) 
emphasizes facts and causes of behavior, (2) uses numbers or counts to quantify and summarize 
information, (3) uses a mathematical process to analyze the numerical data, and (4) uses statistical 
terminologies to present and express the results. In essence, the quantitative methodology assumes 
that social facts have an objective reality and this reality can be identified and measured. As Crocker 
and Algina (1986) and Golafshani (2003) argue, the notion of measuring simply means to understand 
social reality. The observer can "understand" by performing an operation called measurement on the 
physical world. Measurement has been defined by Stevens (1946) as the assignment of numerals to 
objects or events according to rules. This implies, therefore, that measurement in quantitative 
research is objective, quantitative, and statistically relevant. Weiss (1994) argues that the ultimate 
aim of quantitative research is to report how many people are in particular categories or what the 
relationship is between being in one category and another. This does not mean that a study is 
quantitative simply because it collects numbers as information, but because their results can be 
presented as a table of numbers. 
In contrast, qualitative research is “an inquiry process of understanding” where the 
researcher develops a “complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, reports detailed views of 
informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting” (Creswell 1998:15). Qualitative inquiry 
uses a naturalistic approach that aims to understand phenomena in context-specific settings 
(Patton 2001; Golafshani 2003). It explores attitudes, behavior and experiences and attempts to 
collect, analyze, and interpret data by observing what people do or say. Since it is attitudes, 
behavior and experiences that matter, qualitative research usually makes use of fewer people 
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than quantitative research, but the contact with these people tends to last longer and the 
information obtained from and about them tends to be more detailed. Unlike quantitative 
researchers who seek causal determination, prediction, and generalization of findings, qualitative 
researchers seek illumination, understanding, and extrapolation to similar situations (Hoepfl 
1997; Golafshani 2003). This means that qualitative researches tend to be exploratory and 
open-ended and sacrifice uniformity of questioning to achieve fuller development of information 
(Weiss 1994:3) that ultimately leads the researcher to an "understanding of the problem on 
multiple contextual factors" (Miller 2000).  
It is obvious from the above that the utility of either method of inquiry must be premised 
on the research objectives. This implies that researchers must be attuned to the synergy between 
research problems and research methods, where the research problems determine or drive the 
method(s). In fact, scholars have long advocated the combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods in social science inquiry (Patton 1990; Reichardt and Cook 1979). The argument for 
integration is hinged on a pragmatic paradigm that benefits from both numbers and words 
(Glesne and Peshkin 1992; Cresswell 2003; Maxcy 2003). My research design will be a 
combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods. While the qualitative data will 
generate a theory that I will test in the quantitative phase and enable me explore contextual 
elements of the research in greater depth, the quantitative data and results will provide a general 
picture of the research problem (whether or how the intervention reduces the potential for 
conflict in the region) and enable me make inferences about my study population. For this 
reason, priority in this design is given to the quantitative method. The quantitative and qualitative 
methods are integrated at the beginning of the qualitative phase (during the selection of 
participants for in-depth interviews) and at the end (during the discussion of the outcomes of the 
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whole study).  
5.1 Study Location 
In order to capture their variability, the survey participants will be drawn from three 
(Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers) out of the eight littoral states of the Niger Delta. Bayelsa state was 
carved out of Rivers state in 1996. It has a population of 1,998,349 (2005 Census), total land area 
of 10,773 sq. km2, and a population density of 265 persons per sq. km. The state has one of the 
largest crude oil and natural gas deposits in Nigeria, although the majority of Bayelsans live in 
excruciating poverty due to the peculiar terrain and neglect by government and petroleum 
prospecting companies. It has become the hot bed of militant activities in part fuelled by an 
increase in Ijaw ethnic nationalism and state repression. One of its villages, (Odi) was invaded 
and completely razed to the ground by federal forces in 1999. This state accounts for roughly 35 
percent of the 20,192 ex-militants registered in the Amnesty Program.  
Delta state was carved out of the former Bendel state in 1991. It has a population of 
6,710,214 (2005 Census), total land area of 16,842 sq. km2 and a population density of about 207 
persons per sq. km. It has a very diverse ethnic composition (the major ethnic groups are 
Urhobo, Igbo, Izon, Isoko, Kwale, and Itsekiri). Several of the ethnic groups in this state have a 
history of intense inter-ethnic rivalry that often escalates into full scale wars. Much of these 
struggles (i.e. Ijaws vs Itsekiris) have been for positioning in order to gain patronages from the 
oil companies operating in the state. The state has the third largest crude oil and natural gas 
deposits behind Rivers and Bayelsa states. About 10% of the 20,192 registered ex-militants 
operate in this state.  
Rivers state was created in 1967. It has a population of 5,689,097 (2005 Census) and total 
land area of 11,077 sq. km2. Its population density is one of the highest in the world, roughly 284 
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persons per sq. km against the national average of 96 persons per sq. km. The ethnic composition 
in the state is also diverse with the main ethnic groups being Kalabari, Ikwerre, Okrika, Ibani, 
Ekpeye, Gokana, Eleme, Ndoni, Abua, Ogoni, and Odual. The Ogonis are famed for resisting oil 
exploration and for witnessing some of the worst state repressions culminating in the judicial 
murder of the activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others in 1995. The state is the top oil producer 
accounting for about 35% of Nigeria’s crude oil production and play host to about 35% of the 
Niger Delta ex-militants participating in the Amnesty Program. 
5.2 Research Questions 
 
The questions and themes that will guide this study are: 
1. What are the causes of the Niger Delta conflict? 
2.  What are the programmatic and non-programmatic determinants of successful Amnesty 
or DDR program?  
3. Overall, is the amnesty program capable of producing peace in the long-term? 
With the first question, I aim to determine the causes of the Niger Delta conflict. There 
are widely disparate accounts of the causes of the conflict ranging from poverty and 
unemployment to pollution and resource control. In between these extremes are middle range 
theories, which attempt to explain the etiology of the conflict. The divergence of these theories, 
however, contributes little to an effective understanding of the Niger Delta conflict, and by 
implication, its resolution. I hypothesize that one reason the conflict has proven intractable is that 
some of the more important causes of the conflict have not been explored. Based on prior 
research and theory, I will probe the effects of greed (Collier 2002), triangulation (Bowen 1978; 
Beuhler and Welsh 2009; Amato and Afifi 2006), pollution (Ikein 1990; Okonta 1998; Iyayi 
2000; Watts 2009), and resource control (Okonta and Douglas 2003; Watts 2009) on the conflict. 
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I expect to find that combined, these factors account for the conflict in the Niger Delta 
The second question examines how participation in the Amnesty Program produces more 
successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration outcomes for ex-combatants. The 
question examines three related activities and how these activities help to reduce the conflict in 
the region. In the first instance, I will investigate to see whether respondents in the treatment 
category (treatment is indicated by their participation in all aspects of the DDR program 
including arms submission, receipt of reinsertion benefits, and participation in a plethora of 
career and citizens training) are more likely to disarm compared to respondents in the control 
category. One hypothesis is that the violence is strongly correlated with the amount of arms and 
ammunition available to aggrieved youths in the Niger Delta. Thus, militants who participate in 
the Amnesty Program would have submitted their arms and ammunition as precondition for 
participating in the program. I expect to find that militants who participate in the program are 
less likely than non-participants to report that they will acquire more weapons to pursue their 
objectives. 
In the second instance, I will investigate to see whether participation in the DDR program 
reduces the bond existing among ex-combatants compared to combatants who did not enter the 
DDR program. Since violence and membership of deviant sub-cultures are linked (Wolfgang and 
Ferracuti 1967; Maxson and Klein 1990; Spergel 1995), successful completion of treatment 
should reduce the bonding amongst ex-militants. As a result, I expect to find that militants who 
participate in the DDR program will demonstrate weaker bonds to other militants than militants 
not participating in the process.  
In the third instance, I investigate the relation between participation in the Amnesty 
program and ex-combatant’s social, political, and economic reintegration. As several studies 
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indicate (Humphreys and Weinstein 2009; Berdal 1996; United Nations 2000), reintegration is a 
major piece of DDR intervention and has great bearing on armed conflict. Respondents in the 
treatment category would have been exposed to several or all stages of reintegration treatment 
including trauma counseling, skills acquisition training, citizen training, psychology testing, the 
payment of reinsertion benefits, medical treatments, and community reinsertion. As a result, I 
expect that ex-militants participating in the Amnesty program will indicate greater reliance on 
democratic resolution of grievances than on violence compared to combatants not participating 
in the Amnesty program. I also expect that that ex-combatants who entered the Amnesty 
program will be more likely to reintegrate into the workforce and to be accepted back into their 
communities than combatants not participating in the Amnesty program. As their social, 
political, and economic commitments to conventional society increases, their desire to willfully 
and violently assert their economic and sociopolitical rights will reduce significantly. 
Finally, I aim to determine whether non-program factors such as combatants’ exposure to 
oil-induced environmental pollution, their sources of funds and weapons, and the comfort level 
they enjoyed within their groups compared to what exist outside of such groups, affect DDR 
outcomes. This would help to isolate the programmatic determinants of DDR outcomes from 
non-programmatic determinants, and show what aspects of the outcomes are attributable to 
program or non-program factors controlling for all other variables.    
With the third research question, I aim to determine whether the amnesty program by 
design and implementation is capable of producing long lasting peace in the region. This is 
against the backdrop that past governments had introduced policies and programs to address the 
conflict that met with varying degrees of failure. I hypothesize that ex-combatants who enter the 
Amnesty program are more likely to report that that the program will succeed in the long-term, 
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to attribute program benefits to the communities, and to indicate less dependence on violence to 
achieve their objectives than combatants who did not enter the program. I expect to find 
significant differences between both categories to the extent ex-combatants in the treatment 
category will indicate lesser reliance on violence than respondents in the control category. I also 
expect to find that respondents in the treatment category compared to those in the control 
category will indicate that the program benefits the communities more than other stakeholders 
and to indicate that the program is a long-term success, controlling for all other variables.  
5.3 Research Variables  
The five research questions in the quantitative phase predetermine a set of variables for 
this study. Participation in the Amnesty Program is the dependent variable and will be measured 
on a 2-point scale of “participating” and “not participating.” The independent variables derive 
from conditions related to the implementation of the amnesty program such as disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration. I treat these as independent (predictor) variables because they 
cause, influence, or affect the outcomes. These factors were identified through the analysis of the 
related literature and theories. The factors corresponding to the research questions include: 
- Cause related: pollution; resource control; infrastructural deficits; corruption; greed; 
racism; economic exploitation; proliferation of weapons; poverty and unemployment.  
- Reintegration related factors: employment; democratic principles and values; and 
community acceptance of returning ex-militants. 
- Disarmament related factors: amount of arms and ammunition submitted and 
decommissioned and the likelihood of future acquisition of weapons. 
- Demobilization related factors: dismantling of bonds existing amongst militants and 
disruption of resource stream and support to ex-militants by spoilers existing outside program. 
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- Non-program determinants: source of funds, source of weapons, effect of pollution on 
community, and preference for life within armed group than outside of it. 
- Overall assessment of DDR success: short-term success versus long term success.  
Based on these factors 21 predictor variables were identified: “pollution”, “control”, 
“corruption,” “infrastructure,” “exploitation,” “greed,” “racism,” “proliferation,” “poverty,” 
“employed,” “disarmed,” “violence,” “demobilized,” “democratic,” “accepted,” “longterm,” 
“benefit,” “oiled,” “armed,” “extensive,” and “ingroup.”  
In addition to these variables, I will incorporate controls in order to eliminate the 
possibility that the outcomes are a result of factors we have not examined such as demographic 
characteristics like gender, age, education, employment, residence (rural or urban) 
socio-economic status (SES), ethnicity, and religion. These may also function as moderator 
variables in which case they affect the direction and/or strength of the relation between an 
independent and a dependent variable and account for the “interaction effect between an 
independent variable and some factor that specifies the appropriate condition for its operation” 
(Baron and Kenny 1986:1174).  
5.4 Research Frame 
For the purpose of the qualitative phase of the study, the purposeful sample, which 
implies intentionally selecting individuals to study in order to understand the central 
phenomenon (McMillan and Schumacher 1994; Miles and Huberman 1994), will be used. The 
idea is to purposefully select informants, who will best answer the research questions and who 
are “information-rich” (Patton 1990:169). Respondents will be selected for in-depth interviewing 
from members of the Niger Delta community including militants. All of the selected respondents 
would be contacted personally in their homes or by telephone and prescreened to ensure that they 
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meet the requirements of the study. In addition to these primary source interviews, secondary 
source interviews utilizing secondary materials such as newspaper and journal interviews with 
information-rich members of the Niger Delta community will be accessed and analyzed. 
For the quantitative phase of the research, half of the participants for this study will be 
recruited from a register maintained by the Amnesty Committee containing the names of all 
ex-militants participating in the program. From this register, I will draw a sample of about 190 
ex-militants (63 from each state), using systematic random sampling. The remaining sample of 
about 190 non-participating militants will be drawn by means of snowball sampling leveraging 
my extensive contacts in the Niger Delta. The study requirements for the quantitative phase 
includes: (1) self-identification as a militant member of a known/identifiable militant group; (2) 
in the case of the participating militants, must be registered as a participant in the program; (3) 
respondents must be over eighteen years; and (4) militants must display some knowledge about 
the goals of his organization and must belong to a group that operates within the geographical 
confines of the Niger Delta. Participants would be required to fill out a 60 minute standardized 
questionnaire. Questions will be open-ended and close-ended. A token of $10 will be given to 
each participant to encourage their participation in the study. Data collection, recording, and 
analysis will occur from July 2010 to April 2011. 
Because the study will make use of the grounded theory method and triangulation, there 
will be great synergy between the first and second phases of the research. For example, the 
theory developed in the qualitative phase will be tested in the quantitative phase. The results will 
enable me develop multiple perspectives to “represent the complexity” (Creswell 2002:194) of 
the Niger Delta conflict and the DDR intervention.  
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5.5 Phase I (Qualitative Data Collection) 
The first, qualitative phase of the study will use grounded theory method (Glaser and 
Straus 1967; Straus and Corbin 1998; LaRossa 2005) to collect and analyze data. As a formal 
methodology, grounded theory was first presented by Glaser in a 1965 article titled “The 
Constant Comparative Method of Qualitative Research.” However, it was not until the 
publication in 1967 of the book “The Discovery of Grounded Theory” (Glaser and Straus 1967) 
that the grounded theory method (GTM) became popular among qualitative researchers. That 
work was written in part as a protest against what LaRossa (2005:838) describes as the 
“supremacy of theory testing” in the mid 1960s and what the authors viewed as a rather passive 
acceptance that all the ‘great’ theories had been discovered and that the role of research lay in 
testing these theories through quantitative ‘scientific’ procedures (Glasser and Strauss 1967; 
Glasser 1978, 1992; Charmaz 1983; Goulding 1999). Since the goal of the GTM was to generate 
‘new’ theory from data in a process involving both inductive and deductive thinking, Glaser and 
Strauss hoped that the method would help close “the embarrassing gap between theory and 
research” and enhance the social scientists “capacity for generating theory” (Glaser and Strauss 
1967: vii-viii).   
In essence, grounded theory is a form of comparative explanation building which is 
context-based and process oriented. Unlike other methods, theorists working within the grounded 
theory framework do not wait until all the data is collected before analysis begins; instead, there 
is a continuous interplay between data collection and theoretical analysis (Glaser and Strauss 
1967; Glaser 1978; Strauss and Corbin 1990, 1994). In GTM, meanings emerge from the 
phenomena studied instead of being preconceived by the researcher prior to the research 
endeavor. In other words, the inductive method of grounded theory relies more on identifying 
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emerging variables from data and less on imposing à priori conceptual frames thereby 
encouraging researchers to systematically map observations from the phenomena they study. 
This mapping encourages the researcher to immerse himself/herself in the data (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967) by becoming part of (not outside of) the research process.  
Sampling Strategy 
 
This study will employ a purposive sampling technique recommended by Patton (1990) 
that seeks "information-rich cases" that can be studied in great depth. Patton (1990: 169-183) 
describes 16 types of purposive sampling including extreme or deviant case sampling, typical 
case sampling, maximum variation sampling, snowball or chain sampling, confirming or 
disconfirming case sampling, politically important case sampling, convenience sampling, and 
others. I will adopt the maximum variation sampling technique, which Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
describe as the most useful strategy for the qualitative approach. According to Patton (1990: 12) 
this technique: 
aims at capturing and describing the central themes or principal outcomes that cut across a great 
deal of participant or program variation. For small samples, a great deal of heterogeneity can be a 
problem because individual cases are so different from each other. The maximum variation 
sampling strategy turns that apparent weakness into strength by applying the following logic: any 
common pattern that emerge from great variation are of particular interest and value in capturing 
the core experiences and central, shared aspects or impacts of a program. 
 
Mindful of this, I will collect information from knowledgeable informants about the Niger Delta 
conflict and the Amnesty intervention. Knowledgeable informants in this case refers to people 
who because of the unique positions they occupy or their location with the Niger Delta social 
structure are "information-rich" about the Niger Delta conflict and the amnesty program. The use 
of maximum variation sampling will enable me obtain detailed information of each case as well 
as identify shared patterns that cut across cases (see Hoepfl 1997). Also, in terms of sample size, 
I will continue to select cases for interview until I reach theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss 
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1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998; LaRossa 2005). LaRossa (2005:841) argues that a theoretically 
saturated concept is a “well grounded concept.” I will keep conducting interviews and expanding 
concepts until I get to a point where the data reveals no new information. 
The decision to stop sampling will take cognizance of existing guidelines. According to 
Guba (1978), the decision to stop sampling must be based on the following criteria: 1) 
exhaustion of resources; 2) emergence of regularities; and 3) overextension, or going too far 
beyond the boundaries of the research. My decision to stop sampling will take into account my 
research goals and the possibility of achieving depth through triangulation of data sources. I 
expect that the first three or four interviews will narrow the focus of my research and guide 
attention to issues that have direct bearing on the conflict and the Amnesty intervention.  
Data Collection Technique 
For this study, the principal data collection technique will be in-depth interviews used in 
conjunction with secondary sources (Bogdan and Biklen 1982). The secondary sources will be 
interviews with principal Niger Delta stakeholders conducted by journalists. I will conduct the 
in-depth interviews with the aid of semi-structured interview schedules (a list of general topics or 
questions that I intend to explore during the interviews). The use of interview schedule will not 
only ensure that the questions are standardized but that basically the same information is 
obtained from each respondent. Because there will be no predetermined responses, I will have 
the ability to probe and explore responses in order to achieve fuller understanding of the issues. 
The interviews will be conducted at the preferred locations of respondents.  
The interviews will be audio-recorded using a smart pen and electronic journal. This will 
eliminate some of the shortcomings Lincoln and Guba (1985) associate with tape-recording 
interviews including the intrusiveness of recording devices and the possibility of technical 
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failure. Yet, as Patton (1990: 348) argues, the tape recorder is "indispensable" in interviews such 
as I am contemplating. In addition, the Livescribe smart pen with lined-journal has many 
advantages over traditional tape recorders especially because it allows the interviewer take notes 
without disrupting the interviews. The notes and voice recordings are automatically stored in a 
password encoded online data bank that is accessible from anywhere, thus eliminating the need 
to accommodate and secure cassette tapes. Also, it simplifies the data transmission process 
because the voice recordings and notes can be accessed from a computer and the researcher can 
rewind and fast-forward with relative ease to sections of interest without having to play back 
entire tapes. Thus, use of this method will enable me record voice and take notes at the same 
time without disrupting the flow of the interview. 
Analytic Strategy  
In the qualitative analysis, data collection and analysis proceed simultaneously (LaRossa 
2005). Bogdan and Biklen (1982: 145) define qualitative data analysis as "working with data, 
organizing it, breaking it into manageable units, synthesizing it, searching for patterns, 
discovering what is important and what is to be learned, and deciding what you will tell others." 
This definition will guide my inductive analysis. Inductive data analysis implies that the critical 
themes will emerge out of the data (Patton 1990). As Hoepfl (1997: 55) suggests, analysis will 
require some creativity on my part, since the challenge is to "place the raw data into logical, 
meaningful categories; to examine them in a holistic fashion; and to find a way to communicate 
this information to other." 
 I will analyze my in-depth interview data, field notes and secondary interview data using 
the methodology of grounded theory (Straus and Corbin 1998; LaRossa 2005). This method 
consists of a five-stage process: (1) preliminary exploration of the data by line-reading through 
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the transcripts; (2) coding the data by segmenting and labeling the text in a three step process 
beginning with open coding and creating concepts from indicators and writing memos; (3) 
developing variables by aggregating similar concepts together until theoretical saturation is 
reached; (4) connecting and interrelating variables around a central or core variable; and (5) 
constructing a narrative (Creswell 2002). 
 My analysis will begin with the identification of the themes emerging from my raw and 
secondary data through a process Straus and Corbin (1990 1998) and LaRossa (2005) describes 
as "open coding." During open coding, I will identify and tentatively name the conceptual 
categories into which I will group my observations. The goal as Hoepfl (1997) argues is to create 
descriptive, multidimensional categories, which will form the preliminary framework for my 
analysis. Thus, words, phrases, activities, and events which appear similar will be grouped into 
the same category. As the analysis proceeds, I will gradually modify or replace these categories. 
As the raw data are broken down into manageable units, I will develop an "audit trail" (Hoepfl 
1997) or a scheme to associate these data units with speakers and specific contexts. Although the 
particular identifiers developed may or may not be used in my reports, the speakers will be 
referred to in a manner that provides a sense of context (Hoepfl 1997). 
 In the next stage, I will perform what Straus and Corbin (1990) referred to as "axial 
coding." Here, I will re-examine the categories identified during open coding to determine how 
they are linked. I will compare and combine these discreet categories in an innovative new way 
that will enable me appreciate what Hoepfl (1997) calls the "big picture." The purpose of axial 
coding, according to Hoepfl (1997) is not only to describe but to acquire new understanding of 
the phenomenon of interest. Thus, the chain of events leading to the amnesty program, 
descriptive details of the implementation of the various aspects of the program, and the 
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ramifications of the program will be identified and explored. 
 Finally, I will perform "selective coding" to identify a "core variable" which Straus and 
Corbin (1998: 146) define as the "central phenomenon around which all other categories 
[variables] are related." The core variable is chosen from among the saturated variables as the 
linchpin for the overall narrative. It is the variable with the most analytic power and that more 
effectively and efficiently narrates the story of the research. LaRossa (2005: 850) suggests that 
the story should be “lucid, understandable, and hopefully compelling … and reasonably 
accurate.” I expect that my report will be a rich, tightly woven story that "closely approximates 
the reality it represents" (Straus and Corbin 1990: 57). 
 Although the stages of analysis I have outlined suggests linearity, in practice they may 
occur simultaneously. For example, during axial coding, I may determine that the initial 
categories are inadequate or should be revised leading to a re-examination of the raw data. Also, 
based on the dynamics of the analysis, I may collect additional data at any point if I uncover gaps 
in the data or if there is potentially a new storyline to develop. One advantage of GTM is that 
initial data analysis will guide subsequent data collection. I expect to develop a theory from this 
process that will be tested in the quantitative phase of the research. 
 Finally, I will use a method of triangulation known as the dialectic mixed method to 
compare and integrate the quantitative and qualitative datasets according to methods 
recommended by Cresswell (2005). According to Golafshani (2003) triangulation is typically a 
strategy or test for improving the validity and reliability of research or evaluation of findings. 
Mathison (1988: 13) argues that triangulation raises an "important issue in naturalistic and 
qualitative approaches to evaluation" in that it controls bias and establishes valid propositions 
especially because "traditional scientific techniques are incompatible with this alternate 
141 
 
epistemology." Therefore, triangulation "strengthens a study by combining methods. This can 
mean using several kinds of data, including both quantitative and qualitative approaches" (Patton 
2001:247). This holistic analysis will capture variations in outcomes for individuals, groups, and 
communities and especially detail how specific internal and external factors affect respondent’s 
perception of program success.  
Establishing Credibility and Transferability  
According to Hoepfl (1997) qualitative researchers assume the "presence of multiple 
realities and attempt to represent these multiple realities adequately." Credibility tests how well 
the researcher represents the reality. Patton (1990) argues that credibility depends not on the size 
of the sample but on the richness of the information gathered and the analytical ability of the 
researcher. The credibility of this research will depend on the various sources that I tap into and 
specifically on the triangulation of data and methods. Also, I will make segments of my raw data 
available for others to analyze in addition to performing what Lincoln and Guba (1985: 313) call 
"member checks" - asking respondents to corroborate findings. 
If my research has credibility, it should be transferable. According to Hoepfl (1997: 59) 
the transferability of a "working hypothesis to other situations depends on the degree of 
similarity between the original situation and the situation to which it is transferred." Although I 
may not specify the transferability of my findings, I expect that my research will provide 
sufficient information that will enable others determine whether and how the findings are 
applicable to other situations.  
5.6 Phase II (Quantitative Data Collection) 
The second, quantitative phase of the study will test the theory generated in the first 
qualitative phase. It will also identify factors related to disarmament, demobilization, 
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reintegration, and economic reconstruction that account for the success or failure of the amnesty 
program (measured by militants’ self-reported predisposition to the use of violence). I will use 
the cross-sectional survey design, which implies that data will be collected at one point in time 
(McMillan 2000). The primary technique for collecting the quantitative data will be a 
questionnaire containing items of different formats: close-ended questions (multiple choice 
questions asking respondents to select either one option or all that apply, dichotomous answers 
like “Yes” and “No”, self-assessment items, measured on a 4-point Likert-type scale, etc.) and 
open-ended questions. "Don't know" or "not applicable" response categories will be avoided in 
order to discourage their frequent use by respondents. The questionnaire consists of about sixty 
questions, which are organized into eight sections or scales. Following "best practice" the section 
on the personal coordinates of the respondents will come at the end of the questionnaire and the 
wording of this section will indicate clearly that the questions should be answered on a voluntary 
basis.  
The first section of the survey asks questions related to the violence and participants’ 
experiences in it. It includes the selection questions related to the status and identity of subjects 
as militants in one of several groups operating in the region. It will focus on factors contributing 
to the respondents’ decision to join a militant organization, the size of militant organizations, 
their support networks, and how they negotiate identity. These questions are open ended. The 
second section examines the causes of the conflict and the militant’s experience of deprivation. 
The third section focuses on the key actors or participants in the conflict, their motivations and 
networks, their tactical deployment of insurgency and counter-insurgency, and their international 
allies. The fourth section will measure participants’ comfort level with the disarmament and 
demobilization strategy and will provide additional data about the impact of the government’s 
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effort to disarm and demobilize the militants. Specifically, it will gain insight into the amount of 
arms possessed by militants in order to match the amount returned as well as militants bonding to 
other militants and the community. The fifth section will focus on issues in reintegration 
including the types of training militants receive preparatory to reentry into civil society, their 
ability to gain acceptance from conventional society, and their perception of the effectiveness of 
reintegration. The sixth section will measure the impact of institutional factors aimed at enabling 
the economic growth of the region, the performance of certain actors in the implementation of 
the program, and the overall implementation of the program. The seventh section asks for 
self-evaluation of how likely the respondents are to use or not to use violence in the light of the 
amnesty program. Finally, the last section provides demographic information including the 
respondents’ age, ethnicity, health, education, family structure, employment status, gender, 
residency, social economic status, and religion. This scale will provide controls for the research. 
Some questions in the survey have an open-ended “other (specify)” option to provide one correct 
answer for every subject in the study. 
The survey questionnaire will be administered face-to-face. One of the advantages of 
face-to-face surveys is that the researcher can make certain that all items in the questionnaire are 
responded to at the same time that s/he can provide clarifications to questions or concepts that 
respondents are confused about. This can potentially reduce or eliminate the problem of 
non-response bias (both item and unit non-response), which Klandemans and Smith (2002) 
discuss as critical to the reliability and validity of research findings. An informed consent form 
will be included in the questionnaires as an opening page of the survey. Participants will mark a 
space provided, saying “I agree to complete this survey”, thus expressing their willingness to 
participate in the study and complete the survey.   
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Analytic Strategy  
The quantitative analysis will present an SPSS multivariate logistic regression estimating 
a linear trend from the observations for each person and then modeling the intercepts and, 
particularly, the slopes in a regression on individual and community level characteristics. I will 
perform a hierarchical multiple regressions framed in terms of the effect of adding predictor 
variables to a base equation. The base equation will regress participation in the Amnesty 
program (dependent variable) on socio-demographic characteristics as well as measures of an 
individual’s exposure to the conflict and community characteristics. Afterwards, I will include 
variables that specifically measure disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and evaluate 
the amount of the incremental explained variance by subtracting the squared multiple correlation 
in the base equation from the squared multiple correlation in the expanded equations. The 
difference in the squared multiple correlations will be the amount of incremental explained 
variance due to the additional predictors.  
 The study will compare outcomes for the experimental and control groups across the 
three states, holding constant confounding factors that might explain the outcome. If the results 
show no differences across both categories of militants, the government's DDR program would 
not be justified implying that the intervention is incapable of redressing the violence. In another 
sense, instead of implying that the DDR program is ineffectual, a finding of no difference 
between both groups may in fact indicate that my method is misspecified and that I have 
included (or excluded) variables that ought to be excluded (or included) in the study. A new 
study may explore this possibility. However, because I use more than one method, I am 
confident that the variance reflected is that of the trait and not the method.  
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5.7 Study Limitations 
The strength and limitations of mixed methods designs have received immense attention 
from scholars (Creswell 2002; Creswell, Goodchild and Turner 1996; Green and Caracelli 1997; 
Moghaddam, Walker, and Harre 2003). I have discussed some of the strengths of my design; I 
will now discuss some of the limitations. First of all, my research design like any mixed methods 
design requires lengthy time to complete. Considering that this is a dissertation research, this 
study will suffer from limited time availability. In essence, for a study of this magnitude, more 
time (much more than my 10 month schedule) would certainly have impacted data collection and 
improved the results. However, because my design makes effective use of the time available and 
simplifies the tasks to be accomplished, I am confident that this constraint will not adversely 
affect the quality of results. 
 Related to the constraint of time is the limitation imposed by resource availability. More 
resources will be needed to effectively carry out the various phases of the research than would 
have been required if the study was designed as a single method study. I expect that this 
challenge will be mitigated by my success in obtaining collaborative funding from the Social 
Science Research Council and the United States Institute for Peace. I have submitted proposals 
to these organizations and expect a favorable outcome. Besides, the cost of conducting research 
in Nigeria is much lower than what it costs to conduct comparable researches in developed 
countries. I expect that the outcome of the study will more than compensate for the resources 
expended on it. 
Also, the dependent variable for this study is the respondent’s self-reported predisposition 
to use violence to protest perceived injustice. Perception is the active, selective and interpretative 
process of appreciating the world around us. This process, however, is heavily subjective. For 
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example, one problem with measuring perception is the volatility of what one is measuring. In 
essence, the perception of respondents can be drastically changed by events occurring in the 
Niger Delta (such as delay in the payment of monthly stipends, changes in the composition of the 
supervisory agency, sickness, statements or proclamations from public officials, news items, etc). 
For example, if we ask respondents whether they believe the amnesty program is successful 
immediately after the prompt payment of their allowances, we may get a result that will be 
markedly different than if we asked the same question immediately after a delay in payment of 
allowances have been announced. 
The challenges involved with measuring perception do not mean that perceptions should 
not be measured. It only means that we need more information and a more dynamic research 
design to put perception in a more manageable context. My study design does this by effectively 
grounding the perception metrics. It incorporates multiple metrics that gives each other context. 
By using multiple methods of data collection and asking different questions related to the 
violence and the intervention and participants experiences (contextualizing the phenomenon of 
interest), I am confident that I am able to determine whether the perceptions are accurate or 
inaccurate.  
Finally, like any quantitative survey, this study must grapple with the likelihood of 
non-response and the overall effect of this problem on my study results. In data collection, there 
are two types of non-response: item non-response (occurs when certain questions in a survey are 
not answered) and unit non-response (when a randomly sampled individual refuses to participate 
or cannot be contacted to participate). The bias occurs when respondents differ fundamentally 
from non-respondents or when questions differ among the respondent and non-respondent items 
or units. 
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The first step for me in dealing with this problem is to create a properly designed survey. 
My introduction will be personable and professional and the survey itself will feature interesting 
survey content, short survey length, and clear and concise wording that is attuned to respondent’s 
burden and likely interest in the survey. Also, I will send advance letters of introduction, provide 
practical and appealing incentives to respondents ($10 per interview), increase the contact 
attempts and call backs, and the surveys will be administered face-to-face. I believe these 
measures will drastically reduce if not totally eliminate the problem of item non-response. Where 
these still exit, I will discard partial observations and assign weights to each complete 
observation so that the weighted samples better represents the average characteristics of the 
population.  
For unit non-response, no test or correction for bias can be done without obtaining 
additional data that includes information about the targeted respondents that failed to respond to 
the survey. If the number of unit non-response is low, they may have no impact on the study 
outcome. In that case I may not replace them. But if the number is large enough to bias the study 
result, I will replace the non-respondents from the list of all registered participants maintained by 
the Amnesty Committee. The list will be pre-screened to remove names in the first wave of the 
survey and afterwards, samples will draw from the remaining names to compensate for the unit 
non-responses. I will also seek to survey the non-respondents to understand their reasons for not 
responding to the surveys and also to determine whether they differ in certain respects 
(demography, etc.) from respondents. 
5.8 Data Management, Screening, and Security 
 I expect that the findings of this study will be unbiased and of very high quality. To meet 
this expectation, the study data must be very reliable and complete. This is important because a 
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poorly designed study with inadequately managed data may doom even the best conceptualized 
study. Thus, it is essential that I develop and implement procedures to minimize data loss, 
identify concerns soon after data are collected, and detect and correct errors. Possible sources of 
error include inaccurate equipment; poorly designed forms; illegible, inaccurate, or incomplete 
data recording; errors or omissions in data transfer; inadequate training; intentional fraud; 
undocumented changes; programming errors; and misuse of statistical software (Kruse and Mehr 
2008). 
 I will develop clear rules about the handling of data. For example, personnel will be 
assigned to specific data management tasks and rules will be established about how these tasks 
will be performed. All computerized data will be stored on a secure encoded network that would 
limit assess only to authorized persons with passwords. Interview data (voice and notes) will be 
uploaded securely to a password protected internet data bank, using the Livescribe “smart pen” 
and docking station. Paper forms (surveys, field notes, and documents) will be stored in locked 
cabinets when not in use. To ensure confidentiality, each respondent will be assigned a study 
identification number that will replace personal identifiers and be included on all forms, 
documents, and field notes related to that respondent. After data cleaning is complete, every 
personal marker or identifier will be completely erased from the database.  All files on our 
computer networks will be backed up regularly and copies saved in offsite locations for safety in 
case of a major system failure, fire, or accident. 
Beginning with the collection of data, I will use standard data management procedures to 
minimize missing and erroneous data. I will design data forms that have multiple choices with 
check boxes and codes whenever possible to avoid problems with illegible handwritings. Also, 
because the surveys will be administered face-to-face, interviewers will be trained to specifically 
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review questions and responses with respondents on the spot in order to minimize incomplete 
responses or illegible responses.  In addition, the forms will have appropriate number of digits 
and clearly labeled measurement units for continuous variables. All forms will be pre-tested by 
me and the research assistants and data elements determined to be inappropriate (such as too 
time consuming) will be dropped. Each survey will include the study title, informed-consent 
form, space for the subject’s identification number, and date. Forms will be visually inspected 
for completeness and legibility before they are submitted for data entry. Errors found at this stage 
will be corrected. Corrected forms will carry an explanatory note with the initials of the person 
making the changes and the date the changes were effected. 
 Initial screening will be conducted for our sample population and entered in the database. 
I will check for internal consistency by ensuring that only respondents who met the study criteria 
were processed. The screening of the data will be conducted at the univariate and multivariate 
levels (Kline, 1998; Tabachnick and Fidell 2000). Data screening will help identify potential 
multicollinearity in the data, because multivariate tests are sensitive to extremely high 
correlations among predictor variables. I will exclude outlying cases from my analysis because a 
case that actually is in one category of outcome may show a high probability for being in another 
category and produce a poor model fit (Tabachnick and Fidell 2000). Data screening will include 
the descriptive statistics for all the variables such as information about the missing data, linearity, 
normality, and multicollinearity. Also, an interviewer grid and a code book will be prepared to 
facilitate data entering and processing. Answers to closed questions will be coded numerically 
and the grid (in excel) will be set up in such a way to enable easy import of data in SPSS. 
Answers to open questions will be summarized in five lines, although more detailed information 
recorded during the interviews will be written up in an interview protocol. 
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Finally, I will use the database to develop a list of individuals that will be invited to 
participate in the in-depth interviews as well as create a list of events, activities, locations, and 
persons for observation. I will use weekly meetings with my research team to distribute these 
lists, ask for feedback, and discuss problems and challenges arising from the research. I expect 
that these weekly meetings will evolve solutions to problems that emanate from the conduct of 
the study and improve the data management process.  
5.9 Research Permission and Ethical Considerations  
Ethical issues will be addressed at each phase in the study. In compliance with the 
regulations of the Institutional Review Board (IRB), permission for conducting the research will 
be obtained. The Request for "Review Form" will be filed, providing information about the 
principal investigator, the project title and type, source of funding, type of review requested, and 
number and type of subjects. Application for research permission will contain the description of 
the project and its significance, methods and procedures, participants, and research status. This 
project will be accorded an expedited-middle status, since the interviews with the participants 
will be audio taped, though the study will be conducted in a normal social setting, and the subject 
population is over eighteen. However, its topic Due to the sensitive nature of the issues great care 
will be taken to ensure that the research participants are not harmed in any manner by the 
researcher.   
An informed consent form will be developed and the form will state clearly that the 
participants are guaranteed certain rights, agree to be involved in the study, and acknowledge 
that their rights are protected. A statement relating to informed consent will be part of the 
questionnaires and reflect compliance by participation. The anonymity of participants will be 
protected by numerically coding each returned questionnaire and keeping the responses 
151 
 
confidential. While conducting the individual interviews, selected respondents will be assigned 
fictitious names that will be used in describing them and for reporting the results. All study data, 
including the survey files, interview tapes, and transcripts, will be kept in locked metal file 
cabinets in the researcher’s office and destroyed after a reasonable period of time. Participants 
will be told summary data will be disseminated to the professional community, but in no way 
will it be possible to trace responses to individuals.  
5.10 The Role of the Researcher  
The researcher’s involvement with data collection in the two phases of this study is 
different. In the first, quantitative phase, the researcher will administer the survey and collect the 
data using the standardized procedures, including the systematic random sampling, naturally 
existing groups, and reliability and validity checks of the instrument. The data analysis will be 
performed using rigorous statistical analysis techniques and the results will be interpreted based 
on the established values for the statistical significance of the functions.  
In the second, qualitative phase, the researcher will assume a more participatory role due 
to the “sustained and extensive experience with participants” (Creswell 2003: 184) and personal 
involvement with the research topic. The researcher is a graduate student in the Department of 
Sociology, Georgia State University. He is also from the Niger Delta area and has sustained 
meaningful contacts with militants, community leaders, government officials and human and 
environmental rights activists operating in the region. Most of this connection with important 
stakeholders in the Niger Delta is a result of the researchers leading role as a students’ activist 
and later community organizer. He is President of the Ewu Youth Congress (a socio-cultural 
organization campaigning for minority rights in the Niger Delta), Executive Director of the 
Citizen’s Action For Safe Elections (an activist group committed to the ideals of participatory 
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democracy) and Executive Director of the Crime Watch International Incorporated (a not for 
profit organization active in the fight against crime in Nigeria). These experiences and contact 
will provide the researcher the needed access to research sites and subjects and will help him 
contextualize the research objectives. 
All of these experiences introduce the possibility for subjective interpretations of the 
phenomenon being studied and the potential for bias (Locke, Spirduso and Silverman 2000). 
However, because the researcher is not involved in militancy in any form and does not serve in 
any capacity in the governments’ amnesty program, the researcher is sufficiently distant to 
approach the study objectively. This in no way suggests that the researcher does not bring a bias 
to the study. In fact, this is inferred from the choice of issues for study and in the selection of 
research sites and respondents. However, the triangulation of data sources, member checking, 
and thick and rich descriptions of the cases will permit the conclusions to be accurate. In fact, the 
convergence of quantitative and qualitative methods in this study will demonstrate that the 
results are valid and “not a methodological artifact” (Bouchard 1976).  
Also, because of the nature of the research and the volatile nature of the Niger Delta 
(with frequent outbreaks of violence between government forces and militant groups, kidnapping 
for ransom, armed robberies, etc.), safety is a major concern to me. To avoid being caught in any 
cross-fires, I will obtain permission to conduct the research at the various locations from the state 
governments, the Amnesty Committee, and the JTF on one hand and militant groups on the 
other. My contacts in government and my strong connections with militant groups will facilitate 
access and mitigate any serious safety concerns. Moreover, my deep knowledge of the Niger 
Delta, local language skills, knowledge of the customs and traditions and flashpoints, and 
extensive network of friends and associates will reduce the safety risks of the research.  
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Chapter 6: 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I describe the initial results of my survey and in-depth interviews. The 
survey was conducted with a representative sample of 346 former and current combatants in 
Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region. The in-depth interviews were conducted with 10 
knowledgeable informants in the Niger Delta and these were combined with 10 secondary 
interviews conducted by journalists with individuals regarded as key players in the conflict and 
the DDR intervention. These additional interview transcripts were obtained from newspapers and 
journals across Nigeria. The overarching goal of the research is to compare outcomes for two 
categories of militants: those that entered the DDR program and those that did not. I present 
information on their demographic profile, the reason(s) that they entered the conflict, their 
experiences of the conflict, and their perception of the DDR program. This helps to situate 
respondents within the context of their conditions in the Niger Delta. This strategy affords me the 
ability to access the performance of the DDR program and to demonstrate whether the program 
can deliver peace in the long run. 
 Data was collected using quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative 
methodology featured questionnaire survey of 346 adult males and females or “respondents.” 
These respondents were categorized according to whether they entered the Niger Delta Amnesty 
Program or not. 224 respondents entered the Amnesty program, while 122 respondents did not 
enter the program. The combined total of 346 respondents forms the basis of my quantitative 
analysis. In addition to that, I conducted in-depth interviews with 10 key informants. I consider 
each of the 10 respondents knowledgeable about the dynamics of the Niger Delta conflict as well 
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as the Amnesty Program for several reasons. First, they are all members of various Niger Delta 
communities and have lived and worked in the Niger Delta region. Second, each of the 10 
respondents is opinionated about the conflict and the Amnesty intervention based on their 
location within the conflict infrastructure. The results of these in-depth interviews are paired with 
secondary interview data involving 10 key figures in the Niger Delta conflict. Each of the 10 
respondents has well documented relationship with the conflict and the Amnesty Program. For 
example, I analyze an interview conducted with Basil Omiyi the former Group Managing 
Director of Shell Nigeria at a Pan-African investment round-table in New York. In that 
interview, Basil Omiyi framed Shell’s (a major player in Nigeria’s oil industry) role in the 
conflict. I also analyze interview transcripts involving Kingsley Kuku, the Special Adviser to the 
Nigerian president on the Amnesty Program and the Chief Executive Officer of the Niger Delta 
Amnesty Committee. 
6.1 Profiles of fighters and former fighters 
 In order to understand both the nature of the Niger Delta conflict and the DDR 
intervention, it is important that we examine the profiles of the fighters and former fighters. 
Although I collected a lot of information on both categories of fighters (or militants as they are 
more commonly known in Nigeria), only information pertinent to my research questions are 
discussed. The main research questions are: 1) what are the causes of the Niger Delta conflict? 2) 
What are the programmatic and non-programmatic determinants of successful disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration, and 3) is the Amnesty program capable of entrenching 
long-term peace in the Niger Delta? To answer these questions, I first present the general 
demographic profile of my sample of fighters and former fighters. These profiles are discussed 
with the sense of locating respondents within their conflict milieus. After this is done, the 
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remaining chapters examine specific components of the Amnesty or DDR program and their 
effects on the violence.  
Factional Representation 
 Many armed factions were involved in the Niger Delta armed conflict. These factions 
varied in terms of size, areas of operation, objectives, strategy, and targets. These differences 
have posed serious challenges for this study. Perhaps the most daunting challenge is the fact that 
militancy is comingled with criminality. There are a large number of criminal groups in the 
Niger Delta with no connection to the struggle of the Niger Delta people for better conditions in 
the Niger Delta. Many of these groups took advantage of the expanding political opportunities to 
insert themselves into the Amnesty program. Sifting through the mazelike labyrinth of genuine 
and fake fighters posed an enormous challenge. Another tough challenge involved the multiple 
connections of individuals to armed groups. Many of the respondents claimed allegiance to more 
than one fighting group making it difficult to place respondents within the contexts of particular 
groups. To solve this problem, however, I placed respondents in the last group they participated 
in or to which they now belong. Table 1 represents the breakdown of respondents by factions. I 
will use this distribution in all of my subsequent analysis. For the purposes of this dissertation, I 
focus on four of the most important armed groups: MEND, NDV, NDPVF, and FNDIC.  
 
Figure 3: Distribution by armed factions 
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Basic Demographics 
 I present a profile of respondents that reflect their demographics before the conflict, 
during the conflict, and since the DDR program. Figure 4 shows that respondents in both 
categories appear to be evenly matched in terms of age. About 46% of fighters who entered the 
DDR program fell between the age brackets of 25-34. About 48% of fighters who have remained 
outside of the program also fall within that age bracket. However, fighters who did not enter the 
DDR program appear to be younger than fighters who entered the program as 32% compared to 
20.5% in the 18-24 years age bracket did not enter the DDR program.   
 
Figure 4: Distribution by age  
 In terms of gender, there are overwhelmingly more men than women in the sample. This 
is not surprising since the DDR program registered only 133 women out of a total registered 
population of 20,192 former fighters. The number of female militants registered does not appear 
to truly reflect the total number of women active in the conflict as combatants, enablers, or 
spoilers. One of the main hindrances to the participation of women in the Amnesty Program is 
cultural stereotypes of male and female roles. These stereotypes results mainly from the 
prevailing system of patriarchy in which women’s rights are condensed into those of men. Figure 
5 illustrates the gender dimension of the conflict. Also, 66% of fighters who did not enter the 
DDR and 50% of fighters who entered the program are single. It would appear that single people 
had greater motivation than married folks to engage in prolonged armed conflict wherein they 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
18 - 24 25 - 34 35 - 44 45 - 54
AMNESTY
CONTROL
157 
 
are not burdened by family constraints. This is reinforced by the fact that only about 33% of 
fighters who entered DDR compared to 28% of fighters who did not enter DDR have kids. 
 
Figure 5 : Distribution by Gender        Figure 6: Distribution by Marital Status 
 There is no marked difference in the educational levels of both categories of respondents 
although fighters who did not enter DDR appeared to have had more years of schooling than 
fighters who entered DDR. What is clear, however, is what appears to be a very large number of 
uneducated fighters in both categories sampled. For example, 42% of fighters who entered the 
DDR program and 31% of fighters who did not, reported no formal schooling. 41% of 
respondents in the control group have had some primary school education as against 29% of 
respondents in the treatment group. Both categories of respondents were statistically tied in terms 
of secondary school, trade/technical school, and polytechnic/university level education. There 
were also similarities between both categories of respondents in terms of their religious 
affiliation. 68% of fighters who entered DDR and 66% of fighters who did not are Christians. A 
significant percentage of respondents (23% in the treatment category and 30% in the control 
category) claimed African Traditional Religious forms. This is surprising especially when we 
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consider that Nigeria is split almost equally between Islam and Christianity. The 2007 National 
Census reported that Islam accounted for roughly 50% of Nigeria’s population and Christianity 
accounted for about 40%. 
 
Figure 7 : Distribution by Education      Figure 8: Distribution by Religion 
 The ethnic composition of respondents is identical for both groups studied. 74% of 
respondents who entered DDR and 75% of respondents who did not are Ijaw. The Ijaw ethnic 
group is believed to be the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria behind Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, 
and Igbo. They are spread out in the coastal states of the Niger Delta including Ondo and Lagos 
in the west. Following spirited agitations for their own state, Bayelsa state was carved out of 
Rivers and Delta states in 1991 and is homogenous to the Ijaws. Bayelsa state is not only the 
hotbed of Ijaw ethnic nationalism; it is also the cradle of militancy in the Niger Delta. Overall, 
about 43% of respondents who entered DDR and 50% of respondents who did not are from 
Bayelsa state. Rivers state accounts for about 39% of respondents who entered DDR and about 
29% of respondents who did not. This again speaks to the level of militant activism in Bayelsa 
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state, a state with less than a quarter the population of Rivers or Delta state, and a treacherous 
ecology that is partly blamed for the alarming lack of development in the state. 
 
Figure 9: Distribution by Ethnicity     Figure 10: Distribution by State of Residence 
Many theories have been advanced that attempt to link the Niger Delta conflict to 
economic fissures including poverty and unemployment. It has been shown that Nigeria has 
some of the highest poverty and unemployment rates in the world (UNDP 2006). The situation 
appears to be particularly dire for Niger Delta people because of the associated environmental 
problems resulting from oil production. This fact appears to be substantiated by my results. 
About 68% of respondents who entered DDR and 42% of respondents who did not reported that 
they were unemployed in the year before they entered the conflict. Another 6% of respondents 
who entered DDR and 11% of respondents, who did not, reported that they did odd-jobs in that 
same period. 2% of respondents who entered DDR and 4% of those who did not reported that 
they were full-time housewives and earned no income.  
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Figure 11: Distribution of Respondents by Occupation 
 Similarly, 73% of respondents who entered DDR and 53% of respondents who did not 
reported that they had no income in the year before they entered the conflict. Also striking is the 
fact that 19% of militants who entered DDR and 35% of respondents who did not reported that 
they made less than 50,000 Naira (USD 300) monthly in the year before they entered the 
conflict. Figure 12 illustrates.  
 
Figure 12: Distribution of Respondents by Income in Year before Conflict 
6.2 The Pre-conflict Dynamics of Fighters 
 The Niger Delta conflict has been blamed on a number of forces ranging from political 
fissures to environmental challenges. One way to appreciate the performance of the DDR 
program is to examine the contributions of these pre-conflict conditions (what Tilly 1978 calls 
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dual sovereignty) to the conflict. That way, we can assess whether or not this DDR has engaged 
those forces. I probe the origins of the conflict and the socio-political milieu within which armed 
conflict took place and flourished. I address these issues under five headings - origins, 
recruitment and incentives, sources of funds and weapons, organizational roles and 
decision-making, and identity construction. 
Origins of the Conflict 
 The conflict in the Niger Delta has raged for over two decades. While, for the most part, 
the conflict was waged on the turf of ideology and non-conflict, the introduction of armed 
hostilities started in the early 2000s. The metamorphosis of non-violent agitation into violent 
agitation mirrors expanding opportunities in the arena of politics. Armed agitation roughly 
corresponds to the inauguration of Nigeria’s 4th republic, which signaled the end of yet another 
military rule and control by civilians. The three republics before this one were overthrown by 
military regimes. The fourth republic began after elections in 1999 where a retired military 
officer and former military Head of State, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo became the president and 
promised sweeping political, social, and economic reforms. The elections that brought him to 
power were organized by his old constituency, the military. Compared to subsequent elections, 
that election was relatively peaceful although it was characterized by large-scale irregularities 
and witnessed boycotts by many of the most prominent politicians in Nigeria at the time. Many 
of these politicians boycotted the elections because they did not trust the military to hand over to 
civilians. The last two military governments orchestrated very costly transitions that critics called 
“transitions to nowhere.” General Babangida, for example, presided over a transition program 
that spanned about five years and gulped about $5 billion. When elections were eventually held 
in 1993, which were widely hailed as the freest and fairest ever in Nigeria, Gen. Babangida 
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annulled the results. Similarly, Gen. Abacha presided over a transition in which all five 
registered political parties adopted him as their candidate for the elections. With this volatile 
political environment, many established politicians doubted that the transition will take place and 
stayed away from the process. Those who did made instant gains such that the next round of 
elections in 2003 became severely emotionally, psychologically, and physically charged. This 
dynamic is expressed in the fighters’ responses to the question “when did you join a militant 
organization?” Whereas only 1.3% of fighters who entered DDR and 1.6% of fighters who did 
not joined a militant faction in 1998/1999, 23% of fighters who entered DDR and 25% of 
fighters who did not joined an armed faction in 2002/2003. Enlistment into armed groups 
dropped slightly in 2004/2005 but increased to 35% for militants who entered DDR and 38% for 
militants who did not enter DDR in the 2006/2007 election circle. Enlistment into armed groups 
again dropped in the 2008/2009 time period to 16% of fighters in the treatment category and 
11% of fighters in the control category. One unique thing about the periods 2002/2003 and 
2006/2007 is that they were election circles. It is possible, as has been argued by commentators, 
that youths joined armed groups in these periods to facilitate the election of preferred candidates 
or at the promptings of candidates and political parties.  
 
Figure 13: Distribution by Year of Enlistment in Armed Group  
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Much has been written about the causes of the conflict. I probed my respondents to find 
out what they believe were the causes of the conflict. The question asked is “in your opinion, 
what is the main cause of the Niger Delta conflict?” As figure 14 indicates, 18% of respondents 
in the treatment group compared to 29% of respondents in the control group blame pollution for 
the conflict. Similarly, 13 of respondents in the treatment group compared to 19% of respondents 
in the control group believe that resource control dispute is the main cause of the Niger Delta 
conflict. However, only 4% of respondents in the control group compared to 15% of respondents 
in the treatment group believe that infrastructural deficit in the Niger Delta is to blame for the 
conflict. Similarly, 15% of the treatment group and 2% of the control group blame greed or 
resource looting for the conflict. However, both categories of respondents (6% each) have 
similar views that the conflict results from capitalist exploitation of the resources of the Niger 
Delta. 
 
Figure 14: Distribution by Causes of Niger Delta Conflict 
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 In order to probe the causes further, especially to understand how combatants in both 
categories became directly involved in the conflict, I asked respondents whether they ever got 
involved in conflicts or disagreements involving politicians, community leaders, traditional 
rulers, and oil company staff on issues that they did not feel concerned them. 90% of respondents 
in the treatment category and 83% of respondents in the control category answered in the 
affirmative. A follow-up question asked “how often where you involved in such conflicts or 
disagreements?” 41% of respondents in the treatment category and 49% of respondents in the 
control category were “very much” involved in such conflicts. Another 40% of respondents in 
the treatment category compared to 27% of respondents in the control category were “fairly 
much” involved in such conflicts or disagreements. Only 9.4% of respondents in the treatment 
category and 16.4% in the control category chose “not at all involved.” Asked who involved 
them in the conflict, 41% of respondents in the treatment category and 38% of respondents in the 
control category said politicians. 18.8% of respondents in the treatment category compared to 
22% of respondents in the control category say community leaders inserted them into such 
conflicts. Officials of oil companies and the leadership of militant groups were named by 12% 
and 9% of respondents in the treatment category and 5% and 9% in that order, by respondents in 
the control category. Finally, I asked respondents “which of the following emotions did you feel 
as a result of your involvement in other people’s conflicts or disagreements?” 54% of 
respondents in the control category compared to 25% of respondents in the treatment category 
indicated that they felt anxious. 17% of the respondents in the treatment category compared to 
only 4% of respondents in the control category felt sad. 28% of respondents in the treatment 
category compared to 9% of respondents in the control category became angry, while only 13% 
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of respondents in the treatment category and 11% of respondents in the control category “felt 
nothing.” Figures 15 – 18 illustrates these findings. 
 
Figure15: Distribution by Triangulation           Figure 16: Distribution by Frequency of Triangulation 
 
 
Figure 17: Distribution by Mode of triangulation Figure 18: Distribution by Attitude towards Triangulation  
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Recruitment 
 There were stark differences between both groups in their reports about the reason they 
joined armed groups. While only 20% of fighters in the DDR program reported support for the 
ideological and political goals of the group as the reason they enlisted in a fighting group, 78% 
of fighters outside of the program reported support for their groups ideological and political 
goals as reason they enlisted. While 36% of fighters who entered the program reported the need 
to make money as motivation for joining the group, only 4% of fighters outside the program 
believed money was the prime motivation.  
 
Figure 19: Distribution by Reason for Enlisting in Armed Group 
In terms of the mode of recruitment, 42% of fighters who did not enter the program were 
recruited by family compared to 13% of fighters who entered the program. Conversely, 25% of 
fighters in the program were recruited through their cults compared to 14% of fighters outside of 
the program. This shows that cultism (a problem that has plagued the nation’s tertiary institutions 
for some time now) has great influence on the conflict. In fact, as we see from responses to the 
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question “how did you prove to your group that you could be trusted,” 50% of respondents who 
entered DDR and 56% of respondents, who did not, joined a cult to prove credibility. Also 19% 
of respondents in the treatment category and 15% of respondents in the control group reported 
that they swore to oaths to prove their loyalty. Most cults in Nigeria require members to swear to 
oaths as proof of loyalty.  
 
Figure 20: Distribution by Mode of Recruitment  
 Respondents also gave indications of the rewards promised for participating in their 
group’s activities. 30% of respondents who entered DDR reported that they were promised 
money to join the group compared to only 9% of the control group. Another major promise for 
participation was access to oil or the lucrative illegal bunkering trade. 27% of respondents in the 
treatment group compared to 23% of respondents in the control group reported that they were 
promised access to the lucrative clandestine crude oil trade. Conversely, only 11% of the 
treatment group and 20% of the control group were promised opportunities to improve the 
condition of the Niger Delta. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
By Family By Cult 
Group
By 
Neighbor
By Friend Founded 
Group
Sought 
out Group
Forced 
into 
Group
By 
Stranger
Amnesty
Control
168 
 
 
Figure 21: Distribution of Respondents by Incentives for Entering Conflict 
Sources of Funds and Weapons 
 One major issue that was implicated in the literature as fueling the Niger Delta violence 
is the revenue streams flowing to key players in the conflict. In that sense, the funds available to 
fighters is a possible determinant of the length and intensity of conflict. I posed this question of 
funding source(s) to respondents. There is slight difference in the sources of funds available to 
fighters in both the treatment and control categories. The bulk of the funding for both categories 
of fighters is illegal oil bunkering. 41% of fighters in the DDR program and 33% of fighters 
outside of the program reported that their groups got the bulk of their funds from oil bunkering. 
29% of respondents in the treatment category and 23% of respondents in the control category 
implicate politicians as significant contributors to their cause(s). 13% of respondents in the 
treatment category compared to 9% of respondents in the control category indicate that ransom 
payments from kidnap victims constitute their main source of funding. Only 1% of respondents 
in the treatment category and 7% of respondents in the control category say they receive their 
funds mainly from donations. 
  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Amnesty
Control
169 
 
 
Figure 22: Distribution of Respondents by Source of Funds 
 Commentators on the Niger Delta conflict have blamed the proliferation of small arms 
for the conflict. The availability of arms and ammunition to aggrieved groups in the Niger Delta, 
it has been argued, encourages the defiance of the authority of the state and rebellion. The key 
question we asked is “where do you get your weapons from?” An overwhelming majority of 
respondents (76% in the treatment category and 59% in the control category) indicate that they 
get their weapons from international sources. This appears to reinforce the theory that fighters in 
the Niger Delta are involved in oil-for-weapons swaps with dubious international arms dealers 
and oil merchants. This also appears to establish linkages between the arms available to 
insurgents and crude oil theft. If we also take into cognizance the 16% of respondents in the 
control category compared to 2% in the treatment category who say that they get their weapons 
from attacking other armed groups, we see that the Niger Delta conflict is far from the two-way 
conflict between insurgents on one hand and the state/MNOC alliance on the other. Instead, the 
picture that unfolds is of a severely fractured conflict system involving multiple combatants who 
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are as much engaged in turf warfare as they are engaged in hostilities with defined state/MNOC 
targets. It is also interesting to note that 13% of fighters in the control category compared to 7% 
of fighters in the treatment category get their weapons clandestinely from the Nigerian army. 
This appears to substantiate recent reports linking fighters with certain unscrupulous members of 
the nation’s military. Several military officers including a major-general were recently 
court-martialed and jailed for supplying arms and ammunition to fighters. Thus, we see that even 
the military is deeply divided in terms of their loyalty to the state and support for insurgents. 
 
Figure 23: Distribution by Source of Weapons 
Roles and Decision-Making within organization   
 The vast majority of respondents were combat or foot soldiers within their respective 
organizations. 90% of respondents who entered DDR and 81% of respondents who did not enter 
DDR reported that they were combat soldiers. Also 4% of combatants in the treatment category 
and 8% of combatants in the control category reported that they were (are) officers in their units. 
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Figure 24: Distribution by Roles within Armed Groups  
In terms of decision-making within the organization, there appears to be a significant 
difference in reports from both categories of respondents. 82% of combatants in the treatment 
category compared to 64% of combatants in the control category say that officers were 
responsible for making the decision on who and what to attack. Conversely, 26% of combatants 
in the control category compared to 14% in the treatment category say that attack decisions were 
(are) taken collectively. Similarly, when asked who decides what to do with gains made from an 
attack, 82% of combatants in the treatment category compared to 57% of combatants in the 
control category say that officers make the decision. Conversely, 30% of combatants in the 
control category compared to 14% in the treatment category say that decisions were (are) taken 
collectively. This means that respondents in the treatment category operate more within 
organizations with top to bottom decision-making processes, while respondents in the control 
category appears to have a more egalitarian organizational structure. 
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Figure 25: Distribution by Attack Decisions       Figure 26: Distribution by Profit Decision 
6.3 Determining Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Outcomes 
 Assessing DDR outcomes is always a difficult exercise. One possible reason for this 
difficulty involves the great number of activities that individually and collectively produces DDR 
outcomes. Added to this is the fact that DDR is often implemented in environments facing 
ongoing conflict. Thus, it is difficult to identify all of the forces or activities responsible for 
different types of outcomes. In recognition of and in attempt to surmount this challenge, my 
analysis focuses on two types of activities and outcomes: programmatic and non-programmatic 
activities. Under programmatic forces, I examine the contributions of disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration to ending the Niger Delta conflict. These program areas are 
discussed initially as mutually exclusive of each other. This is important, in order to identify 
specific components of these systems responsible for the outcomes. Under the non-programmatic 
factors, I analyze conditions and events existing outside of the Amnesty Program, but which 
none-the-less impacts the outcomes. 
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Disarmament 
  The United Nations (2000) defines disarmament as the “collection, documentation, 
control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of 
combatants and often also of the civilian population.” Further, it suggests that disarmament 
“includes the development of responsible arms management program.” This definition 
recognizes the importance of disarmament to the overall success of DDR programs. As with the 
Niger Delta Amnesty program, disarmament is always the gateway to all DDR processes. 
Combatants typically enter DDR programs by submitting weapons. In many instances, policies 
of one person per weapon have been implemented in recognition of the need to mop up all arms 
available to combatants and to ensure that only genuine combatants enter the program. It goes 
without saying, therefore, that the effectiveness of the disarmament process is a major 
determinant of the overall effect of DDR on conflict situations. According to the UN IDDRS 
(2006), the overarching aim of disarmament within a DDR process is “to reduce or control the 
number of weapons held before demobilization in order to build confidence in the peace process, 
increase security and prevent a return to conflict.” Thus, important operational objectives of the 
disarmament process must include the reduction of the amount of weapons possessed by, or 
available to, combatants. It must also include a reduction in actual or probable armed violence as 
well as improvement in the perception of human security within communities. These are 
minimum requirements against which the Amnesty program could be assessed. 
 The disarmament phase of the Niger Delta Amnesty program began on August 6 2009 
and ended on October 4 2009. A total of 4009 light and heavy weapons were submitted by 
former combatants. In the first wave of registration, the Amnesty Committee documented 20,192 
ex-combatants out of which 133 were women. The implication of this is that not all fighters 
accepted into the program submitted weapons (not that this is a requirement of the Amnesty 
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program). However, since arms collection, documentation, and destruction are central to the 
disarmament process and the overall success of the DDR program, it is crucial that we know the 
amount of arms collected from combatants and how these arms were handled or disposed off. 
One way of doing this in the absence of official data (Nigeria is notorious for its shocking lack of 
documentation on important programs like this) is to ask DDR participants what amount of 
weapons they submitted. I asked respondents in the treatment category to tell me approximately 
what percentage of their total arms stock they submitted to the Amnesty Committee. Figure 27 
illustrates their responses. About 32% of respondents say their group submitted less than 25% of 
their total arms stock. 28% of respondents say they submitted about 50% of their arms and only 
.9% indicated that they submitted all their arms.  
    
 
Figure 27: Distribution by Percentage of Weapons Submitted  
 In order to compare the attitude of respondents in both categories to violence despite the 
Amnesty program, I asked respondents whether they envisaged the need to acquire more 
weapons in the future to pursue their objectives. The results as illustrated in figure 28 is 
revealing. 96% of respondents in the control category compared to 38% of respondents in the 
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treatment category indicated that they anticipate acquiring more weapons in the future. While the 
huge difference between both groups may be suggestive of the positive effects of the Amnesty 
program, we should not lose sight of the fact that the acquisition of more weapons by 38% of 
disarmed combatants is troubling and, perhaps, foretells some problems with the disarmament 
program. Such high numbers is not only capable of jeopardizing the peace process, it is also 
capable of plunging the whole region into warfare more devastating than what has already been 
witnessed. 
 
Figure 28: Distribution by Anticipation of Future Acquisition of Weapons 
Demobilization 
The UN (2006) defines demobilization as the “formal and controlled discharge of active 
combatants from armed forces and other armed groups.” It sees demobilization as consisting of 
two interconnected phases. Phase one typically involves the collection and processing of 
combatants in designated places such as camps, barracks, etc. The second phase involves the 
provision of support packages to those demobilized (often called reinsertion) aimed at facilitating 
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their reintegration into civilian society. Underpinning these phases is the overarching goal to 
reduce or completely diminish the links that combatants have to their armed groups or units 
while increasing and strengthening their links to conventional society. As important as this 
process is to post-conflict reintegration and reconstruction, there are potential challenges 
involved in the management of demobilization processes. As Collier (1994) has observed, 
demobilization on its own, like disarmament, has the potential to generate unintentional security 
dilemmas. One of such challenges involves how and where to engage demobilized 
ex-combatants. According to Collier (1994), governments emerging from war frequently 
demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants into existing security structures and or civilian 
populations. However, this process is heavily politicized, and in the Niger Delta situation, there 
have been reports of groups benefitting disproportionately from the process. Thus, if not properly 
planned and executed, this could create more problems than solutions for conflicted societies. 
For example, in Sierra Leone, because of flaws in the demobilization process, ex-combatants 
remained partially organized within their existing command structures (World Bank 2002) 
thereby threatening the peace process. In some other cases, because precautions were not taken at 
the planning phase, ex-combatants unintentionally reinforced latent command structures (Knight 
and Ozerdam 2004). Similarly, the peace process could be jeopardized if ex-combatants were 
demobilized too quickly before efforts to effectively dismantle their existing command 
structures, were taken (Spear 2005).  
With these in mind, it is important to determine whether, in fact, ex-combatants 
participating in the Niger Delta Amnesty program were sufficiently delinked from their existing 
command structures. To make this determination, I asked respondents “if you were to start a 
business today, who will you partner with?” As figure 29 shows, 31% of combatants in the 
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treatment group compared to 56% of respondents in the control group say they would partner 
with a member of their militant group. Although this shows clear differences between both 
groups of respondents, it is equally evident that a significant portion of respondents in the 
treatment category have not completely broken ties with members of their former factions. Both 
groups are almost statistically tied in terms of partnering with family members at 35% for the 
treatment group and 30% for the control group. This, perhaps, indicates that combatants continue 
to receive some type of support from their families. However, if we consider that 41% of 
respondents in the treatment category and only 13% of respondents in the control category were 
recruited by family members, who probably were insurgents themselves, then we might infer a 
larger difference between both groups than the results show. The result also shows that 11% of 
respondents in the treatment category compared to 1% of respondents in the control category 
would not partner with anyone. This could suggest a period of transition for respondents in the 
treatment category in which they break ties with their former group members and group 
structures but have not yet fitted into more conventional community structures.  
  
Figure 29: Distribution by Choice of Business Partner 
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 I also use a second variable to measure demobilization. I asked respondents “who do you 
spend most of your time with?” I expected respondents in the treatment category to mention 
someone other than a member of their group. If that were the case, and if respondents in the 
control category mostly choose a member of their group, then, I would attribute the difference in 
their responses to the program effects of DDR. The result shows a huge difference between both 
categories. 35% of respondents in the treatment category compared to 73% of respondents in the 
control category spend most of their time with members of their armed factions. 23% of 
respondents in the treatment category compared to only 9% of respondents in the control group 
spend most of their time with family. Similarly, 35% of respondents in the treatment category 
compared to 15% of respondents in the control group spend most of their time with 
non-combatant friends. Although the difference between both groups appears large, the fact that 
35% of members of the treatment group spend most of their time with members of their armed 
factions suggests some problems with the demobilization process. 
 
Figure 30: Distribution by Most Time Spent 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Group Members Family Member Friend Neighbor No one
Amnesty
Control
179 
 
Reintegration 
 Post-conflict reintegration involves several components. According to the UNDP (2000), 
reintegration involves the “political, social and economic reintegration of war-affected 
populations on restoring social and human capital while contributing to political and economic 
stability.” This approach has found support from scholars including Berdal (1996) who argues 
that social and economic reintegration within post-conflict environments are inexorably linked to 
wider political and security considerations. This does not mean that there is uniformity of 
scholarly opinions about what reintegration should consist of. For example, Kingma (2000) has 
argued that the intensity of conflict has immense psychological effects on participants to the 
conflict. As such, he advocates the inclusion of psychological reintegration into DDR designs. 
Pugel (2005) agrees with Kingma and in his study of demobilization and reintegration in 
war-ravaged Liberia, identified four dimensions of reintegration including psychological 
reintegration. For the purpose of this study, however, I will focus on the triad of social, 
economic, and political reintegration. 
 Social Reintegration. Assessing social reintegration is often a difficult venture. This is 
because social reintegration involves a range of activities and practices undertaken at communal 
and individual levels outside of the DDR process. For example, some ex-combatants especially 
women, may reintegrate into their communities quietly in order to avoid some of the stigma 
associated with being members of combat forces. In societies with rigid gender boundaries and 
where the rights of women are routinely condensed into men’s rights, the challenges to 
evaluating social reintegration are enormous. And when we consider that determinants of social 
reintegration often spillover from economic forces (Pugel 2005), we can appreciate the 
challenges of assessing social reintegration.   
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To measure the degree of social reintegration, I asked respondents whether they returned 
to their community following the implementation of the Amnesty program. 95% of respondents 
in the treatment group compared to 33% of respondents in the control group returned to their 
communities. The high return rate for combatants participating in the Amnesty program suggests 
that there is some confidence in the program. It also suggests that there is considerably less 
conflict in the region since even some combatants outside of the program also returned home. 
Since the degree of social acceptance of returning combatants gives an indication of the social 
reintegration of combatants, I asked respondents who returned to their community whether they 
experienced any difficulty gaining acceptance from members of their community. 26% of 
respondents in the treatment category who returned compared to 53% of respondents in the 
control group that returned reported big problems gaining acceptance from members of their 
community. Also, 24% of respondents in the treatment group compared to 31% of respondents in 
the control group that returned reported some problems gaining acceptance from their 
communities. Conversely, 48% of respondents in the treatment group compared to 14% of 
respondents in the control group that returned reported no problems gaining acceptance from 
members of their communities. The results as illustrated in figures 31 and 32 are not surprising. 
The effect of the conflict especially where insurgency was carried out in areas proximate to 
civilian communities and possibly involving civilian casualties, may have damaged previously 
existing communal bonds and it may take time to repair damaged or broken relationships. Also, 
because combatants in the control category did not disarm and demobilize (at least officially), 
there might be civilian hostility to their presence in the community. This is especially true in 
cases where insurgency commingled with criminality. We also should be sensitive to the fact that 
there might be tension between returning disarmed and demobilized ex-combatants and still 
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active armed combatants with whom they had either previously waged turf war or had been 
comrade at arms. 
  
Figure 31: Distribution by Community Return     Figure32: Distribution by Community Acceptance  
 In order to determine their level of involvement with their communities, which might 
give some indication about the degree of their social reintegration, I asked respondents whether 
they are active in the monthly environmental sanitation exercise, which occurs across the nation 
every last Saturday of the month. As figure 32 illustrates, 36% of respondents in the treatment 
category compared to 9% of respondents in the control category indicated that they were very 
active in the sanitation exercise. 32% of respondents in the treatment category compared to 9% 
of respondents in the control category reported that they were fairly active in the monthly 
sanitation exercise. Conversely 69%of respondents in the control category compared to only 
11% of respondents in the treatment category reported that they were not at all active in the 
monthly sanitation activities. Based on the huge differences between both categories of 
respondents, I can infer that combatants who entered the Amnesty Program appear to be more 
socially reintegrated into their communities.  
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Figure 33: Distribution by Participation in Community Activities 
Economic Reintegration. The conflict in the Niger Delta has been blamed on the 
economic challenges the people of the region face daily on account of oil production, which 
began in the region five decades ago. The people of the region have faced many economic 
problems including unemployment, which is believed to be as high as 80% of the adult 
population – the highest in the nation. To measure economic reintegration, I ask several 
questions. In the first instance, I asked respondents whether they were in any form of paid 
employment outside of the Amnesty program. The result shows little or no difference in the 
employment situation of respondents in both categories. .9% of respondents in the treatment 
category compared to 1.6% of respondents in the control category say they are employed 
full-time. Another 4% of respondents in the treatment category compared to 5% of respondents 
in the control category say they are employed part-time. 4% of respondents in the treatment 
category compared to 10 of respondents in the control category reported that they were 
self-employed. However, the vast majority of respondents (90% in the treatment category and 
82% in the control category) indicated that they were unemployed. In the second instance, I ask 
whether the unemployment situation in the Niger Delta was better now than before the conflict. 
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If more respondents say that the situation in the Niger Delta is better now, that would indicate 
greater economic opportunities for members of the community including disarmed and 
demobilized combatants. 17% of respondents in the treatment category compared with 2% of 
respondents in the control category say that the situation is better now than before the conflict. 
48% of respondents in the treatment category compared to 32% of respondents in the control 
category say the situation is the same, while 39% of respondents in the treatment category 
compared to 65% of respondents in the control category believe that the situation is worse now. 
Finally, I ask respondents in the treatment category whether they believe that they will ever use 
the skills they had acquired from the Amnesty program in the future. 40% of the respondents 
believe that they will apply the skills in future. 30% do not believe that they will ever use those 
skills and 29% did not know if they will ever use those skills. Respondent’s skepticism about the 
applicability of the skills set they had acquired may not be unconnected with skepticism among 
the larger population about the utility of education in an increasingly shrinking job market. 
Figures 34-36 illustrates these findings. 
 
Figure 34: Distribution by Employment Status 
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Figure 35: Distribution by Present Employment Conditions 
 
Figure 36: Distribution by Likelihood of Future Skill Application 
Political Reintegration. Like social and economic reintegration, political reintegration is 
crucial to the DDR process. Because of the nature of patronage politics practiced in Nigeria 
where political office holders hold allegiance to certain influential political figures also known as 
“godfathers,” and actively service these godfathers at the expense of the populace, politics in 
Nigeria has become a zero-sum game, where the winner takes all. Not only do politicians invest 
money into the process, they also mobilize force from a segment of the under-serviced 
population to bulldoze their way into government. In the process, the majority of the people are 
alienated from the political process. For the DDR program to succeed, it is crucial that 
ex-combatants are reintegrated into the political mainstream such that their views count and their 
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opinions are respected. This is crucial especially since the United Nations (2000:11) recognized 
the “need to convert combatants who pursue their objectives through force to civilians who 
pursue their objectives through other means,” including democratic alternatives.   
I use two measures to assess whether ex-combatants were reintegrated into the political 
process. In the first instance, I asked “what is the most effective way to deal with oil-related 
community problems?” Because respondents in the treatment category have gone through 
several or all stages of the DDR process, I expect that they would opt for a non-violent political 
solution to oil-related community problems. Thus, if they choose any of the following five 
options they would be considered politically reintegrated: approaching government officials, 
approaching traditional rulers, approaching oil company officials, dialogue and negotiation, 
peaceful protests, and litigation. But if they choose none of these and instead choose any one of 
the following: taking up arms to fight, destroying government property, and destroying oil 
infrastructure, they will be considered not politically reintegrated. As figure 37 illustrates, 31% 
of respondents in the treatment category believe that dialogue and negotiation is the best way of 
addressing oil-related community problems. However, about 30% of respondents in the 
treatment category compared to about 96% of respondents in the control group believe that 
violence is the best way to resolve issues.  
The second question asks “think about access to political participation in the Niger Delta, 
is the situation better now than before the conflict?” Only 42% of respondents in the treatment 
category compared to 27% of respondents in the control category believe that the situation is 
better now than before the conflict. 34% of respondents in the treatment category and 37% of 
respondents in the control category believe that the situation has not changed while 23% of 
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respondents in the treatment category compared to 35% of respondents in the control category 
believe that the situation is worse now.   
 
 
Figure 37: Distribution by Method of Conflict Resolution  
 
 
Figure 38: Distribution by Opinion on Opportunities for Political Participation   
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Chapter 7: 
RESULTS 
7.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, my results are organized and presented through a method of triangulation 
known as the dialectic mixed method. The first step in conducting the dialectic mixed method 
analysis is to review the findings from the single methods, in this case, questionnaire survey and 
in-depth interviews. After this is done, I will compare and examine the findings for convergence, 
divergence, and uniqueness. The second step of the dialectic mixed method involves integrating 
both single methods in a way that potentially increases the verifiability and validity of the overall 
results. I expect that with this method, the findings from the single methods will complement and 
strengthen each other and the overall results.  
I provide a thematic understanding of my single data using logistic regression for the 
questionnaire survey and Grounded Theory Methodology (GTM) for the in-depth interviews. 
Each of the core themes represents a research question. I first outline results of the questionnaire 
using logistic regression before discussing the in-depth interviews. Then, I compare the findings 
for convergence, divergence, and uniqueness. The method is dominated by the unique findings 
generated from the in-depth interviews through the use of grounded theory. For example, 
through GTM, several variables were generated on the causes of the Niger Delta conflict. These 
variables were matched for convergence with survey findings where the main cause of the 
violence in the region as revealed through the in-depth and secondary interviews is strongly 
illustrative of triangulation. This convergence is more nuanced because it illustrates the 
underlying mechanism that influenced behaviors rather than matching examples to survey results 
in a one-on-one format.  
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The Niger Delta Amnesty or DDR Program had three main objectives: disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration. In furtherance of these objectives, insurgents were invited to 
submit their arms and ammunition in exchange for amnesty from prosecution and reintegration. 
The government hoped that the program will stop the fighting and give the government the 
opportunity to address what it believed to be the main causes of the violence: unemployment 
induced by lack of knowledge and skills (illiteracy), and greed. To resolve these problems, the 
government embarked on a program of re-training and skills/vocational education. Through 
these, and the granting of waiver from prosecution, the government hoped to disarm, demobilize, 
and reintegrate combatants into civilian society. The reintegration program itself contained three 
elements: social, economic and political reintegration. The ultimate aim of the program was to 
end the violence which had become protracted and entrench long-term peace. In order to assess 
how well the program contributes to ending the violence and establishing long-term peace, I 
generated eight measures to capture the overall impact of the Niger Delta Amnesty Program. 
7. 1 Measuring Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Outcomes 
 The potential for peacebuilding in the Niger Delta was increased following the 
introduction of the Niger Delta Amnesty Program in August 2009 by the now deceased President 
Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. Before the introduction of the program, armed confrontation had 
escalated between government forces and militant or rebel fighters. Not only did the conflict 
produce countless deaths and social displacement, it also directly threatened the economic 
livelihood of the nation, which is dependent on oil exports. The idea of building the peace 
through the instrumentality of DDR, perhaps, originated from the support that policymakers, the 
world over, have given to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. It is believed that 
DDR programs are effective in facilitating peace in environments plagued by armed violence 
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(Annan, 1996) and greatly reduce the risk of a return to conflict after peace had been entrenched 
(Humphreys and Weinstein 2007). The United Nations (2000) believes that a deliberate 
disarmament program can go a long way to end armed conflict and prevent a return to armed 
conflict. Similarly, Spear (2002: 14) argues that “peace requires breaking the command and 
control structures operating over rebel fighters.” This would make it harder for them to “return to 
organized rebellion.”   
 Muggah (2009) has argued that disarmament and demobilization must be aligned to 
reintegration, for sustainable peace to occur. Reintegration has been shown to encompass at least 
three interrelated elements (Humphreys and Weinstein 2007), including economic reintegration, 
social reintegration, and political reintegration. Concerning economic reintegration, Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) argues that a higher risk of conflict exists where there is absence of 
income-earning opportunities for youths. Similarly, the International Peace Academy (2002: 5) 
believes that peace in post-conflict societies is anchored on the ability of ex-combatants to earn a 
livelihood through legitimate means. Thus, in order to create and sustain peace in post-conflict 
societies, reintegration programs must “create economic opportunities for combatants” 
(Humphreys and Weinstein 2007: 534).  
 In terms of political and social reintegration, policy makers and other important 
stakeholders recognize that the success of DDR programs is tied to their ability to reintegrate 
ex-combatants into the social and political mainstream. For example, the United Nations (2000: 
11) identified the need to “convert combatants who pursue their objectives through force to 
civilians who pursue their objectives through other means.” It argues that one of the critical tests 
of the peace process is to generate confidence in democratic alternatives to armed conflict. For 
this reason, the need to reabsorb ex-combatants into the political system such that they not only 
190 
 
participate in the political process but believe that such participation is the only way to resolve 
outstanding grievances, has been stressed. Similarly, Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) have 
emphasized the need for ex-combatants to be reconciled to their communities, family, friends, 
and neighbors. Thus, social acceptance is a significant determinant of post-conflict reconciliation 
and stable peace. 
7.2 Research Question 1 
 I formulated several research questions for this study. The first research question asks 
“what are the causes of the Niger Delta conflict?” The question is predicated on the fact that 
there is a shocking lack of agreement among scholars on what is responsible for the Niger Delta 
conflict. Instead of uniformity, scholars have differed greatly in their perception of the etiology 
of the conflict. The most common causes identified are pollution, resource control disputes, 
corruption, economic exploitation, ancient hatreds, ethnicity, colonial history, racism, political 
marginalization, infrastructural deficits, federalism, poverty, and unemployment. Although 
scholars have fully explored the connections between the environment, ethno-religious tensions, 
formal politics, and economic fissures and the violence, not much has been done to probe causes 
existing outside of these boundaries. For that matter, very little has been done to explore the 
connections between greed/predation and the conflict or the relationship between intra-personal 
disputes between powerful political and economic interests and the conflict. Similarly, not much 
has been done to tease out the impact that the alliance between the Nigerian political state and 
petrol-capitalism has had on the conflict. My goal, therefore, was to probe the causes of the 
conflict as a way to measure the performance of the Amnesty program. The rationale for this is 
that the adoption of the Amnesty or DDR approach to the conflict situation in the Niger Delta 
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was predicated on a pre-determined set of causes. If the conceptualization of cause is faulty, 
then, the Amnesty Program might not produce the expected results.  
 In order for the Amnesty program to end the violence in the Niger Delta and produce 
long-lasting peace, it must first address the grievances that produced the conflict. We get a sense 
of government’s conceptualization of the causes of the violence from its program content. First, 
the government named its DDR program the “Amnesty Program.” This suggests that the 
insurgents were criminals motivated by greed and the opportunity for resource looting. Thus, 
from the government’s perspective, the insurgents were first and foremost motivated by greed 
rather than altruism. Second, the government proposed a comprehensive plan to reeducate, 
retrain, and or enskill combatants who enter the Amnesty program. This would suggest that 
militancy in the Niger Delta was motivated by the twin evils of illiteracy and unemployment. In 
retraining or enskilling them, government hoped to make the insurgents employable and reduce 
or eliminate the desire to use violence to eke out a living.  
From the combination of in-depth and secondary interviews, I derived another possible 
cause of the conflict – deliberate manipulation and or insertion of jobless youths by powerful 
social, economic, and political interests into resource/power disputes. The act of deliberately 
manipulating or inserting hapless youths (or innocent third parties) into resource and power 
disagreements involving two or more influential stakeholders is what I call resource 
triangulation. Resource triangulation has several strains. For example, when youths are inserted 
into disputes or contests by politicians in order to secure political advantage, we have political 
triangulation. When retired military officers or community leaders engage youths in violence in 
order to benefit from natural resource extraction, we have predatory triangulation. When 
multinational oil corporations encourage youths to violently engage one another in violence in 
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order to maximize their profit, we have economic or exploitative triangulation. The question asks 
respondents who involved them in third-party conflict. The variable “triangulated” takes a value 
of 1 (triangulated) if respondent’s choose (1) group leader, (2) politician, (3) Community leader, 
(4) Traditional ruler, and (5) oil company official. It takes a value of 0 (not triangulated) if 
respondents say no one. Table 1 presents results of the logistic regression on the causes of the 
Niger Delta conflict.  
Survey Results 
In the first model, I included 9 variables: federalism, poverty/unemployment, racism, 
resource control disputes, economic exploitation, infrastructural deficits, arms proliferation, 
corruption, and greed, with pollution as the reference category. The results shows that those who 
entered the Amnesty program have significantly higher odds of identifying infrastructural 
deficits and greed as principal causes of the Niger Delta conflict, than the control group. Other 
variables including federalism, poverty/unemployment, racism, resource control disputes, 
corruption, economic exploitation, and arms proliferation exhibited weak association with the 
conflict. This result is surprising considering that much has been written about the possible 
impact that elements such as pollution, poverty, and resource control have on the conflict. 
In the second model, I added another predictor variable “triangulation.” The results show 
that those who entered the Amnesty program have significantly higher odds of identifying 
infrastructural deficits, greed, and triangulation as the main causes of the Niger Delta conflict, 
than the control group. As with the first model, the results show no association between 
federalism, poverty/unemployment, racism, resource control disputes, economic exploitation, 
corruption, and arms proliferation and the Niger Delta conflict.  
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Table 1. Estimated Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Analyses of Causes of the Niger Delta 
Conflict. 
 
Self-Reported Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Causes of Conflict 
   
Pollution Ref Ref Ref 
Federalism 2.236 2.297   4.126* 
Poverty 
Racism 
Resource Control 
Economic Exploitation 
Infrastructural Deficits 
Arms Proliferation 
Corruption 
Greed 
  .639 
1.531 
1.103 
1.625 
    5.775** 
2.187 
2.333 
  9.917** 
.628 
1.413 
1.163 
1.695 
 5.611** 
2.421 
2.329 
 0.734** 
.597 
2.608 
1.775 
1.126 
3.026 
1.443 
  5.543* 
  16.550** 
Triangulation 
 
2.135*  2.750* 
 
Demographics 
   
Age 18-24 
Age 25-34 
Age 35-44 
Age 45-54 
Ijaw 
Married 
Delta 
Bayelsa 
Rivers 
Employed 
No Income 
Less than 50,000 
50,000 – 99,999 
100,000 – 149,999 
Above 150,000 
Exposure 
Violence 
 
N 
-2 Log Likelihood 
Nagelkerke R2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
346 
407.615 
.156 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
346 
403.306 
.171 
Ref 
2.005 
3.220 
4.306 
  .919 
  .869 
Ref 
  2.947* 
  2.521* 
   .322* 
Ref 
  .228** 
.182* 
.323 
.349 
2.401 
.022** 
 
346 
256.268 
.588 
*p <0.05 ** p <0.01 
In the third model, I repeated the analysis with added controls for demographic variables 
(age, ethnicity, marital status, state of residence, employment status in the year before they 
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entered the conflict, income in the year before they entered the conflict), extent of community 
exposure to pollution (a non-programmatic variable) and self-reported predisposition to violence 
(a programmatic variable). The results are similar except that while federalism has become a 
significant predictor of the conflict, infrastructural deficits no longer is. The results show that 
respondents who entered the Amnesty program have significantly higher odds of identifying 
federalism, corruption, greed, and triangulation as principal causes of the Niger Delta conflict, 
than combatants who remained outside of the program, controlling for all other variables. 
Overall, it is clear that the third model is the best predictor of the causes of the conflict with a 
Nagelkerke R2 of .588, which explains about 58.8% of the variance on the causes of the conflict. 
Similarly, with a -2LL of 256.268, the model has the best fit of the three models, although it is 
not a perfect model. 
In-Depth Interview Results 
 In this phase of the research, I combined the in-depth interview data with the secondary 
data. There were a total of 20 interviews. Using the Grounded Theory Methodology, I sought to 
build a conceptual model of the causes of the conflict, from the concepts and indicators that 
emerged from the data using the variable-concept-indicator model recommended by LaRossa 
(2005). The process began with open coding where I attempted to break down the data into 
separate units of meaning (Goulding 1999). I scrutinized my interview transcripts very closely by 
reading them line-by-line and word for word. I did this in order to “produce concepts that fit the 
data” (Strauss 1987). As I read the transcripts, I made notations on the margins about ideas 
which were resonating from the transcripts. I read each line as fragments or patches, isolating 
and taking words out of their contexts while at the same time looking for relations between them. 
As I painstakingly scrutinized the data, I conjured up ideas and theories from the literature that 
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evoked or conveyed similar meanings and which, perhaps, offered some more elaborate 
explanations for the behavior, events, or activities being described. I noted the emerging ideas 
and references in analytic memos that I developed to contextualize my data. I used the memos 
both to compartmentalize and expand my thoughts, and to build bridges across strands of 
thoughts emerging from the data.  
 The memos also helped me ask generative questions that helped to place events in proper 
context. For example, when a respondent said “some powerful people in the area who were 
trying to determine superiority over the other sparked off the orgy of bloodletting that later 
enveloped the Warri axis of Delta state.” I put this down in my memo with a question mark. 
What does it mean for powerful people to spark off violence? What does it involve to fight for 
superiority? How do you determine superiority? When another respondent observed that “a 
major cause of the problem is the officials of government, big time politicians, traditional rulers, 
and retired military officers … who provided the weapons to jobless youths now parading 
themselves as militants to steal electoral victories and oil,” I began to connect the dots. Struggle 
for superiority could be political struggle to occupy public office. It could be struggle for 
positioning in the lucrative oil bunkering trade. What became clear at this point was that there 
were multiple parties to the conflict and Niger Delta militants appeared to be pawns in some 
high-level political and economic wrangling for power, prestige, and wealth. Thus, I created 
multiple concepts including “third-partyism,” “pawns,” “master-servant syndrome,” “power 
play, “divide-to-conquer,” etc. before settling for “triangulation.” 
 With persistent interrogation of the data as well as constant comparison of the ideas that 
were emerging from the data, I developed many more concepts that alluded to the causes of the 
Niger Delta conflict including “resource deprivation,” “economic exploitation,” “illiteracy,” 
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“arms proliferation,” “greed,” “infrastructural deficits,” “corruption,” “pollution,” “resource 
control,” “racism,” “federalism,” “poverty,” “unemployment,” and “cultism.” I continued to 
interrogate my data for possible convergences, divergences, and uniqueness, until subsequent 
new indicators failed to generate new concepts. All of these concepts yielded multiple indicators. 
Figure 39 illustrates how the concept of triangulation was developed from multiple indicators in 
the data. Although only six indicators are highlighted, there were many indicators for the 
concept. This process was also used to develop the other concepts that pertain to the causes of 
the conflict.            
           CONCEPT (TRIANGULATION) 
 
 
   Indicator 1     Indicator 2     Indicator 3     Indicator 4    Indicator 5       Indicator 6 
 
Figure 39: Concept-Indicator Model for Triangulation 
Note: Lines among indicators show how the constant comparison of indicators generates concepts. (This figure 
builds on LaRossa’s, 2005 revision of Glasser’s, 1978, and Strauss’s, 1987 depiction of the concept-indicator 
model.) 
1”
The political gladiators in the country with different aims and objectives coerced jobless youths into the conflict 
by opiumizing them.”
2
 “These are youths that were recruited for political thuggery and armed by politicians.”
3
 
“Most of the so-called militant generals are glorified errand boys to powerful people in Nigeria, who use them to 
steal crude oil.”
4 
“With the arming of some of them by retired military rulers who know the sweetness of oil, they 
went into bunkering.”
5
 “It is either the government and oil companies ignore the complaint or they sponsor people 
to fight against each other so that they can lift crude unchallenged.”
6
 “They are capitalist imperialists and are part 
of the violence. They fund the violence because they buy stolen crude, which they pay for with cash or weapons.” 
 The next phase of coding was axial coding. According to LaRossa (2005), the purpose of 
axial coding is to examine the relationships among variables. To develop variables, I abstracted 
the concepts by asking questions such as, what is the extent of triangulation? How pervasive is 
the problem of triangulation? What are the types of triangulation? I asked these questions of all 
the concepts that had emerged from the data. In axial coding, the researcher codes intensively 
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around single variables and their relationship to other variables. In this case, I was primarily 
interested in the relationship amongst variables at the level of their properties and dimensions 
(Hinojosa et al 2008) including their convergences and divergences. Through the aligning of 
variables and their properties, patterns emerged that ultimately led me to identify a focal variable 
for analysis. For example, in comparing concepts and their properties, I started to think in terms 
of types, levels, extent, and degrees as a way to develop hypothesis or propositions about the 
causes of the conflict. I sought not only to establish relationship between all the variables, but 
also to clearly delineate their properties and dimensions in order to properly determine their fit. 
For example, what might be the relationship between triangulation and greed or between 
triangulation and corruption? How are these related to Nigeria’s federal structure or to concerns 
and agitation about resource control? Further, what forces are at play when otherwise peaceful 
but poor or unemployed young people are encouraged to take up arms against some social 
elements or forces to satisfy the desires of a few powerful people?  
 In order to code for process I complicated my analysis by introducing the element of 
time. Just like the question is asked, the chicken and the egg, which comes first, so also I asked 
which of these variables, come first? Which of the variables acted as catalyst to the others? And 
which of these variables had more immediate effect on the conflict? In other words, were there 
immediate and remote causes for the violence and which variable was a remote cause and which 
was an immediate or more immediate cause? In order to answer these questions, I worked back 
and forth between open and axial coding. I also made extensive use of my analytic memos, 
which are records of my theoretical assumptions based on conceptualizations from my data. 
These helped to guide me throughout the analytic process.  
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 It soon became clear that triangulation appeared to be the most immediate cause of the 
conflict. For example, one respondent observed that “the arms dimension to the Niger Delta 
struggle started when the youths that where armed by politicians for political purposes took 
advantage of the arms in their possession to engage the oil companies for the purpose of a better 
deal.” In this sense, armed agitation did not appear to be a conscious strategy to protest perceived 
injustice; rather, the aggressive energy of youth coupled with rising levels of unemployment, 
poverty, and corruption lent itself to the manipulative scheming of more powerful social, 
political, and economic forces. In other words, although there were many forces responsible for 
the violence, it was the immediate and deliberate act of certain important stakeholders to equip 
youths for sundry nefarious purposes that transformed socio-economic and political grievances 
into violent insurgency. Figure 40 diagrams the process of axial coding showing that in order to 
create a variable, there must be at least two concepts. Although the diagram depicts only two 
indicators per concept, there were many indicators per concept.  
(TYPES OF TRIANGULATION) 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 40: Variable-Concept Indicator Model 
1a “These two groups where loyal to the former River state Governor, Dr. Peter Odili who was their sponsor. He 
used them to dominate the political scene during and after the 1999 General elections until they fell apart.” 1b “After 
Asari publicly criticized the election process as fraudulent, the Odili government withdrew its financial support from 
the NDPVF and began to support Tom’s NDV, effectively launching a paramilitary campaign against the NDPVF.” 
2a “Some business men who thrive on illegal bunkering activities were also part of the sponsors.” 2b “Some 
politicians armed them and generals used them to steal crude.” 3a “Most of the so-called militant generals are 
glorified errand boys to powerful economic interests who use them to monopolize violence and control the trade in 
illegal oil.” 3b “They are capitalist imperialists and are part of the violence. They fund the violence because they buy 
stolen crude, which they pay for with cash or weapons.” 
Indicator 1
a
  Indicator 1
b
  Indicator 2
a
    Indicator 2
b
     Indicator 3
a
  Indicator 3
b
 
Concept A (Political Triangulation)   Concept B (Predatory triangulation    Concept C (Economic Triangulation)  
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Finally, I concluded the process using selective coding. At this stage, I transformed types 
of triangulation from a focal variable (which tentatively hypothesized relationships between 
triangulation and other important variables) to the core variable, which is “the central 
phenomenon around which all other categories [variables] are related” (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 
146). I selected types of triangulation from among the theoretically saturated variables as the 
linchpin for my overall narrative about the causes of the Niger Delta conflict. Compared to the 
other variables, it is the variable with the most analytic power and that more effectively and 
efficiently explains how and why the armed dimension of the conflict started in the first place. 
As LaRossa (2005: 850) has suggested for core variables, the story of triangulation is clear, 
understandable, reasonably accurate, and compelling. By focusing on the activities of individuals 
and groups otherwise obscure in the conflict dynamics, a theory of triangulation directs attention 
away from those combatants one respondent describes as “glorified errand boys” and another 
calls “pawns” and unto the masters, the real purveyors of violence who are often shielded in 
government houses where the appurtenances of power acts as subterfuges that both prevents their 
exposure and enables them to continue to manipulate violence for their own material gain. 
Triangulation is able to do this because it harmonizes all of the other competing explanations for 
the violence, without diminishing them. In essence, all of the other variables are related to 
triangulation, and this ultimately becomes the basis of my grounded theory. Apart from being 
theoretically saturated, triangulation, more than any other theory about the cause of the conflict, 
is centrally relevant to my research and has the most “clear and grabbing implication for formal 
theory” (LaRossa 2005:852).  
Combining Survey and In-Depth Interview Results 
 This section describes the findings that converge, diverge and are unique across both 
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methods about the causes of the Niger Delta conflict. There were a total of 12 findings across 
both methods, 11 of these findings converged, but differed in terms of the strength or level 
(degree) of intensity of the finding. Also, one finding was unique to the in-depth interview 
method.  
Convergence 
 The findings converged in terms of identifying 11 possible causes of the conflict. Both 
the survey and the in-depth interviews produced responses associating pollution, resource 
control, poverty and unemployment, infrastructural deficits, racism, economic exploitation, 
federalism, corruption, greed, and triangulation with the conflict. Both methods also converged 
in terms of the association between racism and the conflict, which was considered very weak. 
While the association between poverty/unemployment, racism, resource control, economic 
exploitation, infrastructural deficits, and arms proliferation was weak in the surveys, they were 
strong in the in-depth interviews. As a result, I label these as diverging by degrees. 
Divergence 
 There were no clear divergences between both methods except in terms of the strength of 
the association between several of the variables and the conflict. While the survey showed no 
association between poverty, unemployment, racism, resource control, economic exploitation, 
infrastructural deficits, and arms proliferation and the conflict, the in-depth interviews indicated 
some (even though weak) association between these variables and the conflict. As a result of 
this, I label both methods as diverging in terms of degrees in relation to these variables. 
Uniqueness 
 There were three findings unique to the in-depth interviews. First was the association 
between marginalization and the conflict. Although survey respondents did not see this as a 
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factor in the conflict, in-depth interview respondents indicated a strong relationship between this 
variable and the conflict. For example, one respondent observed that: 
There are 15 obnoxious laws against the Niger Delta. 15 that we know. The Land Use Decree, the 
Petroleum Act of 1959 amended in 1999, the Exclusive Export Zone Decree, the Native 
Ordinances. 15 of them including the Osborne Land law. All of these laws are militating against 
the development of the Niger Delta. These laws have enslaved the Niger Delta and enslaved the 
Niger Deltans. The first step is the abrogation of all of these laws so that the Niger Delta people 
can have increased participation and authority over what rightfully belongs to them. 
 
Suffice to say that in the in-depth interviews, there were numerous indicators for the concept - 
marginalization. Second was the association between resource deprivation and the conflict. 
Respondents repeatedly alluded to benefits of oil production accruing to people, businesses, or 
communities that had no owner status to oil. Those whose land harbored the resource were 
deprived of advantages that accrued from oil, while outsiders enjoyed all the benefits. The 
relationship between resource deprivation and the conflict was so strong that I was tempted to 
make it the core causal variable for the conflict and the linchpin for my analysis. Third, 
respondents repeatedly blamed cultism or membership of secret cults for the conflict. One 
respondent observed that: 
There is a relationship between cultism and militancy. All of the known militants are cultists. 
These cultists were empowered by government officials. The Vikings is fashioned out from the 
cults of the Niger Delta. That is why you see they wear red when they are going out for deadly 
action. Out of every ten able-bodied person of the Niger Delta, nine are Vikings. All elected 
officials in the Niger Delta are Vikings. 
 
Within the last three decades, campus cults have proliferated tremendously such that there are 
cells of cults in local communities outside of campus environments. More importantly, the 
campus cults or as a respondent put it “neo-cults” exist side by side more traditional cults often 
competing for influence. In the last two decades, the number of cult-related killings has more 
than quadrupled, and in election circles, cults are the primary recruiting grounds for politicians 
desperate to secure political victories at any cost.  
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7.3 Research Question 2 
 In light of the above, my second research question asks, what are the programmatic and 
non-programmatic determinants of successful Amnesty or DDR program? The question aims to 
understand whether and how the Amnesty program facilitates the disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration of combatants in the Niger Delta. I look for evidence that participation in the 
Amnesty program: 1) reduces the desire of ex-combatants to acquire more weapons to pursue 
their objectives, 2) destroys or disrupts the factional networks that link ex-combatants together, 
3) improves income-earning opportunities available to ex-combatants, 4) facilitates 
reconciliation between ex-combatants and their communities, 5) generates increased confidence 
in the democratic process amongst ex-combatants, and 6) leads to peace in the long-term. I also 
look for evidence that non-program factors like sources of funds and weapons, community 
exposure to pollution, and participants comfort levels within their fighting units, also affect 
program outcomes. This research question, like the first, is inspired more by the theoretical 
implications of the theory of conflict transformation than by policy arguments about DDR 
outcomes. Lederach (1999) posits that conflict is ultimately transformed from a destructive form 
to a constructive one when all parties to a conflict address both the substantive and episodic 
dimensions of conflict. Thus, destroying the infrastructure of conflict and facilitating the full 
socio-economic and political reintegration of ex-combatants guarantees against a return to armed 
confrontation.  
 Also, consistent with the theory of greed or predation (Collier 2003), the persistence of 
violence in the Niger Delta should depend on the availability of opportunities for fighters to 
benefit from the conflict. Thus, ex-combatants who get their funds mainly from oil bunkering 
should be the least likely to reintegrate into the labor force where benefits are considerably lower 
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than benefits accruing from oil theft. Also consistent with the literature, the ease with which 
arms come into the country from abroad, should determine the outcome of the DDR process. 
Thus, ex-combatants who have access to foreign arms and ammunition should be the least likely 
to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate into society. Similarly, the extent of pollution and or 
damage to the ecology by oil production, should determine the performance of the Amnesty 
program. Thus, ex-combatants whose communities were greatly impacted by oil-induced 
pollution should be the least likely to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate into society. Finally, 
the outcomes of the Amnesty program might be affected by ex-combatants’ comfort levels 
within their armed groups or units. Thus, ex-combatants who believed they were better off within 
their armed groups or units should be the least likely to reintegrate into the community. 
Survey Results 
 I used logistic regression to assess whether participation in the Amnesty program will 
produce more successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration outcomes for 
ex-combatants. The analyses controlled for demographic variables. In order to measure 
disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and overall success of the Amnesty Program, I 
developed eight measures to capture different dimensions of the program. My first measure 
DISARMED indicates whether ex-combatants are likely to acquire more weapons to pursue their 
objectives. The question asks “do you anticipate a future need to acquire more weapons to pursue 
your objectives?” The measure takes a value of 1 for respondents who believe they will acquire 
more weapons and 0 for those who do not believe they will acquire more weapons. 
The second measure DEMOBILIZED indicates whether individuals maintain links with 
their former factions or whether they have broken their ties with their formal factions. The 
question asks “if you were to start a business today, who will you partner with?” The options 
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include “member of militant organization,” “family member,” “friend,” “neighbor,” and “no one/ 
do it on my own.” The measure DEMOBILIZED takes a value of 1 if individuals prefer to 
partner with a member of a militant organization and 0 if they prefer to partner with family, 
friends, neighbors, or no one but themselves.  
The third measure EMPLOYED indicates whether ex-combatants had reintegrated 
economically by looking at their current employment status. The measure takes a value of 1 if 
the respondent indicates that s/he was employed full-time, part-time, or self-employed. The 
measure takes a value of 0 if they indicate that they were unemployed.  
The fourth measure ACCEPTED captures the degree of respondent’s social reintegration. 
Specifically, it records respondents answer to the question “did you experience any difficulty 
gaining acceptance from your neighbors?” The measure takes a value of 1 indicating that 
respondents were socially reintegrated, if the respondent reports no problems gaining acceptance 
from their neighbors. The measure takes a value of 0 if respondents report “big problems” or 
“some problems.” 
The fifth measure DEMOCRATIC captures the degree of political reintegration. The 
question asks “in your opinion, what is the most effective way to deal with oil-related 
community problems?” The options were “approaching government officials,” “approaching 
traditional rulers,” “approaching oil company officials,” “dialogue and negotiation,” peaceful 
protests,” “litigation,” “taking up arms to fight,” “destroying government property,” and 
“destroying oil infrastructure.” The measure takes a value of 0 if respondents believe that taking 
up arms to fight, destroying government, or destroying oil infrastructure is the most effective 
way to deal with oil-generated conflict. The measure takes a value of 1 for all other options. 
The sixth measure VIOLENCE captures the likelihood that ex-combatants will use 
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violence in the future to redress perceived injustice. The measure takes a value of 1 of 
ex-combatants report that they are likely to use violence in the future and 0 if they indicate that 
they will not use violence. Since the Amnesty Program is designed to reduce the ex-combatants 
desire for violence, the measure “violence” is intended to capture how successful the program is 
at achieving this primary objective. 
The seventh measure LONGTERM captures ex-combatants belief about the long-term 
success of the Amnesty Program. The measure takes a value of 1 if ex-combatants believe that 
the program will succeed in the long-term (5-10 years). The measure takes a value of 0 if 
ex-combatants report that the program will succeed only in the short-term (1-3 years) or if they 
believe that the program will fail. 
The final programmatic measure BENEFIT indicates the likely beneficiaries of the 
Amnesty program. The question asks, “Overall, who would you say is likely to benefit most 
from the Amnesty program?” The measure takes a value of 1 if respondents say “oil producing 
communities” and 0 for all other options.  
 To measure the impact of non-program factors, I develop four distinct measures. To 
measure the source of funds, I ask respondents where they get most of their funding from. The 
options where international sources, politicians, oil bunkering, ransom payment, oil companies, 
government, and donations. The measure OILED takes a value of 1 if respondents say they get 
most of their funds from oil bunkering and 0 for all others. Summary statistics (see figure 22) 
shows that about 41% of respondents in the treatment category and 33% of respondents in the 
control category say they get their funds primarily from crude oil theft.  
 To measure source of weapons, I asked respondents where they get their weapons from. 
The options were seized from other groups, seized from government forces, purchased from the 
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army, international sources, and local arms dealers. The measure ARMED takes a value of 1 if 
respondents say they get their weapons from international sources and 0 for all others. 
 To measure the amount of damage to the ecology, I asked respondents “how much did 
your community experience the effects of oil-based pollution.” The options were very much, 
fairly much, not very much, and not at all. The variable EXTENSIVE takes a value of 1 if 
respondents say their communities very much or fairly much experienced the effects of oil-based 
pollution and 0 if they say their communities experienced the effects of oil-based pollution not 
very much or not at all. 
 To measure the comfort level that ex-combatants enjoyed within their fighting groups or 
units, I asked respondents “as a member of the group, did you feel better inside it than you would 
have been outside it?” The measures were better, same, and worse. The variable INGROUP 
takes a value of 1 if respondents say they felt better inside the group than outside of it. The 
variable takes a value of 0 if they report that they felt the same way or worse inside the group 
than outside of it. 
 The results presented in Table 2 are interesting. The table presents both programmatic 
and non-programmatic findings. In the first model, I included 5 variables: disarm, demobilize, 
accepted, employed, and democratic. These five variables measure the three different aspects of 
the Amnesty Program – disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Reintegration involves 
three related sets of outcomes: social reintegration (measured by the degree of acceptance that 
ex-combatants report they received from members of their communities), political reintegration 
(measured by ex-combatants self reports about strategies they might use to resolve oil-based 
grievances in the future), and economic reintegration (measured by ex-combatants self-reports 
about their reintegration into the workforce).  
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The results show that ex-combatants who entered the Amnesty program have 
significantly higher odds of being disarmed, demobilized, and socially and politically 
reintegrated. In terms of disarmament, ex-combatants had significantly lower odds of acquiring 
more weapons to pursue their objectives in the future than respondents in the control group, 
controlling for all other variables in the model. Similarly, ex-combatants who entered the 
Amnesty Program had significantly lower odds of maintaining links with other combatants or 
their armed groups than combatants who did not enter the Amnesty program controlling for all 
other variables in the model. Also, ex-combatants in the treatment category had significantly 
higher odds of being accepted back into their communities than combatants in the control 
category, controlling for all other variables in the model. Finally, ex-combatants who entered the 
Amnesty program had significantly higher odds of resolving oil-based grievances and 
disagreements using democratic means as opposed to violence than combatants who did not 
enter the Amnesty Program, controlling for all other variables in the model. The results also 
show that ex-combatants had lower odds of being employed than combatants who did not enter 
the Amnesty program, controlling for all other variables in the model. However, this finding is 
non-significant, indicating a weak relationship between employment and reintegration success. 
In the second model, I added two more variables to measure the overall outcome of the 
Amnesty Program. When VIOLENCE, LONGTERM and BENEFIT were added to the model, 
the results changed very little from model 1. The results indicate that ex-combatants who entered 
the Amnesty program still showed significantly higher odds of being disarmed, demobilized, and 
socially and politically reintegrated than combatants in the control group. Concerning economic 
reintegration, ex-combatants who entered the Amnesty program showed non-significant lower 
odds of reintegrating into the workforce than combatants who did not enter the Amnesty 
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program. In terms of measuring the overall performance of the Amnesty program, ex-combatants 
showed significantly lower odds of the likelihood of using violence to redress grievances than 
respondents in the treatment category. Thus, ex-combatants in the treatment group compared to 
those in the control group are less likely to use violence to redress future disagreements, 
controlling for all other variables in the model. However, the results measuring the long-term 
impact of the Amnesty program was non-significant. 
In the third model after adding variables to measure the non-program determinants (oiled, 
armed, extensive, and ingroup), the results changed significantly. Disarmed, demobilized, 
accepted, and democratic continued to be significant predictors of Amnesty success. The variable 
“employed” which had showed weak relationship to program success in the first two models 
became a significant predictor in model three. Thus, ex-combatants who entered the Amnesty 
program had significantly lower odds of acquiring more weapons, of maintaining links with 
other combatants or armed groups, and being employed than respondents in the control group. 
Similarly, ex-combatants who entered in the Amnesty program had significantly higher odds of 
being reintegrated socially and politically than combatants who did not enter the Amnesty 
program, controlling for all other variables. As with the second model, respondents in the 
treatment category compared to respondents in the control category showed significantly lower 
odds of the likelihood to use violence to pursue their objectives, controlling for all other 
variables.  
 With regards to the non-programmatic factors, the results show that ex-combatants who 
entered the Amnesty program compared to those in the control group have significantly lower 
odds of obtaining the bulk of their funds from oil bunkering controlling for other variables in the 
model. This means that unlike combatants in the control group, ex-combatants in the treatment 
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group were more likely to get their funding from other sources.  
Table 2. Estimated Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Analyses of Programmatic and 
Non-programmatic Determinants of DDR Outcomes. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables 
   
     Disarmed .134 (032 - .555)** .196 (.043 - .902)* .155 (.029 - .813)* 
     Demobilized .269 (.096 - .755)*    .240 (.081 - .709) **   .201 (.061 - .656)** 
     Accepted 
     Employed 
     Democratic 
     Violence     
     Long-term 
     Benefit 
     Oiled 
     Armed 
     Extensive 
     Ingroup 
 10.310(4.359–24.382)** 
.420 (.139 -1.269) 
137.166(25.226-745.837)** 
10.829 (4.500 – 26.063)** 
.335 (.104 – 1.081) 
76.277(10.983–529.754)** 
.241 (.069 - .843)* 
.620 (.103 – 3.752) 
3.039 (.552 – 13.733) 
 
 12.432 (4.831 - 31.997)** 
.225 (.060 - .842)* 
 105.273 (11.314 – 979.527)** 
.193 (.040 – .932)* 
.507 (.074 – 3.486) 
2.283 (.374 – 13.934) 
.336 (.122 – .930)* 
3.438 (1.351 – 8.750)** 
  1.216 (.212 - 6.989) 
  .231 (.076 - .700)** 
            
Demographics 
   
Age 18-24 
Age 25-34 
Age 35-44 
Age 45-54 
Education 
Ijaw 
Married 
Urban 
Delta 
Bayelsa 
Rivers 
No Income 
Less than 50,000 
50,000 – 99,999 
100,000 – 149,999 
Above 150,000 
 
N 
-2 Log Likelihood 
Nagelkerke R2 
Ref 
2.537 (.974 – 6.609) 
8.008 (1.794 – 35.754)** 
2.256 (.208 – 24.437) 
2.245 (.999 – 5.046)* 
1.066 (.383 – 2.970) 
.657 (.242 – 1.785) 
1.062 (.490 – 2.300) 
Ref 
5.194 (1.838 – 14.677)** 
7.747 (2.437 – 24.630)** 
Ref 
.156 (.061 - .398)** 
.110 (.011 – 1.115) 
.021 (.001 -.408)* 
.125 (.011 – 1.370) 
 
346 
190.321 
.725 
Ref 
2.781(1.022 – 7.568)*  
7.418 (1.580 – 34.834)** 
1.859 (.147 -23.445) 
2.049 (.886 – 4.742) 
1.075 (.377 – 3.068) 
.623 (.220 – 1.764) 
1.052 (.474 – 2.333) 
Ref 
4.826 (1.677 – 13.893)** 
7.312 (2.256 – 23.695)** 
Ref 
.152 (.057 - .403)** 
.128 (.014 – 1.207) 
.026 (.001 - .546)* 
.142 (.012 – 1.690) 
 
346 
182.424 
.739 
Ref 
3.391 (1.187 – 9.690)* 
10.778 (1.924 – 60.371)** 
2.083 (.135 – 32.021) 
2.622 (1.029 – 6.680)* 
1.316 (.418 – 4.147) 
.607 (.192 – 1.922) 
1.333 (.562 – 3.165) 
Ref 
4.926 (1.613 – 15.046)** 
8.780 (2.440 – 31.589)** 
Ref 
.149 (.052 - .432)** 
.117 (.008 – 1.719) 
.030 (.001 - .814)* 
.110 (.009 – 1.346) 
  . 
346 
166.072 
.769 
*p <0.05 ** p <0.01 
 The results also show that ex-combatants in the treatment group compared to those in the 
control group have significantly lower odds of believing that conditions within the group were 
better than conditions outside of the group, controlling for other variables in the model. This 
means that respondents in the control group were more likely to find conditions within their 
groups desirable and amenable to their interests than respondents in the treatment group.   
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Perhaps, this would explain why respondents in the control group were unwilling to enter the 
Amnesty program. Finally, respondents in the treatment group had significantly higher odds of 
obtaining their arms from international sources than respondents in the control group controlling 
for other variables in the model. Overall, the third model appears to be the best predictor of 
outcomes for this DDR outcome with a Nagelkerke R2 of .769, which means that the model 
explains about 76.9% of the variance on the outcome of this DDR program. Similarly, with a 
-2LL of 256.268, the model has the best fit of the three models, although it is not a perfect 
model. 
In-Depth Interview Results 
 My qualitative data analysis on the program and non-program determinants of Amnesty 
success follows the grounded theory methodology described in section 7.1.3. As I pointed in that 
section, GTM permits the continuous interrogation of data from the ground up, in order to 
generate theory. Theory evolves from the research process itself being a product of continuous 
intersections and interaction with data. Unlike quantitative methods where data collection and 
data analysis are treated often, as separate processes, where analysis does not proceed until data 
collection is complete, with GTM data collection and analysis proceeds simultaneously. The 
search for meaning begins with the very first interview conducted and continues on through the 
last, and involves the careful interrogation of data through a three-phase process of coding – 
open, axial, and selective coding (see LaRossa 2005). 
 I subjected my in-depth interview data to the three-phase coding procedure (LaRossa 
2005). I specifically sought to assess the performance of the Amnesty program through its 
three-pronged intervention model: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. My goal was 
to use the grounded theory method to build a conceptual model from the concepts and indicators 
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that emerged directly from the data. In the open coding phase, I identified and or created 
concepts and matched multiple indicators to these concepts. When concepts were developed, I 
kept matching and pairing indicators to concepts until I reached theoretical saturation. At that 
point, additional indicators did not create new concepts; neither did they add value to the 
concepts already developed.  
The data yielded many concepts on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. 
Beginning with disarmament, respondents discussed their fears, beliefs, and hopes about the 
disarmament program. One theme that continued to resonate was the idea that ex-combatants did 
not submit all of the weapons that they had. One respondent told me that “I can tell you with 
every sense of emphasis that only about 30% of weapons were returned.” This theme, the idea 
that ex-combatants who entered the DDR program returned only a fraction of their weapons, 
dominated the discussion on disarmament. Related to the issue of disarmament was the 
distinction respondents made about participants in the Amnesty Program. One reason they did 
not believe ex-combatants returned all of their weapons was because the majority of people who 
registered as ex-combatants and entered the Amnesty program did not take part in the actual 
fighting. According to one respondent “the so-called militants that are participating in the 
program, these are not militants. I can tell you that 90% of them are unemployed people who 
have no means of livelihood. The real militants are not participating in the program” Some 
respondents were more nuanced in their discussion of participation in the program. According to 
one respondent:  
There are two groups of agitators in the Niger Delta - the freedom fighters and the criminal 
elements. The freedom fighters are the genuine militants. They are the ones that have refused to 
participate in the Amnesty program. They have all their weapons intact. The fake militants are the 
ones you see parading the streets, chasing girls, and spending money like there is no tomorrow. 
They are the ones participating in the Amnesty program. They did not submit any weapons 
because they have no weapons to submit. 
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From these discussions, I identified several concepts including “hidden arms,” “armed” and 
“disarmed.” In terms of the relationship between disarmament and participation, I identified 
“fake militants” and “genuine militants” as the most resonant concepts with multiple indicators 
in the data. These concepts were abstracted into variables when I began to inquest into their 
properties. For example, with disarmed, I asked are there levels to the submission of arms? What 
percentage of weapons return would be considered ideal by managers of the program? In that 
context, I created the variable “extent of disarmament” to explain the interaction between 
participation and return of weapons. Thus, if the Amnesty program is populated by “fake 
militants,” what are the possibilities that they returned weapons to the Amnesty Committee? And 
if they returned weapons, where did they get the weapons from? I also created another variable 
“types of militants” to explain participation and non-participation in the program. Because of its 
implication for the entire disarmament process, I make types of militants the focal variable. 
Because of its properties and dimensions, I chose types of militants as the core variable. 
This variable has the most analytical power than levels of disarmament. Apart from giving us an 
idea about the individuals who entered the Amnesty program especially their motivations, it also 
speaks to the return of arms and ammunition, which is central to the Amnesty process. From the 
data, nearly all respondents observed different types of militancy. While some used the words 
“fake” and “genuine” others spoke about “struggle militants,” “freedom fighters,” and “criminal 
militants.” They also alluded to the fact that the arms submission exercise was a farce. It was a 
farce from the beginning when illegitimate “ex-combatants” with no troop, brigade, or unit were 
enlisted into the program by “top political sponsors” and “godfathers.” To conclude, the in-depth 
interview data indicated that the disarmament process was a complete failure because of the 
deliberate insertion of non-combatants into the program. This action not only alienated genuine 
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militants, it also compromised observed outcomes of program benefits. This would explain why 
only 4009 weapons were retrieved from the 20,192 former combatants participating in the 
program.  
Next, I examine the process of demobilization. There were considerable disagreements 
by respondents about the outcome of the demobilization process. From early on, three themes 
dominated the debate about demobilization. The first theme involved the idea that militants 
participating in the Amnesty program had lost the bond that held them together. The dominant 
concept developed to capture this was “demobilized.” I abstracted this concept into a variable by 
examining the “extent of demobilization,” which was a continuum from low intensity to mid 
intensity, and then to high intensity. Low intensity demobilization occurs in those instances 
where participants in the DDR program still maintained strong linkages to their command 
structures even though they were committed to the Amnesty program. According to one 
respondent “how do you expect people to just wake up and tell their brothers bye bye because 
they are participating in Amnesty? How is that possible? These people have been together for 
many years through thick and thin. How do you expect them to just walk away?” Thus, low 
intensity demobilization involves the enlistment of ex-combatants into the Amnesty program 
without delinking them from their command and control structures. In fact, as one respondent put 
it “even the Amnesty officials are using the structures of the militant groups through the 
commanders to gain control of the boys. That is why they pay the boys their allowances through 
their commanders.” 
Mid-intensity demobilization involved the dismantling of erstwhile militant groups 
although the ex-combatant remained firmly imbedded in a network of former combatants. In that 
situation, a body of ex-combatants exists as primary support networks for ex-combatants. In 
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terms of high intensity demobilization, ex-combatants are completely delinked from their armed 
units and command structures. They are also alienated from their former colleagues. In this 
instance, ex-combatants are completely demobilized and ready to forge new interactions with 
non-combatant members of their communities. As one respondent puts it “there are some former 
militants who are completely fed up with militancy. They do not want to belong anymore. They 
see the Amnesty program as God-sent. They were tired of living like animals in the swamps.” It 
would appear that for this group of participants, conditions outside of their armed factions were 
far better than conditions inside. 
A second major theme involves the idea that the Amnesty program was not designed to 
dismantle existing militant structures but to reform or change them to become amenable to 
existing social institutions. According to one respondent “who is talking about dismantling 
militant groups? Nobody is talking about that. What they want is for these groups to keep low 
profile, not dismantle them. If they dismantle them, how will they hope to win elections 
tomorrow?” Thus, the Amnesty program is seen as efforts by powerful patrons to chastise errant 
surrogates in order to realign them to their structures of control and domination. Seen from this 
perspective, the demobilization process is a success since it had whittled down the excessively 
restless energy of Niger Delta youth who by their increasing participation in illegal oil bunkering 
were beginning to defy the authority of these power mongers. On the other hand, it is a failure 
since the goal of demobilization is to destroy existing bonds among militants and between 
militants and the command and control structures of the group. 
The third major theme sees the demobilization process as a complete failure. It is a failure 
because it failed to incorporate the more important segment of the active militant population into 
the Amnesty program. According to one respondent “there is nothing like demobilization going 
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on. What is your formula for demobilizing youths whose only credentials for enrollment into the 
program is that they are hungry and are from the region?” Implied here is the idea that 
participants in the program were not militant properly so called. If they were not militant and 
never belonged to militant groups, how do we discuss demobilization? The idea of the 
“demobilization of non-militants” is a theme that continually ran through the data. It was also the 
dominant topic on disarmament. This topic would also reemerge in discussions about 
reintegration. It is clear, that it is one of the strongest themes that emerged from the data and will 
play a more central role in my overall analysis. 
Discussions on reintegration produced several important but divergent findings. First, one 
group of respondents believed that ex-combatants participating in the Amnesty program were 
completely reintegrated. The idea of reintegration assumed here is social and political 
reintegration. In terms of social reintegration, ex-combatants in the program were seen as 
representatives of the communities from which they were drawn. Because the majority of 
participants were never involved in the conflict in the first place, there was no reason to talk 
about reintegration. As one respondent describes it: 
Why are you asking about reintegration? What is reintegration? I have told you 
that these so called militants are nothing but hungry youths. The Amnesty 
program is a windfall. It is Jonathan’s dividend of democracy to jobless Niger 
Delta youths. These youths have been removed from the street where they pose a 
threat to the asset of the rich. They are now on government payroll and those who 
put them there have become godfathers. They command the obedience of the 
youths.  
 
On its face value, this would imply that the social reintegration aspect of the Amnesty program is 
a success. However, if we consider that some other respondents challenged the authenticity of 
these militants, then we might reconsider describing the program as a success. For example, 
asked whether the reintegration program is working, one female respondent opined: 
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No. Let me talk about social reintegration. The community is governed by rules. When those 
militants who have gone to collect money come back, we won’t accept them. Not that it really 
matters. We can’t force them out. But we will run away from them. They are not looking out for 
our wellbeing. They are not interested in the welfare of our children. We will not associate with 
them. We consider them as armed robbers, thieves, gang members, cultists. We know them by 
their father’s name. We know people who are fighting for us. 
 
Thus, we see that there are conflicting interpretations about the outcome of social reintegration. 
What is not in doubt, however, is that the extent of reintegration appears to be directly 
proportional to the level of participation in militancy in the first place. About 90% of my 
respondents believed that the majority of participants in the Amnesty program were not directly 
involved in the fighting in the first place. Hence the question of reintegrating them into their 
communities, which they never left, should not arise.  
  In terms of political reintegration, the theme that resonated more with respondents is the 
relationship between program participants and politicians or political parties. One female 
respondent described program participants as “political thugs” who go around with politicians 
during elections, invoking fear and snatching ballots. According to her:  
 Listen, elections in this country are not free and fair. So, when you talk about political reintegration, 
nobody votes. They put who they want in office. It is not free and fair. It is these boys that they are 
rewarding under the pretense of Amnesty that they use to perpetrate their evil. So, if you are talking 
about reintegrating these boys politically, then yes. You reintegrate them into political thuggery. 
 
Respondents were strikingly unanimous in their belief that program participants were protégés of 
politicians and political parties. One respondent used the concept “politician network” to 
describe militants. Because of their association with politicians and the political system, their 
absorption into the political mainstream appears relatively smooth. One respondent described 
the political influence that one repentant commander now wields: 
 He is one of the most powerful men in Nigeria today. Just the other day, he was angry with a 
minister who refused to give one of his boys a multibillion naira contract. He sent his boys to the 
minister’s office to embarrass the minister. After insulting him, they threatened to lock him out of 
his office. The next day, a letter came from the presidency directing the minister to proceed to a 
less lucrative ministry while the nominee of the former warlord became the new minister. 
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 Ex-combatants had become more politically powerful through their deployment of violence. As 
the data suggests, they were strongly integrated into a network of politicians, which not only 
guarantees income at certain periods such as during elections, but also facilitates the absorption 
of ex-combatants into the political system, where they act as “strongmen” and “legmen” for 
politicians who use them to achieve political ends. The Amnesty program is seen by some as 
attempts to retool the mutually beneficial relationship between politicians and ex-combatants. 
  In terms of economic reintegration, opinions of respondents were strongly uniform. What 
appears to be the consensus was that apart from the reinsertion benefits paid monthly to 
ex-combatants, there was no work to reintegrate ex-combatants into. There were multiple 
indicators for the concept of unemployment. It was also relatively easy to abstract the concept 
into a variable by thinking about the extent of unemployment. For example, I pondered the 
question, how pervasive is the problem of unemployment? Virtually all respondents viewed the 
unemployment situation in the Niger Delta as alarming. Although ex-combatants were being 
trained or retrained, the consensus was that such training would not amount to much unless 
something was done to create industries to absorb them. According to one respondent: 
They say they are learning to become carpenters and brick layers. Tell me, when they come back to 
the community, there is no industry, nowhere to apply their trade. They won’t even give them loans 
to establish a business. So, where are they going to work? Did you see any industry when coming 
to this community? Where are they going to apply their trade? To put what they have learnt into 
practice? What is economic reintegration in all these? Is this what they call economic reintegration? 
It doesn’t make any sense. 
 
 In sum, there appears to be a great deal of skepticism about the reintegration of 
ex-combatants. In terms of social reintegration, respondents were conflicted about the effect of 
the Amnesty program on the social reintegration of ex-combatants. Respondents, who believed 
that most participants in the program were non-combatants, believed that participants were 
effectively reintegrated into their neighborhoods for the simple fact that they never left those 
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neighborhoods in the first place. They were thrust into the Amnesty program as a way to engage 
the idle energy of youths and redistribute oil wealth. Some other respondents believe that 
because participants were impostors, they would not reintegrate into the communities. It would 
appear, that reintegration was strongest in the political field. Because participants were firmly 
entrenched in political networks, it was easy for them to reenter the political system where they 
act as political thugs and strongmen to established politicians. Finally, there was a high degree of 
uniformity among respondents that the Amnesty program despite its vocational and skills 
training efforts, was a failure. Respondents cited the non-availability of industries to absorb the 
trained or retrained ex-combatants, as one reason for the failure. 
 In terms of the non-programmatic determinants, respondents diverged in important 
respects. When asked about the sources of funds for militants, respondents mentioned different 
funding sources including oil bunkering, kidnap for ransom, armed robbery/piracy, political 
patronages, and government. These concepts yielded multiple indicators. For example, one 
respondent (NP) observed that: 
 Illegal oil bunkering was the main source of fund to militant groups in the Niger Delta. 
Though some groups still got money surreptitiously from some state government who 
believe these armed youths can play a major role in election activities in the states, this 
was not as regular as the fund coming from illegal bunkering activities. That means that 
politicians were part of the sponsors and they play significant role. Some business men 
who thrive on illegal bunkering activities were also part of the sponsors. With a good 
knowledge of the oil industry, some militants were able to set up local and make shift 
refineries to refine petroleum products which they sell to the public in jerry cans. This 
illegal refining of product became a boom because the federal government was unable to 
accede to the public demand for petroleum products. At the height of the crises another 
dimension to money making was introduced that is hostage taking. Ransom paid by 
government or oil companies became a source of income.  
 
As the above passage reveals, the sources of funds to militants were diverse and were directly 
and indirectly related to the political state. To transform the concepts (such as “oil bunkering,” 
“ransom payments,” “armed robbery/piracy,” “political funding,”) into variables, I thought in 
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terms of the pervasiveness of the use of these sources. From the interviews, it became clear that 
oil bunkering was fairly common practice among militants and possibly other members of Niger 
Delta communities. I began to ask questions to help me resolve the properties of oil bunkering. 
For example, what does it take to establish local refineries for the refinement of petroleum 
products? Who are the target buyers? Why was it difficult for government to shut down these 
refineries? Was this because of the connections between militants and politicians? However, 
there was no unanimity among respondents about the main sources of funds. While some blamed 
bunkering, many others fingered politicians as the chief sponsors of militancy. This would 
suggest that triangulation acts in different ways to impact the conflict. First, it provides direct 
benefits to politicians and other powerful stakeholders who use militants in their political and 
economic permutations. Second, it encouraged many jobless youths to go into militancy as they 
see it as their opportunity to obtain their share of the national cake. In fact, one respondent 
observed that: 
With so much money given to the boys, different politicians and political parties 
succeeded in confusing the boys to even fight against each other. At a time, the boys felt 
that they can start making money on their own instead of waiting for instructions from 
the politicians, by holding the state and Nigeria to ransom. They felt it was time to get 
their share of the national cake. That is when the whole thing blew up. The politicians 
could no longer control the boys because they have so much arms in their armory. They 
went back to the creeks, which they know like the back of their hand, and unleashed 
terror.  
 
While it is obvious that militants get their funding from multiple sources, respondents tended to 
suggest that oil bunkering and payments by politicians who steal money from government, were 
the most important funding sources for militants. 
 Respondents also tended to have different theories about where militants get their 
weapons from. However, the most common source adduced was international sources. In that 
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regard, some respondents established linkages between illegal oil bunkering and international 
arms purchase. According to one respondent: 
 It was not very difficult for the militants to source weapons from the international 
community especially the war torn Africa nations of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, 
Congo etc. The militants were also able to exchange crude oil sourced illegally for arms, 
these arms were brought by their foreign crude oil buyers. Also of importance is the 
collaboration of some military men both in the army and navy who also supply arms to 
these groups some of these arms were those they brought home from the peace keeping 
missions and those stolen from military armory in the country. The collaboration between 
some of these military boys and the militants was very thick because of their illegal 
bunkering links which also became a major source of the conflicts in the region. 
 
Apart from oil for arms swaps, militants also got weapons from moles located within the armory 
of the Nigeria Armed Forces. In 2010 for example, about 8 senior military officers were indicted 
and convicted for their roles in weapons sales to armed groups.  
 The in-depth interview data also revealed that Niger Delta communities suffered 
extensively from the negative effects of pollution. In virtually every community where oil was 
mined, respondents observed the negative effects of oil production. One female respondent (AG) 
observed: 
 When you ask me that question, you take me back to the bad part of my life. You don’t 
even want to know what my community has gone through. Let me tell you. From the time 
we started growing up as children and when I began to know the problem of this 
community, since then and up till now, it has been poverty, hunger, suffering. You know 
why? Like I told you before, the main problem was that we could not grow food crops to 
eat. So my family faced starvation, hunger. Because when they drill the oil, the land 
cannot grow food anymore. Then, most of my uncles went into fishing. But as they were 
fishing, the spill from the oil pipes, the whole place was messed up. We couldn’t fish. 
Tell me, from hunger to starvation to sickness. It is not just that spills kill the fish, they 
cause so many sicknesses and diseases and there are no hospitals. People died from 
hunger and starvation, from no medical care. It was very bad. It is the same situation in 
all communities. Even worse in some places. 
 
The effects of oil production are felt not only in terms of lost income but also in terms of lives 
lost due to sicknesses and diseases and starvation. In fact, on this account, there was uniformity 
of opinion by respondents. As one respondent puts it, “the whole of the Niger Delta smells of oil. 
It is so strong that when we go to bed at night, our dreams are dreams of oil. Oil as killer. Oil as 
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destroyer. It is a nightmare.” Another respondent suggested that no right thinking person will 
experience the quality of damage to the Niger Delta ecology and not carry guns to fight. He 
observed that even the most developed societies such as the USA, which was built on notions of 
justice, otherwise peaceful citizens will take to arms if they had to live with the conditions of the 
Niger Delta. Thus, for respondents, exposure to pollution is a major determinant of militancy. As 
such, the Amnesty program can only succeed if it addresses the issue of pollution squarely and 
urgently. 
Combining Survey and In-Depth Interview Results 
 In this section, I describe the results of the single studies in terms of how they converge 
and diverge, and their unique contributions to the study.  
Convergence 
The findings converged in virtually all aspects of the program determinants. In terms of 
disarmament, the survey indicated that respondents who entered the Amnesty program were the 
least likely to acquire more weapons to pursue their objectives. This finding appears consistent 
with the interview results to the extent that majority of participants were non-combatant in the 
first place. Because they were non-combatant, they had no need to acquire weapons. This would 
suggest as did the survey results, that those who entered the Amnesty program were less likely 
than combatants who did not enter the program to acquire more weapons. 
 In terms of demobilization, the survey found that ex-combatants who entered the 
Amnesty program were less likely to maintain links with other combatants or their armed 
factions. The interview results generated several levels of demobilization ranging from 
low-intensity to high-intensity. While some respondents referenced low intensity, which implies 
that ex-combatants were still strongly imbedded into active command structures, others 
maintained that ex-combatants were highly demobilized, in which case, they were completely 
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alienated from former groups and colleagues. Also, interview respondents observed that because 
most of the program participants did not belong to any militant groups and as such did not 
participate in the conflict, they was no need to talk about demobilization. This supports survey 
results, which indicated a strong relationship between program participation and demobilization.
 The survey indicated that ex-combatants who entered the Amnesty program were more 
likely to be reintegrated socially and politically than combatants who stayed outside of the 
program. These findings are consistent with the interview findings. Across board, interview 
participants believed that participants in the Amnesty program were strongly reintegrated into 
their communities. Similarly, interview respondents believe that those participating in the 
Amnesty program also had relatively strong levels of integration into the political system. Finally 
both survey and interview findings appear to converge in terms of economic reintegration. While 
the survey results indicated that ex-combatants who entered the Amnesty program were less 
likely to be reintegrated into the workforce than respondents in the control group, the interview 
results indicated that ex-combatants who entered the Amnesty program were very likely to be 
unemployed because of the non-availability of work opportunities in the Niger Delta.  
Divergence 
 Results of both single studies did not appear to diverge at all. However, survey results 
tended to produce snapshots of events, activities, or behavior, while interview results delved 
deeper into the reasons behind the activities, events, or behavior described. This was true in all 
themes examined. For example, from the survey results, we gather that ex-combatants in the 
treatment category compared to those in the control category were less likely to acquire more 
weapons to pursue their objectives because most of the people who entered the Amnesty 
program were not genuine militants and did not belong to any armed group. As such, they had no 
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weapons to return and were not expected to acquire weapons. In terms of demobilization, the 
findings of the in-depth interviews appeared to diverge in degrees from the findings of the 
survey. While the survey indicated a strong relationship between participation and 
demobilization, the interview results show disagreements in terms of the Amnesty effect on 
demobilization. Respondents indicated several levels of demobilization within a continuum, from 
low to high intensity. Those located at the lowest levels were more difficult to demobilize 
because they continued to be firmly entrenched within their armed units. In fact, a respondent 
observed that the Amnesty program was not designed to destroy existing armed factions but to 
align them to the goals of certain established structures. Finally, the survey results appear to 
diverge from the interview results regarding the effect of pollution. Whereas the survey results 
found no association between exposure to pollution and the Amnesty outcomes, the in-depth 
interview respondents drew strong association between both. Thus, people or communities who 
experienced the negative effects of pollution were more difficult to disarm, demobilize and 
reintegrate into society. 
Uniqueness 
 The in-depth interviews produced unique results. First, it unmasked the identities of 
participants in the Amnesty program. While the survey results suggested that participants were 
ex-combatants and tended to attribute outcomes to the program, the in-depth interviews revealed 
that most participants had no prior link to militancy. Second, while the surveys suggested that as 
a result of their participation in the program, respondents in the treatment category were more 
likely to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate into society, the interview respondents tended to 
agree but made the case that those who entered the program were more likely to disarm, 
demobilize, and reintegrate not because of the program effects but because they were not 
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combatant in the first place. Their integration into the Amnesty program was intended to engage 
idle youths and to redistribute some of the oil wealth, which for the most part, was located in few 
hands. Unique to the survey was the finding that combatants in the treatment category were less 
likely than those in the control category to believe that conditions inside their group were better 
than conditions in the larger society. 
7.4 Research Question 3 
I measured overall outcome using three different measures: “violence,” “longterm,” and 
“benefit.” The variable “violence” measures the likelihood that ex-combatants will use violence 
in the future to pursue their objectives. The variable “longterm” measures whether 
ex-combatants believe that the Amnesty program will succeed in the long term, and the variable 
“benefit” captured ex-combatants belief about the potential beneficiaries of the Amnesty 
program. 
Survey Results 
 While the survey analysis showed a strong bivariate relationship between participation in 
the Amnesty program and belief about the program’s long-term positive effect, the logistic 
regression, controlling for demographic factors, showed very weak relationship (p = .572). Thus, 
off the three measures, only “violence” showed a strong association with the Amnesty program. 
This means that participation in the Amnesty program significantly reduces the likelihood that 
ex-combatants will use violence to pursue their objectives in the future. To that extent, the 
Amnesty program is a success. 
In-Depth Interview Results 
 The results of the in-depth interviews are interesting. Respondents believed that the 
Amnesty program was a short-term success and long-term failure. They anchored the failure on 
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aberrations in implementation, which one respondent (NP) calls the “Nigerian factor.” The 
Nigerian factor refers to greed, corruption and cronyism rolled up in one. Another respondent CC 
observed that the list of militants had become bloated. According to him: 
The majority of the names on that list are ghost names. Where did we get 26,000 
militants from? I tell you, if there were 26,000 militants in the Niger Delta, Nigeria would 
long have seized to exist. They are adding mores names every day. Each additional 
fictitious name, adds a minimum of 65,000 to the bank account of the managers of this 
scam. 
  
Another respondent, Eti, referenced the fact that some ex-combatants such as Gen John Togo 
who initially accepted Amnesty, went back to fighting as evidence that the program was doomed 
to fail. She argued that the program appears successful now, only because, as is typical with new 
projects in Nigeria, funds are flowing into and out of it. As soon as the funds stop flowing, the 
fighting will resume.  
Combining Survey and In-Depth Interview Results 
 In this section, I describe the results of the single studies in terms of how they converge 
and diverge, and their unique contributions to the study.  
Convergence 
 The findings converged in terms of the overall effect of the Amnesty program on the 
violence. Survey results showed strong relationship between participation and future use of 
violence. Similarly, interview participants believed that program participants were less likely 
than non-participants to invoke violence in the future. Similarly both survey and interview 
participants did not think that the program will be a long-term success, although the bivariate 
relationship showed a strong relationship between participation and belief that the program will 
succeed in the long-term. In terms of beneficiaries of the program, both single studies appeared 
to converge. The survey respondents did not see any association between participation and 
opinions about the potential benefits of the program. Interview respondents believed that the 
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program will benefit all of the important stakeholders in the Niger Delta except members of the 
community.  
Divergence 
 Results of both single studies did not appear to diverge. However, while survey results 
only indicated that there was no relationship between participation in the program and 
respondent’s belief about who stood to benefit from the program, the interview results indicated 
very strongly that local communities will not benefit from the program. According to KC: 
It is obvious who is benefitting from Amnesty. Very obvious. The government 
has increased oil production to 2.2 million barrels per day. And when you 
consider that world oil price have skyrocketed you will know how much the 
government is making. And all this money will vanish into thin air because of 
corruption. The oil companies too, are posting fantastic profits. It is unbelievable. 
But look at those communities, did you see any changes? Big no. 
 
This means that while oil companies and the government have made gains from the program, the 
condition of the communities have remained essentially the same. Respondents were almost 
unanimous in their belief that oil producing communities would be left out of the “gravy train” 
especially since it was not in the interest of the forces responsible for the conflict to share their 
loot with the public. This explains why the roads, schools, health centers, and public 
infrastructure remain in deplorable conditions. It also explains the shockingly high levels of 
poverty and illiteracy among the people since the only means by which the powerful attain and 
maintain power is to keep the mass poor, illiterate, and disorganized. Thus, unemployment, 
pollution, corruption, anger, and disenchantment remain at dangerously high levels.  
Uniqueness 
 Although there were no unique findings from either single method, the in-depth 
interviews generated responses that enabled me determine the long-term effect of the Amnesty 
program on the conflict as well as determine the potential beneficiaries of the program. Because 
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it would have been difficult to reach a conclusion on these issues without the interview results, I 
consider these findings unique. For example, a significant majority of interview respondents 
(about 80%) believed that the Amnesty program would succeed only in the short-term to address 
the violence. One respondent argued that the Amnesty program was established specifically to 
achieve only short-term success, and to that extent was successful. According to him 
The way I understand Amnesty is that it is a temporary measure to encourage the 
militants to drop their arms. This would enable the government to address some of 
the grievances. If you look at the Amnesty program very well, you will see that it 
succeeded in doing this. But I think that using the program to solve all of the 
problems, is wrong. It should not happen. If they are thinking that the Amnesty 
itself will finally solve all the problems, then, they are joking. It will fail woefully. 
 
Similarly, respondents believed that the only party unlikely to benefit from the Amnesty program 
is the community. While corrupt officials of the state (including officials of the Amnesty 
program), politicians, traditional rulers, community leaders, oil companies, and militants make 
money from increased oil production, local communities and ordinary people continue to suffer 
from pollution, infrastructural failure, political marginalization, and economic strangulation. 
None of these issues, which both the surveys and interviews indicated as causes of the conflict, 
appear to have been addressed.  
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Chapter 8: 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
8.0 Introduction 
 The primary purpose of this study was to examine the Niger Delta Amnesty or DDR 
Program in order to determine whether or how well it contributes to establishing long-lasting 
peace in the Niger Delta. My interest in the Niger Delta peace process stems both from the 
observed negative effects of prolonged violence on Niger Delta communities and earlier interest 
by researchers in the program and non-program effects of DDR on protracted conflicts. For 
example, Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) focused on the individual level determinants of 
demobilization and reintegration in Sierra Leone, showing that wealth, education, age, gender, 
and ideology were significant determinants of successful demobilization and reintegration. 
Similarly, Pugel (2007) assessed the impact of DDR on post-conflict reintegration and 
demobilization in Liberia. The study found significant empirical evidence to support the 
conclusion that former combatants who entered the Liberian DDR program and completed a 
course of reintegration training, reintegrated more successfully than former combatants who 
chose not to enter the program but reintegrated on their own.  
Although these studies yielded useful results, they both focused on two categories of 
demobilized and reintegrated ex-combatants. To date, no study has compared DDR outcomes for 
disarmed and demobilized ex-combatants who entered DDR and still active combatants who are 
unwilling to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate into civilian society. A comparison of non-active 
and active combatants, I believe, yields the greatest predictive power of DDR effectiveness than 
a comparison of two groups of non-active ex-combatants. Moreover, these studies focused only 
on demobilization and reintegration. DDR as conceptualized by the UN (2000) and 
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acknowledged by scholars including Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) and Pugel (2007) 
involves three related activities including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. 
Understanding DDR outcomes can only be complete if all aspects are examined. My focus on the 
three aspects of DDR is meant to address this shortcoming.  
More importantly, most studies on DDR (see Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; Pugel 
2007; Muggah 2009) rely solely on quantitative methods, which are limited in terms of their 
explanatory potential. Over the last four decades, qualitative methods have garnered greater 
acceptance among researchers motivated by the need to deepen understanding of social 
phenomena and to penetrate areas where quantitative methods alone could not. This development 
has further encouraged the use of diverse methodological strategies in the social and behavioral 
sciences, which until recently, was popular only in applied fields including evaluation (Greene 
and Caracelli 1997; Greene 2007) health sciences (O’Cathian 2009), education (Sammons and 
Gu 2008) and educational psychology (Betzner 2008). Today, the deliberate use of mixed 
methods has coalesced into a substantive field. Thus, studies of the program and non-program 
effects of DDR on conflict and post-conflict societies, I believe, are greatly enhanced by the use 
of mixed methods. 
For this study, my quantitative sample was composed of 346 adults from the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria. All of my respondents self-identified either as former combatants or as 
currently active combatants. The sample of ex-combatants consisted of 201 adult males and 23 
adult females, out of which 86 were married, 75 had children younger than age 17, and 166 were 
Ijaws. The sample of still active combatants consisted of 102 males and 23 females, out of which 
35 were married, 35 had children younger than age 17, and 92 were Ijaws. My 10 in-depth 
interviews had 6 adult males and 4 adult females. These respondents were selected purposively 
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because of their knowledge about the central issues of this research. I also analyzed secondary 
interview data involving 10 individuals who were personally involved in either the conflict or the 
management of the conflict. 
In the following sections, I will restate the three research questions that I developed for 
this study, which results were presented in chapters 6 and 7. After restating the questions, I will 
briefly answer them and discuss them in relation to the theory of conflict transformation, which 
undergirds this work. My conclusions and recommendations will complete this section.  
8.1 Research Question 1: What are the causes of the Niger Delta Conflict? 
 Questionnaire survey analysis revealed an interesting set of results. Controlling for key 
program and non-program factors, logistic regression results indicate that poverty, 
unemployment, racism, resource control disputes, economic exploitation, and arms proliferation, 
(all indicated in the literature to have strong relationships to the conflict), were not significantly 
associated with the conflict. Instead, greed (p = .002), corruption (p = .013) and triangulation (p 
= .048) were significantly associated with the conflict. 
 In-depth interview analysis supports the results of the questionnaire surveys, although 
almost all participants evinced relationships between many different factors. However, using 
GTM, I find that triangulation had the highest number of indicators among all the factors 
identified. I also find that triangulation told the most compelling story about the origin of the 
Niger Delta armed conflict, although greed, corruption, cultism, pollution, resource control and 
resource deprivation also yielded multiple indicators. Combining both methods using the 
dialectic mixed method approach I find that triangulation is the dominant causative factor for the 
conflict. It also has the most unifying power among the other factors including corruption, 
federalism, and greed, which logistic regression indicated were significant predictors of the 
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violence. 
Discussion of question 1 Results 
 Theoretically and conceptually, “triangulation occurs when two people in a family bring 
in a third party to dissolve stress, anxiety or tension that exists between them” (Charles 
2001:281). This idea of triangulation originates from family studies, specifically from the 
investigation of marital conflict between parents. One particular form of triangulation in families 
involves parent-initiated triangulation of offspring into parents’ marital conflict. Indicators of 
children’s triangulation into parents’ marital conflict include parents’ attempts to form an 
alliance with the child against the other parent and the child becoming the focus of parents’ 
attention in order to avoid addressing their own problems (Buehler and Welsh 2009; Bell, Bell, 
and Nakata 2004).  
 The triangulation of children into parents marital disputes have been shown to produce 
negative effects on children. Amato and Afifi (2006) and Jacovitz et al argue that triangulation 
violates established boundaries because it places youth in confusing and distressful situations as 
they negotiate between parents at the same time that they manage conflicting loyalties. Bradford 
et al (2004) and Miller, Anderson, and Keala (2004) argue that over time, youths involvement in 
their parents’ marital conflict places them at risk for psychological distress especially anxiety, 
depressive symptoms, and withdrawal tendencies. Buehler and Welsh (2009) argue that not only 
are triangulated youths at risk for “internalizing problems” (or psychological distress) but also 
for “externalizing problems” such as lying, cheating, and disobedience at school. 
 I apply the principle ideas of parent-initiated marital conflict to the environment of 
resource conflict. As the results of this study shows, Niger Delta militants are victims of the 
schisms between powerful political and economic interests in Nigeria. Militancy results from the 
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manipulative scheming of acrimonious and feuding stakeholders who successfully project their 
high-level political and resource disputes on hapless youths who are encouraged and mobilized 
to take ownership of these disagreements. Through monetary inducements, promises of higher 
social placements, and percentage cuts from illegal oil deals, otherwise peaceful youths are 
inserted into armed gangs, through which they engage the state in violent hostilities.  
 Thus, when hapless, indigent, but youthfully aggressive peasants are triangulated into 
resource appropriation disputes involving powerful and influential people, they unknowingly 
become "caught in the middle" or "trapped in the center" were they are increasingly torn between 
divided loyalties to the state, traditional institutions, community leadership, politicians, and oil 
conglomerates. I envisage triangulation as a system process in which the peasant becomes 
involved in stakeholders' conflictual interactions by taking sides, distracting stakeholders, and 
perpetrating acts of violence that potentially escalates the conflict between stakeholders and 
contributes significantly to general insecurity among the population. Evidence from this study 
shows a very strong bivariate relationship between triangulated youths and internalizing 
problems such as anxiety, anger, and sadness. At least 60% of triangulated respondents in the 
control group compared to 25% of respondents in the treatment group, say they experienced 
anxiety on account of their involvement in conflict that did not directly concern them. Perhaps, 
this is one reason they find it difficult to enter the Amnesty program.   
 As a result of triangulation, at risk youths develop what Davies and Cummings (1994) 
call “emotional reactivity,” which results from increasing psychological distress due to the 
strains and stresses of triangulation. In this sense, emotional reactivity to resource conflict 
produces acute emotional disconnect from traditional social values at the same time that it 
produces intense sensitivity to personal needs including the need for profit and self preservation. 
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Put differently, triangulation subdues youth’s affectivity or sensitivity to communal needs 
including the need for group progress and survival at the same time that it increases the desire to 
profit out of conflict. Eventually, the profit nexus dissipates all forms of personal resistance to 
collective marginalization and erodes the identity of collective deprivation, which deeply etches 
conceptions that Niger Deltans have of the self. When this happens, a certain fatalism develops 
that diminishes all previous conceptions of the self at the same time that it gives birth to a new 
form of being – militancy.  
It would appear, however, that not all youths are affected in the same way or to the same 
extent by triangulation. Youths more at risk to manifest the negative effects of triangulation are 
those youths who lack effective social anchors capable of deflecting all or some of the harmful 
effects of triangulation. These would include youths who have no parents, youths who have 
extremely poor parents on account of which parents lose controlling power over their kids, and 
illiterate youths desperate for some type of economic opportunity. Evidence from this study 
suggests that about 42% of respondents in the treatment group and 31% of respondents in the 
control group were starkly illiterate. Another 29% of respondents in the treatment group and 
41% of respondents in the control group were only marginally literate. I expect for these groups 
are at greater risk for triangulation. 
All of this suggests that triangulation places peasant youths at risk for adjustment 
problems particularly internalizing problems such as anxiety, depression, and anger and 
externalizing behavior such as school dropout, criminal violence including armed robbery, rape, 
kidnapping, illegal oil bunkering, and arson, and resistance violence including armed insurgency. 
For example, when ER described combatants in the treatment category as “hooligans, 
nincompoops, and vagabonds,” he was reacting unconsciously to the negative effects of 
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triangulation.  According to him: 
The sad news is that those who fuel the violence are the same people publicly clamoring for 
peace. They are like rats with long mouths. They bite you, and blow cool air on the injury so 
that you will not feel the pain. And then, they bite you again. The militants are completely at the 
mercy of this powerful people who play them like koso and smile to the banks whenever there is 
an attack. 
This implies that the crucial issues concerning the insurgency have not been addressed. Central 
to the plan to grant Amnesty to insurgents is the idea that these combatants were personally 
flawed. Insurgents were criminals who had violated the law and needed to be pardoned, 
retrained, and socially, politically and economically assisted to become useful members of their 
communities again. In this sense, individual members of insurgent groups were the problem. If 
society could modify the behavior of these individuals by teaching civil skills and reorienting 
them to societal values, they would miraculously turn around. This blame-the-victim approach 
does nothing to unravel the real causes of the problem. Because the real causes of the conflict, 
which in this case, are greed, corruption, problems with Nigeria’s federal structure, and 
triangulation, are unaddressed, the conflict will remain protracted even where there appears to be 
a lull in its episodic manifestations.  
 Lederach (2003) argues this point well when he observed that responding to the episodic 
nature of conflict does very little to untangle deep seething animosities that makes conflicts 
protracted. For him, central to unraveling the grievances behind armed conflict is the intersection 
of the past and present. In the Niger Delta, past exploitative and unjust relations including greed 
and corruption-fueled triangulation provided the veneer for insurgency. Therefore, the present 
lull in fighting (due to the Amnesty program) should provide the platform to recognize and deal 
with the set of factors that individually and collectively led to the fighting. Although the violence 
and its consequences as well as the DDR intervention can bring forth this consciousness, they do 
not have the ability by themselves to positively alter or change that history. The potential for 
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constructive change begins with our ability to “recognize, understand, and redress” the past and 
proceeds with our “willingness to create new ways of interacting” and to “build relationships and 
structures” that are geared towards the future (Lederach 2003: 34). Unfortunately, because the 
Amnesty program is designed only to address the episodic aspects of the conflict and not what 
lederach (2003) calls the “epicenter” of the conflict, I do believe, and this study strongly 
suggests, that the Amnesty program will not succeed in the long-term. 
 The above discussion of triangulation should not presuppose the absence of other causes. 
It only means that triangulation appears to hold the greatest predictive ability for resource-based 
violence in Nigeria. I would argue that triangulation interacts with pollution, resource control 
disputes, infrastructural failure, federalism, corruption, and greed to produce violence in Nigeria. 
For example, there have been calls for the convocation of a sovereign national conference of all 
Nigerian nationalities to discuss and articulate a new politically structure for Nigeria. As it stands 
now, Nigeria operates a federal system in which power is shared unequally between the central 
government and the federating units. The central government controls all forms of external 
spending including international trade and maintains an iron fist control over natural resource 
extraction and distribution. Because of the immense power of the central government, 
competition among ethnic groups for control of the center is stiff, giving rise to a win-at-all-cost 
mentality. This mentality supplies the justification for inserting youths into hostile resource and 
power confrontations in which they ultimately stand to benefit nothing.  
 Scholars including Sagay (2008) and Akiba (2002) argue that the Niger Delta conflict 
arises principally from the nature of Nigeria’s federalism. Nigeria’s warped federal structure is 
ethnoclaimatocratic. I use the neologism ethnoclaimatocracy to describe a system which 
encourages and promotes economic and socio-political striving based on ethnic locations. The 
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system is essentially primordial and nihilist since it totally torpedoes the essential principles 
upon which federalism operates. This is why when the president comes from a particular region, 
all of the political appointments and developmental projects are sited within his particular 
ethno-religious confluence. The effect of this type of federalism is that it promotes powerful 
forces for identification with certain marginal interests. Corruption and greed and now 
triangulation becomes the tools by which these marginal interests reach their economic and 
political culmination. Under such conditions, armed conflict serves a useful function since it 
affords disadvantaged and marginalized communities the opportunity to demand a stable and 
equitable socio-political system. 
 In terms of corruption, the findings of this study is consistent with literature on the 
subject. Okonta and Douglas (2003), Osaghae (1998) and Ouattara (2001) have all suggested 
linkages between corruption and armed conflict. Ouattara (2001), for example, argues that 
corruption breeches basic human rights including rights to a meaningful social existence. 
Because of corruption, government is bloated, the formal private sector shrinks, public 
institutions are weakened, and rules and regulations are arbitrarily enforced. Corruption is so 
widespread that even the Amnesty program is not insulated from its omnipresence. According to 
one respondent, ER: 
Don’t mind these people. They think that we are all fools. Don’t mind them. Do you know the 
billions that they have voted for the Amnesty program? Go and check. But where is the 
appropriation for the money. All of this comes out of the security votes which everybody knows 
is never accounted for. The Amnesty program is the biggest conduit for stealing money 
legitimately. It is a clever trick by government to pull the wool over our eyes.  
 The findings also support Collier’s (2000) theory of greed or predation. Collier argues 
that in Africa, oil like diamonds, is a lootable resource. Because of its lootability, oil or the desire 
to profit from oil, engenders intense antagonisms among powerful forces situated proximately to 
its extraction and distribution. According to him, the predatory nature of these powerful forces 
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located within and outside of the political state produces armed conflict. Collier (2000) argues 
that although other grievances like pollution, resource control disputes, ethnic marginalization, 
and struggles for identity contributes to resource conflicts, people actually rebel because of the 
desire to profit out of war, and not because of grievances. Similarly, Keen (2005) argues in 
support of the greed thesis. For Keen (2005), the objective of war is not to win but to create 
conditions and opportunities for the plundering of economic assets without the requirement of 
accountability. He argues that armed conflict does not vitiate public order or rationality; instead 
it creates a new type of social order and rationality. It would seem, then, that the Niger Delta 
armed conflict has very little to do with grievances over marginalization, pollution, 
infrastructural deficits and resource control, but has everything to do with corruption, greed, and 
triangulation.  
 The in-depth interviews, however, yielded some results that either diverged from the 
survey results or were unique. I will touch on three of these findings briefly. In the first case, the 
results showed that economic exploitation was a major cause of the Niger Delta conflict. 
Respondents drew analogy between the billions of dollars that oil companies operating in the 
Niger Delta declare annually as profits and the very poor conditions of the Niger Delta and its 
people. According to AG:  
There is a clear difference between the oil companies and our communities. Look at 
them; see how beautiful their environment is. Look at this place, even their dogs will hate 
to live here. It is painful to realize that all they are is made possible by what we are. As 
they become more beautiful, we become uglier. 
 
Without knowing it, AG struck at the heart of debates about the core and the periphery. The 
peripherization of the Niger Delta and the resulting deprivation and marginalization of the people 
is anchored on petrol capitalism. In the course of fifty years, petrol-capitalism evolved in Nigeria 
through the capture and control of state and cultural power that in turn permits, preserves, and 
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extends its aggressive economic agenda. For example, Wikileaks cables on Nigeria showed the 
strong connection between the Nigerian state and global oil powerhouses like Shell. In one of the 
cables, the group head of Shell in Africa described to officials of the US embassy how it controls 
the affairs of the Nigerian state. She observed that Shell had representatives at every level of 
government in Nigeria and was privy to every policy that emanates from the state. Thus, in order 
for petrol-capitalism to achieve its objectives of maximizing profit, it must first gain control of 
Nigeria’s political and cultural institutions. It is through these institutions, that its economic 
agenda is legitimated and the peasants pacified. The pacification of the peasants does not occur 
through their peaceful acquiescence; rather, it is obtained by force. The judicial murder of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa by a state/MNOC alliance hungry for oil and willing to deploy force to the maximum 
extent required, is one good example. Not only did this killing achieve the objective of 
facilitating oil production, it demystified the people’s belief in their own power of resistance. It 
told a compelling story, as nothing else would, that petrol-capitalism was a force that could not 
be challenged through peaceful protests or civil resistance, but by force. As one respondent who 
is a top commander of the militant group MEND put it: 
For years, our people went on peaceful protest against oil companies without 
success. We carried placards and marched on the streets. Those things don’t work. 
The only thing that oil companies who are addicted to oil understand is violence. 
They understand kidnapping. They understand war. The Nigerian state 
understands trigger play more than peace. 
 
In the second instance, the interview results show a clear relationship between racism and 
the conflict. About 60% of respondents discussed the connections between racism and the 
conflict. For example, AG compared reactions to the Gulf of Mexico spill and spills in the Niger 
Delta. According to her: 
So I think that it’s because of racism. They cannot treat us the way they treat their 
people over there. I heard that when there was oil spill in America. In the Gulf of 
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Mexico. The whole world joined them to clean the oil. They gave all the 
communities, people who were doing businesses like the fishing that we do here. 
Because the oil spill killed all the fish in the water. They gave them money. They 
took care of them. But here, they treat us like the real black men that we are. The 
thing that they will not do in their land in America, in Europe, they will do here.  
 
AG’s observation throws into relief Lipsitz’s (2011) discourse of the spacialization of 
race and the racialization of space. According to him, the “lived experience of race takes place in 
actual places while the lived experience of space draws its determinate logic from overt and 
covert understandings of race.” The ecological devastation of the Niger Delta region occurs at 
the same time that the world closes its eyes to its debilitating effects on local people. The world 
can afford to do this because of the global racial imagination that dehumanizes or sub-humanizes 
people of color as well as the cultural and economic institutions that support these people. 
Because of the global racial imagination of black people as inherently inferior or naturally 
sub-human, their institutions and resources are rendered superfluous. Not only are their land 
despoiled (through deliberate acts of pollution), but processes are created to ensure that their 
recovery is impossible. On top of that, the people who inhabit these despoiled spaces are marked 
as expendable. It would appear, therefore, that AG’s linkage of racism with observable 
disparities in responses to spills occurring in racialized spaces, is spot on. Not only does it 
highlight racialized treatments of people that are phenotypically different from one another, it 
also underlines the problem of environmental racism. Chavis and Lee (1987) define 
environmental racism as a complex web of discriminatory environmental practices, activities or 
inactivity, and policies that results from racial differences. In the Niger Delta, environmental 
racism manifests in non-enforcement of oil exploration laws and regulations, toxic waste 
dumping, deliberate discharge of effluent into otherwise pristine waters, and the deliberate 
exclusion of members of oil producing communities from the decision making boards, 
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commissions, and regulatory bodies pertaining to oil production in the Niger Delta. 
In the third instance, the interview results show a strong relationship between cultism and 
the conflict. In the last several decades, cultism, especially in Nigeria’s higher institutions has 
had negative consequences on communities, families, and members of academic communities. 
Cult violence have become so pervasive that there has been a major cult violence every for the 
last ten years. Often, when cult violence occurs, it is one campus cult against another campus 
cult. The victims of these cult clashes are often student members of cults or some innocent 
victims who were either caught in the cross fires or where victims of mistaken identity. Some 
university teachers such as the late Mr. Akpekpe of the University of Benin have also fallen 
victim to cult violence. Some interview respondents drew attention to the fact that the armed 
insurgency in the Niger Delta started as rival cult clashes between members of Asari Dokubo’s 
cult group (the Vikings) and Ateke Tom’s group. Both groups fought over control of lucrative 
bunkering channels and for political patronage. The war started when Asari felt shortchanged by 
Ex-governor Odili, whom he felt used and dumped him. The successes that he recorded 
sabotaging oil pipelines and participating in the oil bunkering persuaded many other young men 
and women to embrace militancy. Thus, the link between cultism and militancy cannot be 
discountenanced.    
8.2 Research Question 2: What are the programmatic and non-programmatic 
determinants of successful Amnesty or DDR program? 
 The results of the logistic regression, controlling for demographic variables is interesting. 
In terms of disarmament, the study found that participation in the Amnesty program, 
significantly reduced the desire among ex-combatants to acquire weapons to pursue their 
objectives (P = .020).  
In terms of demobilization, the Amnesty program was shown to significantly impact 
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demobilization. Those ex-combatants who entered the Amnesty program were less likely to 
maintain links with former colleagues or groups than respondents in the control group (P =.006).  
In terms of reintegration, the study found that economic reintegration (p = .030), social 
reintegration (P = .000), and political reintegration (P = .000) were significantly associated with 
the Amnesty program. Thus, those who entered the Amnesty program compared to those who 
did not were more likely to be socially and politically reintegrated. However, participants 
compared to non-participants, were less likely to be economically reintegrated. 
 With regards to the non-programmatic factors, the results show that ex-combatants who 
entered the Amnesty program compared to those in the control group were less likely to obtain 
the bulk of their funding from oil bunkering. Compared to respondents in the control group they 
were also less likely to prefer conditions with their groups to conditions in the larger society. 
Conversely, respondents in the treatment category were more likely to obtain their weapons from 
international sources compared to respondents in the control group.  
 The results of the in-depth interviews supports the survey findings marginally. The 
interview results suggest that participants in the Amnesty program were more likely to be 
demobilized, but this is only because the majority of participants never belonged to armed 
factions in the first place. In terms of reintegration, the results suggest that participants in the 
Amnesty program were more likely to be socially and politically reintegrated than those who did 
not enter the program. However, this is mainly because the majority of participants never left 
their communities to fight. In the case of political reintegration, several respondents observed 
that elections were never free and fair in Nigeria and that most of the individuals who entered the 
Amnesty program were surrogates of politicians. Thus, there was no hindrance to their political 
reintegration. They show that respondents in the treatment category were less likely to be 
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genuine combatants. About 80% of respondents believe that the majority of those who entered 
the Amnesty program were ordinary citizens who see the Amnesty program as an opportunity to 
“get paid” by government. Consequently, they believe that the disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration exercise was a farce. In terms of economic reintegration, the results suggests that 
because of the chronic lack of employment opportunities, trained or retrained ex-combatants 
were more likely to reintegrate into unemployment than into the workforce. This result supports 
the survey findings, which indicates that respondents in the treatment category were less likely 
than respondents in the control category to be employed. In that sense, the economic 
reintegration of combatants was a failure.  
 In terms of the non-program determinants, interview results converged. Respondents 
believed that politicians were the principal source of funds to Niger Delta militants. The 
interview results also support survey results to the extent that program participants were more 
likely to be dissatisfied with conditions within armed groups, hence their enlistment. However, 
opinions wavered about the sources of weapons. Respondents believed that weapons were 
obtained through oil-for-cash swaps and all militants were involved in these deals. The interview 
results diverged from the survey results which found no association between communities 
exposure to pollution and DDR outcomes. Interview respondents indicated that exposure to 
pollution was a significant determinant of DDR outcomes.  
Discussion of question 2 Results 
The literature depicts DDR as an important effective strategy for ending protracted armed 
conflicts or for preventing a return to conflict in post-conflict societies (Doyle and Sambanis 
2002). Studies of post conflict demobilization and reintegration show that ex-combatants who 
enter DDR programs are more likely to remain non-violent than ex-combatants who disarmed, 
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demobilized, and reintegrated on their own (Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; Pugel 2007).  
Yet, there is skepticism that DDR achieves what is increasingly been ascribed to it. Critics argue 
that DDR programs are too often narrowly conceived, inflexible, technocratic, bureaucratic, and 
detached from the political transition or broader recovery and reconstruction strategies (Muggah 
2009). As a result of concerns such as these, policy planners seek more evidence that DDR 
programs are effective at ending protracted conflict and establishing peace in the long term. This 
study is one response to that quest.  
My study examined the Amnesty program in order to demonstrate DDR effectiveness. 
DDR typically consist of a cluster of activities including disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration, which interact and intersect each other to entrench peace. Although, most DDR 
studies focus on programs enforced by international agencies such as the UN, the Niger Delta 
DDR was created and is funded by the Nigerian government. This means that the Amnesty 
program from the beginning, did not emerge spontaneously from below but instead, was an 
imposition from above, a process Muggah (2009) would describe as a “broader ‘Weberian’ 
project of securing the legitimate control of force" from combatants on behalf of the state. As the 
results show, concern about the conflict was principally about the state regaining control over the 
legitimate use of force than it is about resolving the grievances and animosities that gave rise to 
the conflict. 
The study, for example, found that ex-combatants who entered the DDR program were 
more likely to disarm compared to respondents in the control category. However, results from 
the qualitative interviews suggest that this DDR effect might be moderated by the fact that most 
participants in the DDR program were non-combatant members of the communities who were 
deliberately inserted into the program for some political ends. One respondent IK observed that: 
No genuine militant is participating in the Amnesty program. None. The people you see, these are 
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area boys of some big shot politicians. They put their boys and girlfriends in there just to make 
money. If you think I am lying, ask about the weapons returned. And you will see that were they 
say they have 26,000 reformed militant, they will only show you a few hundred guns and 
thousands of bullets. What is a bullet without guns? Bullets are like groundnuts in the Niger Delta. 
This means that caution must be applied when DDR is credited for the disarmament success in 
the Niger Delta. Until we know something about the “participation effect” or until we can 
determine for a fact that all participants in the program had direct relationships to the conflict, we 
must proceed to attribute successes with extreme caution.  
Another source of worry about the disarmament process concerns questions about the 
disposition of arms collected. On May 25 2011, Maj. Gen. Sarkin Yarkin Bello who at the time 
was the Commandant of the Joint Task Force (JTF) and led the fiercest battles against the Niger 
Delta insurgents, told the media that militants submitted 1,798 rifles, 1,981 guns of different 
types, 70 rocket propelled grenades (RPG), 154 pistols, I spear, and 6 cannons. He also informed 
that the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces had directed that these 
weapons be destroyed. Unfortunately, there has been no official word on how and from whom 
these weapons were retrieved. Also, the Army announced that following the President’s order, 
the weapons were destroyed at the 82 Base Ammunition Depot Demolition Ground at Lokpanta, 
a boundary town between Abia and Enugu states. There are no records that any civilians or civil 
organizations witnessed the destruction of these weapons. The secrecy which shrouds this entire 
process suggests that the process might not have been handled according to recommended best 
practices. For example, advocates demand that because of the importance of disarmament to the 
whole DDR process, there must be visible and tangible evidence of success in terms of arms and 
munitions collected (Muggah 2009; Spear 2006). Also, when disarmament is undertaken with 
concrete verification mechanisms and when arms are destroyed, confidence in the peace process 
is established. 
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Collier (1994) has observed that demobilization, like disarmament, have the potential to 
generate unintended security dilemmas (Collier 1994). Berdal (1996), Hitcock (2004), and 
Nillson (2005) see demobilization as a process which goal is to disconnect combatants from their 
armed groups or units. Nillson (2005) argues that demobilization returns the monopoly of force 
to the state through the disbandment of armed groups. Earlier studies on demobilization (see 
Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; Pugel 2007) show significant association between DDR and 
demobilization. This study concurs. However, I find that the association between DDR and 
demobilization is moderated by “participation effect.” About 80% of my interview participants 
believe that the majority of people who entered the Amnesty program should not have been in 
the program in the first place, because they did not participate in the conflict. If this were true, 
then, we should expect that they would indicate greater levels of demobilization than combatants 
still active in the conflict. 
Similarly, my finding of significant relationship between DDR and reintegration is also 
moderated by “participation effect.” Interview respondents observed that the majority of people 
enrolled into the Amnesty program had no relationship to the fighting in the Niger Delta. They 
suggest that, politicians and other influential stakeholders in the same way that they created the 
conflict are deliberately inserting non-combatants into the program in order to profit from the 
process. This result is supported by recent developments in the Niger Delta where over the last 
several months; there have been agitations and protests on the streets of the Niger Delta over 
participation in the program. Ex-combatants speaking through different aegis complain that 
managers of the program are deliberately and clandestinely excluding genuine disarmed militants 
from participating in the program at the same time that they populate the program with their 
cronies (Bayelsa Reports 2011).  
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These reintegration challenges are not novel in themselves. Azam et al (1994) showed 
that reintegration programs are often heavily politicized leading to the marginalization of groups 
crucial to the peace process. For example, the failure to accommodate the interests of RENAMO 
dissidents in Mozambique spurred another round of fighting even after the peace agreement had 
been signed (Nillson 2005). Not only has this program defect prevented the proper absorption of 
potential spoilers into the program, it has also given ex-combatants the opportunity to reorganize 
latent command structures as happened in Sierra Leone in 2000 (see World Bank 2000). And as 
Knight and Ozerdam (2004) have argued, even where ex-combatants did not intentionally set out 
to reorganize latent command structures, the fact that program managers and influential 
politicians were deliberately creating bottlenecks for would be repentant combatants, was an 
incentive to reorganize and reactivate violence. 
In his conflict transformation theory, Lederach (1997) argued for a holistic approach to 
transforming conflict from a destructive form to a situation amenable to all conflicting parties. 
Part of his strategy was to completely and deliberately engage the multiplicity of issues that not 
only generated the conflict, but that also continued to make the conflict protracted. In this sense, 
the issues that generated the conflict may be different from the issues that sustain the conflict. 
The participation effect in the Amnesty example functions as an obstacle to the peace process. 
This occurs as a result of the artificial grafting of the Amnesty program on the conflict without 
attempts at meaningfully engaging combatants with a view to addressing genuine grievances. 
Again, this appears to reinforce the argument that the Niger Delta combatants are estranged 
hirelings of influential members of the political and economic ruling elite who entered the 
conflict for their own profit. Their desire for profit is abstracted and transformed into legitimate 
grievances that are justified through popular rhetoric.  It is for this reason that the Amnesty 
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program is heavily combatant-centric instead of tailored to address genuine grievances. As the 
evidence suggests, this might mean that the program will fall far short of expectations, in the 
long run.  
8.3 Research Question 3: Overall, is the amnesty program capable of producing peace 
in the long-term? 
 I measured overall outcome using three different measures: “violence,” “longterm,” and 
“benefit.” The variable “violence” measures the likelihood that ex-combatants will use violence 
in the future to pursue their objectives. The variable “longterm” measures whether 
ex-combatants believe that the Amnesty program will succeed in the long term. The variable 
“benefit” captured ex-combatants belief about the potential beneficiaries of the Amnesty 
program. While the survey analysis showed a strong bivariate relationship between participation 
in the Amnesty program and belief about the program’s long-term positive effect, the logistic 
regression, controlling for demographic factors, showed very weak relationship (p = .572). Thus, 
of the three measures, only “violence” showed a strong association with the Amnesty program. 
This means that participation in the Amnesty program significantly reduces the likelihood that 
ex-combatants will use violence to pursue their objectives in the future. To that extent, the 
Amnesty program is a success. 
 The results of the in-depth interviews diverged from the survey findings. Respondents 
believed that the Amnesty program was a short-term success and long-term failure. They 
anchored the failure on aberrations in implementation, which one respondent NP, calls the 
“Nigerian factor.” The Nigerian factor refers to greed, corruption and cronyism rolled up in one. 
Another respondent CC observed that the list of militants had become bloated. According to him: 
The majority of the names on that list are ghost names. Where did we get 26,000 militants from? I 
tell you, if there were 26,000 militants in the Niger Delta, Nigeria would long have seized to exist. 
They are adding mores names every day. Each additional fictitious name, adds a minimum of 
65,000 to the bank account of the managers of this scam.  
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Another respondent Eti, referenced the fact that some ex-combatants such as Gen John Togo 
who initially accepted Amnesty, went back to fighting as evidence that the program was doomed 
to fail. She argued that the program appears successful now, only because, as is typical with new 
projects in Nigeria, funds are flowing into and out of it. As soon as the funds stop flowing, the 
fighting will resume. Moreover, the evidence strongly indicates that ordinary members of Niger 
Delta communities, the same people all sides to the conflict claim they are fighting for, will 
benefit nothing from the Amnesty program but continued deprivation, marginalization, and 
frustration. Thus, I find very strong evidence that the Amnesty program, despite its promises, is 
incapable of delivering peace beyond the short-term. It stopped the violence momentarily to 
allow for a more inclusive process of reconciliation that had the potential to transform the 
destructive conflict into a constructive one in which all parties to the conflict engage each other 
and resolve all disagreements, suspicions, and animosities. Unfortunately, the program missed 
this important moment and instead, began to assume a much wider and unanticipated role as the 
de jure and de facto solution to the conflict.  
 The transformation of the Amnesty program from a stop-gap measure into its own end is 
a contradiction of widely established standards for DDR (see, for example 
www.unddr.org/iddrs/framework.php). In places where DDR has been implemented, it was 
always implemented as part of a process of reconciliation, prejudice reduction, and 
socio-economic and political transformations. In that sense, DDR represents just one piece of a 
puzzle, albeit a very important one, but by no means the entire process. DDR should be 
conceived not as an end in itself but as part of a multi-dimensional process of peacebuilding. The 
Amnesty program, therefore, should be seen as an important part of Nigeria’s peace 
infrastructure. As the theory of conflict transformation explains, peacebuilding is a cumulative 
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process that engages a whole range of actors, strategies, processes, institutions, and contexts. 
Further, the entire architecture of peacebuilding is activated by individuals and groups who play 
different complimentary roles in a triangle shaped formation. In that case, people (or groups) at 
different levels must interact with people (or groups) at other levels to bring about desired 
outcomes. This was not the case with the Amnesty program, which one knowledgeable 
informant described as “top-heavy and bottom-thin.” By ignoring the wider context of the 
conflict (pollution, resource control, exploitation, marginalization, corruption, greed, 
triangulation, etc) as well as important “bottom” voices, the Amnesty program prepared the stage 
for what will be its eventual failure. 
8.4 Conclusion 
 The Niger Delta Amnesty program was instituted at a time of great social, political, and 
economic ferment and trepidation. Fear hung in the air like ripened banana fruits. Apprehensive 
businessmen jettisoned their lucrative oil businesses and fled the region. People – natives and 
foreigners alike – dreaded to walk the streets at anytime. On top of all that, the Nigerian state 
was on the verge of economic ruin. 80% of its domestic revenue and 95% of its foreign exchange 
came from oil exports, mainly produced in the Niger Delta. A mix of socio-political, 
environmental, and economic challenges had unleashed the potent energy of peasant youths on 
the nation. Their modus operandi was simple, the use of armed violence to redress what they 
termed “decades of exploitation and marginalization.” Oil installations were attacked ceaselessly 
and oil workers, many of whom are expatriates, were kidnapped and released after the payment 
of hefty ransoms. Some of these “captives” died in the process of their capture, in captivity, or 
during attempts by security forces to seize them from their captors. 
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Within a short while, the psychology of fear, upon which the militants based their 
operations, began to yield the real dividends. Governments (local, state, and federal) courted 
them. Politicians of different stature feted them. Oil companies, who for decades resisted calls to 
make their operations cleaner and safer, fell over them. And the militants milked these important 
stakeholders for effect. They issued threats and ultimatums, and in some instances, backed up 
their threats with action. Soon, they began to control their own territories, over which new 
emergent generals presided. By August 2009 when the Amnesty program was introduced, over 
100 dreaded militant camps or territories had been created. Militancy boomed and many 
individuals, who had no conception of the central ideas behind the Niger Delta struggle, became 
emergency, cash-and-carry militants. They all smiled to the banks.  
Although militancy appeared to contain enormous benefits, there were also major 
challenges. The Nigerian state was capable and willing to use force to quell this emergent 
resistance movement. It did so with the creation of the Joint Task Force (JTF) a crack team of 
no-nonsense soldiers drawn from the various arms of the Nigerian military. The JTF in keeping 
with its mandate and promise to “fight to the finish” swung into action and leveled whole 
villages, leaving in its trail many deaths and a mass of homeless, traumatized, and angry 
villagers. Despite its mandate to “fight to the finish,” it soon became clear that the government 
had to adopt another approach, a less aggressive one, to deal with the problem of insurgency. 
The Amnesty program was that approach.  
From the onset, the Amnesty program encountered difficulties. The first challenge was 
how to build confidence with combatants, many of whom had come to see the state and its 
representatives, as enemies. How do you encourage combatants who were suspicious of every 
move of government to suspend their apprehension and give the program a chance? Of a truth, 
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the Amnesty program got a big boost from the federal government especially with President 
Jonathan, himself from the Niger Delta, in charge. In order to surmount the first challenge, the 
program had to engage a second challenge – money. Where will the money come from to handle 
the different stages of the Program? This question, and the first, was answered when the 
government generously opened its coffers to the program. Huge sums of money were disbursed 
not only to buy the support of some renegade combatants, but also to establish the program as a 
long-lasting institution capable of resolving not only the conflict in the Niger Delta but conflict 
everywhere in Nigeria. The source of the funds that went into setting up the program, at least at 
the initial stages, remain shrouded in mystery. Explanations have been half-hearted permitting 
full-throated innuendoes to thrive. 
Today, two years after, the program is still active but the ceasefire that was called in 
order to establish the Amnesty program is no longer active. Despite what appears to be relative 
calm in the Niger Delta (compared to the situation in 2008 and 2009), violence everywhere in 
Nigeria appears to be spiraling out of control especially with the Boko Haram insurgency in the 
northern parts of Nigeria, which many believe is an attempt by northern elements to reap the 
kind of “settlements” and “pay-offs” that Niger Delta insurgents enjoy from the Amnesty 
program. Some stakeholders, however, believe that the Amnesty program is working. In fact, 
Kingsley Kuku, the special adviser to the Nigerian president on Amnesty, called the verdict on 
the performance of the program. According to him: 
The amnesty proclamation, and subsequent post-Amnesty disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) program, is the sincerest, boldest and most profound effort by any Federal 
Government of Nigeria since 1960 to address the agitation for fairness, equity and development in 
the oil-bearing Niger Delta. 
To show how effective the Amnesty program has been, Kuku drew comparisons between the 
situation in the Niger Delta today and what existed before the program was launched in 2009. He 
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observed that: 
In 2008 alone, it was estimated that Nigeria lost over N3 trillion as a result of militancy in the 
Niger Delta. By January 2009, militancy in the Niger Delta had virtually crippled Nigeria’s 
economy. Investment inflow to the upstream sub-sector of the oil industry had dwindled. 
Exasperated foreign investors had begun redirecting their investments to Angola and Ghana. At 
that point Angola surpassed Nigeria as Africa’s highest crude oil producer. This dwindling 
investments in the critical oil and gas sector threatened Nigeria’s capacity to grow its crude oil 
reserves as planned by the end of 2010. 
 
In a sense, Kuku is right. There were drastic reductions in the levels and frequency of 
attacks immediately following the introduction of the Amnesty program. However, Kuku did not 
explain whether the investors that fled have returned. He also did not explain whether those who 
fled were inspired more by the escalating violence or by the dearth of vital infrastructure such as 
electricity, roads, and water, or by a combination of all of these. Yet, according to the Bergden 
Niger Delta Security Reports (2010), “militant attacks by month have ebbed and flowed since the 
beginning of 2006 when MEND made its first appearance.” From the results of this study, I 
expect that this pattern will continue. As the Bergen Reports (2010) shows, one year after the 
introduction of the Amnesty program, the violence had not abated. For example, in 2009, there 
were a total of 82 violent attacks by suspected insurgent groups in the Niger Delta compared to 
42 incidents in the first 6 months of 2010. Between August 6 and October 4 2009, some of the 
top commanders of MEND along with thousands of their fighters entered the Amnesty program. 
In January of 2010, however, Jomo Gbomo, MENDs spokesperson announced that MEND had 
called of its ceasefire and would resume hostilities with the Nigerian state. Subsequently, it 
detonated two car bombs in Warri, Delta state, at the Post-Amnesty meeting organized by the 
Vanguard Newspapers to deepen understanding about the program and explore ways to maintain 
the ceasefire. In an email message after the attack, Jomo Gbomo said: 
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) salutes all its 
operatives who at great risk, successfully planted and detonated two (2) car 
bombs at the venue of the Vanguard Post Amnesty Conference in Warri, Delta 
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state. Three such bombs of varying strength were planted at this venue. It was 
unnecessary to detonate the third and most powerful bomb as our operatives 
noticed the participants at this jamboree fled towards the direction of the last 
bomb. Any attempt to detonate this bomb would have resulted in great loss of life. 
This bomb is being preserved for future use. All who participated in this operation 
safely returned to their respective bases 
And in its most brazen attack yet, MEND detonated two car bombs outside of the Eagle Square 
venue of the October 1, 2010 independence day celebrations with the president and other top 
functionaries of government in attendance. Eight people were killed and many others injured in 
that attack. In all, the government appears incapable of responding to the new guerrilla tactics of 
MEND and other separatist groups like Boko Haram. For example, the government, at the last 
minute, shelved plans for the October 1 2011 independence day celebration at the Eagle Square 
over threats by MEND and Boko Haram to bomb the venue of the celebration. This latest move 
by government, which appeared to be in deference to the insurgents, showed like nothing else 
would, that the peace was fractured and the Amnesty program, touted as the only solution to the 
conflict, had failed to entrench peace in the Niger Delta.  
 
 
Figure 41: Map of insurgent attacks in the 1st half of 2009 (adopted from the BergenRiskSolutions 2009). 
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Figure 39: Map of insurgent attacks in the 1st half of 2010 (adopted from the BergenRiskSolutions 2010). 
 
 The result of this mixed-study suggests mixed outcomes. By drawing on program and 
non-program factors, this study demonstrates that the complexity of factors that led to the 
conflict, the levels of unemployment and poverty, levels of interaction amongst members of 
militant groups, the nature of funding and arms supply, the degree of social and political 
acceptability, and the manner in which participation in the program was negotiated and executed 
are all crucial determinants of DDR success. Overall, the study finds that the Amnesty program 
appears to be partially successful at the macro-level since it facilitated the resumption of full oil 
production activities in the Niger Delta. As a result, crude oil output increased from about 1.3 
million bpd at the peak of the conflict to about 2.2 million bpd now. With this increase, 
government revenue from oil has increased tremendously and the profitability of oil companies 
has quadrupled. This is good news for the federal government and oil companies, which have 
been shown to be addicted to oil revenue or profit. This shows clearly that the state/petrol-capital 
alliance is the primary beneficiary of this DDR program. This partial macro-level success, 
however, must be qualified. Apart from enabling the resumption of full oil mining activities, the 
Amnesty program has been unable to engage other macro level changes. For example, it has not 
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produced the much anticipated security sector reforms, which is crucial in order to develop the 
type of intelligence that would be proactive in preventing future armed conflict. The Nigerian 
Police Force, a humongous, monolithic body of law enforcement officers, remains ill-equipped, 
ill-trained, and ill-funded to provide the much needed service to Nigerian people. Moreover, the 
task of using one central force to police a nation of 150 million people that are fragmented along 
multiple lines begs for urgent reforms. This was of no consequence to the planners and 
implementers of the Amnesty program. Also, cooperation or collaboration with other large scale 
institutions such as the school and the family have not been developed such that the success 
achieved at the level of increased oil revenue cannot be replicated elsewhere. Thus, apart from 
the state/MNOC alliance, other key sectors of the society appear to be alienated from the 
Amnesty program, thereby permitting the ultimate breakdown of the peace process. 
 At the micro-level, the program has mixed results. The results show that the program has 
effect on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Participants in the program are less 
likely to acquire weapons and to maintain links with other combatants. They are also more likely 
to be reintegrated socially and politically into society. However, program participants are less 
likely to reintegrate economically, which suggest a critical failure for the program. Because of its 
noticeable failure at the economic level, which in the Niger Delta is the structure upon which all 
else rests, the Amnesty program is unable to reconfigure the base of militancy in the Niger Delta. 
This is despite the fact that the program has been successful in co-opting and engaging some 
militant leaders (along with their members) through the payment of reinsertion allowances, 
choice contracts, and skill/vocational training. Many Niger Delta separatist groups still operate 
outside of the program and these groups have gained more traction with the formation of 
separatist groups in other parts of Nigeria. One of such separatist groups is Boko Haram, which 
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has established itself as a religious separatist movement active in the northern parts of Nigeria 
and funded by powerful political forces. The refusal of many insurgent groups to enter the 
Amnesty program and the commitment of MEND (the main insurgent group in the Niger Delta) 
to continue armed hostilities with the Nigerian state is predicated in part on the program’s 
remove from communities and local people whose sufferings fuelled agitation in the Niger Delta 
in the first place. These local peoples continue to suffer the negative effects of oil production 
including pollution. They also continue to be unemployed, poor and lacking basic necessities of 
life including medical care and education. Armed insurgent groups also refused to be part of the 
program because the framework for peace ignored some of the more direct causes of the conflict 
including greed, corruption, and triangulation. Those empowered to implement the program are 
part of the original architecture of the conflict and could not be trusted to implement the program 
in the best interest of the communities. It is for this reason that many youths with direct and 
indirect connections to the program implementers but with no connection to the conflict, were 
inserted into the program, further alienating genuine insurgents and increasing the prospects for 
full-scale program failure.  
 The study demonstrates that the social, economic, and political circumstances 
surrounding the implementation of the Amnesty Program reflects defects in program design, 
ultimately affecting the outcomes. Not only did the program lack the endorsement of critical 
segments of the population including local communities and still active insurgents, the program 
was not well equipped to address issues of heterogeneity amongst program participants. This is 
the reason that key insurgents like John Togo who was one of the first to embrace the Amnesty 
program, withdrew from the program. Thus, the program failed most dramatically in its inability 
to provide ex-combatants with a longer term framework for economic advancement. 
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 It is clear, then, that the Niger Delta Amnesty or DDR program has been unable to alter 
the Niger Delta conflict dynamics in any sustainable way. The conflict, which initially was put in 
pause mode by the introduction of the Amnesty program, appears to be rebounding, and this will 
have dire consequences for people of the Niger Delta and all who come to the Niger Delta for 
economic or socio-political reasons. This outcome is not unexpected especially if we consider 
the principles of conflict transformation (wherein protracted conflict can only be transformed 
into a situation amenable to all parties when the etiology of the conflict is addressed in ways that 
assuages the angst, anxieties, and concerns of all parties to the conflict). More importantly, the 
study finds that the Amnesty program preserved what Charles Tilly (1978) called “revolutionary 
situations.” Tilly described a revolutionary situation as the emergence of a condition of “dual 
sovereignty.” According to Tilly (1978: 200), dual sovereignty depicts: 
 The appearance of contenders or coalitions of contenders, advancing exclusive alternative 
claims to the control over the government …; commitment to those claims by a 
significant segment of the subject population …; the incapacity or unwillingness of the 
government or its agents to suppress the challenger coalition.  
Thus, the Niger Delta conflict appears to be rebounding because the outcome of the peace 
initiative either preserved the existing condition of dual sovereignty or accelerated conditions for 
the rebounding of dual sovereignty. It is instructive to note that the conditions for the rebounding 
of dual sovereignty typically presents with the absence of outright military victories and often 
following negotiated settlements (Licklider 1995; Walter 1997; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; 
Mason and Quinn 2009). In the Niger Delta case, the extant negotiated settlement preserved 
some or all of the pre-conflict conditions that provoked the violence. In that sense, instead of 
weakening or dismantling the condition of dual sovereignty, the Niger Delta Amnesty or DDR 
program appears to strengthen that condition. As the condition of dual sovereignty waxes instead 
of waning, the Amnesty or DDR-induced peace fragments into the resumption of armed 
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hostilities. The results of this study show clearly that the Niger Delta Amnesty or DDR program 
has preserved the structural conditions that make the resumption of armed conflict decidedly 
inevitable.  
 This conclusion is reinforced by Mason and Fett’s (1996) decision calculus on the 
probability of civil war reoccurrence after peace settlements. According to Mason and Fett 
(1996) and Mason and Quinn (2009) the potential for sustaining peace (after civil war) or the 
reoccurrence of civil war (after peace settlements) is a function of the difference in expected 
utility from resuming war compared to sustaining peace. I slightly modify their formula to 
calculate the probability of the resumption of armed hostilities in the Niger Delta. I calculate the 
benefits from resuming armed conflict as: 
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Where EUCW is the expected utility of resuming armed conflict, EB is the expected benefit from 
armed conflict, PC is the preservation of all (or some) of the pre-conflict conditions, PV is the 
probability of achieving victory, ED is the expected cost of defeat, 1 – PV is the probability of 
defeat, C is the rate at which the costs of conflict are absorbed from the present time (ti = 0) 
through a time in the future when victory is achieved, tv. Thus, for Niger Delta insurgents to 
prefer resumption of armed hostilities to sustaining the peace, the expected utility of resuming 
armed conflict EUCW must be greater than the expected utility of sustaining the peace, EUS. I 
slightly modify Mason and Quinn’s (2009) formula for calculating the expected benefits from 
sustaining the peace in the following equation: 
a = 
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Where EUA is the expected utility from the Amnesty-induced peace, AB is the benefit from 
participating in the Amnesty program. By agreeing to participate in the program, insurgents save 
the costs of achieving victory:  
 


 
This saving could be a significant determinant of insurgents’ decision to pursue conflict or to 
accept peace only if insurgents invested their own resources in the conflict. This savings will 
have no meaning for insurgents where a third party operating from within the political state bears 
the entire costs of conflict (or victory) as is the case in the Niger Delta. Because insurgents are 
essentially victims of triangulation, they will continue to fight as long as their sponsors within 
the political state continue to have access to state resources with which they fund insurgency. 
The implication of this decision calculus is that any variable that (1) decreases insurgent’s 
estimate of their ability to achieve victory; (2) decreases the benefits from engaging in armed 
insurrection; (3) decreases the pre-conflict conditions of the Niger Delta; (4) decrease the amount 
of resources and influence available to powerful political and economic interests that fund 
insurgency; (5) increases the costs of the conflict; (6) increases the duration of the conflict; and 
or (7) increases the benefits for participating in the Amnesty program, should increase 
insurgent’s incentives or motivation to sustain the peace instead of resuming armed hostilities. 
 Conversely, I would expect armed hostilities to resume if (1) a condition of dual 
sovereignty persists after the Amnesty program is implemented, (2) if the powerful political and 
economic interests vested in the conflict remain intact, and (3) if insurgents perceive that the 
expected utility of resuming armed conflict (including the potential for redressing the 
pre-conflict grievances in the long-run) is greater than the expected utility of sustaining the 
peace. If we consider these in terms of Lederach’s theory of conflict transformation, I find that 
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the peace produced by the Amnesty program is at best short-termed. For example, Lederach 
argues that peace can only occur when a peacebuilding strategy (such as DDR) transforms: (a) 
the conflict itself; (b) some aspects of the socio-historical and political system in which the 
conflict occurs; (c) the persons involved in the conflict; and (d) the relationships between 
adversaries. It is transformation at these multiple levels that ultimately produces peace. 
Unfortunately, the Amnesty program not only appears to have glossed over these issues but also 
retained the pre-conflict conditions and coalitions, thereby guaranteeing a return to armed 
conflict.  
8.5 Rethinking Theory  
In line with the findings of this study, I propose two theories to predict and explain 
resource-based armed conflict in Nigeria. These theories, with caution, could be applied to 
resource-based conflicts in other parts of the world especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The first 
theory is the Theory of Resource Deprivation. This social structure theory explains insurgency 
amongst Niger Delta youths as a function of socialization in a society dominated by oil 
exploitation and defined by huge governance deficits. The ineffective regulation of oil 
production led to production practices that devastated oil-bearing local communities and people 
in such a way that their recovery has proven impossible. The oil-induced economic, political, and 
social disorganization is a culmination of historical pressures beginning with slavery and 
colonialism and on through negotiated independence, the profligacy of corrupt civilian regimes, 
and military rule that put immense pressure on local communities and people to seek alternative 
means not only for social expression but also for economic subsistence. The exploitative alliance 
between the state (dominated by majority ethnic groups) and oil companies left a wound that has 
deepened with lack of economic and political opportunity. The structure of exploitation thrust 
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minority youths into a system of forced dependency and negative self-feelings at the same time 
that it created a basis for their forced identification with the same powerful forces responsible for 
their condition. Consequently, minority youths who are deprived of control and benefit of their 
own resources, are shut out of the socio-political mainstream, and are isolated in segregated 
underdeveloped communities. As a result of this, they develop ambivalence and antagonism 
towards the objects, structures, and individuals responsible for their negative conditions. 
 Militancy, therefore, offers these youths the opportunity to not only understand 
themselves within the dominant structure of privation but also to create new identities that frees 
them of the forced obligation to conform and acquiesce to their own oppression. The liberated 
aggressive energy, which is borne out of their deep frustration and introspection becomes 
directed towards social objects (including politicians, government officials, and employees of oil 
companies) they consider as oppressors or the structures and institutions that these “oppressors” 
construct (including oil installations, public facilities, police stations, etc) to facilitate the 
exploitation and marginalization of Niger Delta youths. However, because some of these youths 
are inserted into political networks controlled by powerful political interests, their anger may 
deflect against some social scapegoat who may be persons most like themselves. 
 It is important to note that deprived youths, through the process of introspection and 
identity construction, are able to untangle their ambivalence towards one another and to direct 
their potent aggressive energy towards the actual source of their privation: the exploitative 
alliance between the state and oil corporations. In its most extreme form (as seen from the 
behavior of MEND insurgents who remain active outside of the Amnesty program), resistance to 
privation produces a revolutionary ferment, which when conscious, is a powerful, individual, 
revolutionary force that can be become the motive force for breaking free from poverty, 
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injustice, oppression, and deprivation. In that sense, the attitude of fatalism as distinct from the 
attitude of passivity or indifference can serve the rational objectives of the struggle against those 
conditions that give rise to this attitude in the first place. 
 From the stand point of resource deprivation theory, insurgency results from institutional 
and structural conditions. As long as these conditions were preserved by the peace settlement, 
violent insurgency will continue and escalate despite the investment of huge resources. Hence, 
discrimination arising out of ethnic group membership has a significant impact not only on 
poverty levels but also on the willingness and determination of oppressed minority youths to 
break out of the cycle of poverty using arms. As long as Niger Delta youths are deprived of 
control and benefits of their own resources, we will be able to predict that armed conflict will 
continue.   
 Finally, in assessing the significance of any structural or institutional moment on 
insurgency, the resource deprivation theory is interested in two dimensions of causation: with 
respect to each structural or institutional moment, the theory inquires into its effect either on the 
extent or on the distribution of poverty and suffering. The extent of poverty refers to the 
particular people who are consigned to impoverishment and suffering. In the Niger Delta 
example, these are minority ethnic group members including women (especially female heads of 
households) and children. The distribution of poverty refers to the characteristics of the 
population that makes them susceptible to poverty. In the Niger Delta example, it is the fact of 
membership in a community where oil is mined as a result of which the land and waterways are 
completely destroyed to the extent that the people (who are predominantly dependent on land for 
subsistence) are unable to make any form of living. Based on these, the theory asks what forces 
determines who will become militant? The answer to the question lies in resource deprivation. If 
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the people who produce the country’s wealth are exploited and marginalized to the extent that 
they experience great difficulties meeting life’s challenges, they will in turn attempt to turn 
around their fortunes using any means necessary, including armed conflict. 
   The second theory is the theory of triangulation. In this theory, I propose that militancy or 
insurgency in the Niger Delta results directly from the manipulative insertion of youths into 
hostile third-party resource disputes involving high-level political and economic players 
including politicians, community leaders, traditional rulers, top-level serving and retired military 
leaders, and oil companies. One of the mechanisms by which resource conflict between these 
important stakeholders becomes a risk factor for armed conflict is the triangulation of peasant 
youths into these resource disputes such that peasants are "caught in the middle" or "trapped in 
the center" and torn between divided loyalties to the state, traditional institutions, community 
leadership, and oil conglomerates.  
 I conceptualize triangulation as a system process in which powerless Niger Delta youths 
are deliberately inserted into stakeholders resource disputes as a way to strengthen the bargaining 
power of economic and political elements working within structures created to facilitate and 
expand petrol-capitalism. In this sense, the peasant youth (or its extension – the militant youth) is 
nothing but a pawn, being played by powerful chess masters. And as is characteristic of pawns, 
the Niger Delta peasant or militant, is completely expendable because he can be quickly replaced 
by any of the over 20 million idle youth in the Delta, whose idleness results directly from the 
machinations of the same powerful economic and political forces whose entrenched class 
interests produced the Niger Delta conflict. 
 Critical to achieving their economic and political goals, is the participation of peasant 
youths in disputes involving these powerful stakeholders. The youths play functional roles to the 
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extent that their participation in the disputes is limited to taking sides with stakeholders by 
attacking or distracting other stakeholders. The acts of violence deliberately perpetrated by these 
youths on behalf of their principals becomes counter-productive (or dysfunctional) when it 
potentially escalates the conflict between stakeholders beyond what is needed to extract huge 
political and economic concessions and payouts. The dysfunctional aspects of triangulation 
results from the inability of peasant and uneducated youths to balance the conflicting signals that 
they receive from their sponsors, who are high level political and economic actors. The 
confusion results from the conflicting loyalties that these youths have to the state, traditional 
institutions and values, community leadership, and oil companies. Each of these important 
political and economic players frequently place antithetical expectations and goals on these 
youths, often shaking the core values and principles that have governed life in local communities 
for generations. For example, in political seasons, politicians enlist the youths to derail or 
destabilize the campaigns of opponents and rival political parties. The promises made to the 
communities and the youths is for the development of the communities through the provision of 
vital infrastructures and the creation of work opportunities. But as soon as they are entrenched in 
government, they begin to use the same youths to sabotage oil and government assets in order to 
benefit financially. Not only are the electoral promises unfulfilled, existing infrastructure is 
deliberately sabotaged in order to win huge oil contracts and payoffs. This type of contradiction 
puts pressure on youths, especially where these youths lack effective social anchors capable of 
neutralizing the negative effects of triangulation. These youths routinely develop adjustment 
problems particularly internalizing problems such as anxiety, depression, social withdrawal, fear, 
and anger and a range of externalizing behavior including armed violence such as militancy, 
piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping. 
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 The conflict process model of triangulation that I propose, therefore, does not reject the 
notion that conflict arises from unresolved grievances (such as pollution, unemployment, 
resource control agitations, etc) or from greed. Instead, resource conflict results from a 
cumulative process involving all of these diverse forces. Triangulation is the last stage of this 
process and is the trigger that sets of the conflagration. It is the last in the chain of causes, but 
potent enough, to send otherwise peaceful youths over the edge.   
8.6 Recommendation 
 DDR is an important mechanism for peace in war-torn and post-conflict societies. As this 
study has shown, DDR can make invaluable contributions to peace processes. However, as 
Guehenno (2009: xvii) has argued, DDR is a “facilitator but not a driver” of peace. Thus, DDR 
can assist but never act as a substitute for a political process. In the Niger Delta example, DDR 
became an ineffective substitute for the political process resulting in major confusion over its 
aims and ends. Although, it succeeded in slowing down the pace of insurgency and provided a 
platform for negotiation with insurgents, it has proven inadequate as the “one-size-fits-all” 
solution to the conflict. Its use in this way is misinformed and misdirected and threatens to vitiate 
even the temporary gains made and to plunge the nation into potentially more devastating rounds 
of violence. To halt this drift, this study makes the following recommendations: 
1. This DDR program is very highly combatant-centric. This means that the main focus of 
the peace process was to placate combatants through various monetary inducements. Although 
focus on combatants is crucial to the peace process, this should have been done as part of a larger 
focus to target agents of conflict including triangulation, greed, corruption, the warped federal 
structure, pollution, resource control, economic exploitation, unemployment, and poverty.This 
means that critical stakeholders in the conflict (i.e. host communities) were marginalized by the 
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lopsided focus on insurgents. If we consider Lederach’s holistic approach to conflict 
transformation in which all parties to the conflict as well as the grievances and socio-economic 
and political contexts of conflicts must be integrated into the peacebuilding architecture, we see 
that the approach of the Amnesty program targeted only the symptoms or “episodes” of the 
conflict rather than its “epicenter.” Because the Amnesty program was animated by the impulse 
to resolve or deescalate the conflict, it could only achieve marginal or modest short-term, 
non-permanent results. It is crucial then, that DDR programs address both the episodic nature of 
conflicts as well as the epicenter of conflicts. This would give implementers the opportunity to 
engage broader contexts as well as “explore and understand the system of relationships and 
patterns” that produced the conflict in the first place (Lederach 2003: 30). Towards this end, I 
advocate second generation conflict reduction activities to bolster the effects of DDR. Unlike 
traditional DDR which focuses mainly on combatants within military structures, second 
generation activities and programs focus not on military units but on civilian communities that 
are affected by armed conflict. According to the United Nations (2010), second generation 
activities and programs can be implemented to support the peace process, build trust, contribute 
to a secure environment and help build the foundation for longer term peacebuilding. Because 
they focus alternatively on area-based, community-based and collective incentives (Muggah et al 
2009), second generation activities and programs have the capability to engage the entire conflict 
environment and quicken the march towards peace. 
2. The Niger Delta Amnesty program was designed and implemented singularly by the 
Nigerian government. There was no contribution from international organizations such as the 
United Nations, which typically acts in conjunction with nation-states in designing DDR peace 
programs. The lack of international partnership and collaboration affected both the design and 
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implementation of the Niger Delta DDR program. For example, in Timor-Leste, two of the four 
DDR interventions were designed and managed by international organizations. The UNDP 
designed and managed the RESPECT program (Recovery, Employment and Stability Program 
for Ex-Combatants and Communities in Timor-Leste). The second program FRAP (FALINTIL 
Reinsertion Assistance Program) was designed and implemented by the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) with funding from the World Bank, USAID, and Canada. 
Although the other two programs were designed and implemented locally or nationally, they 
received core funding support from international sources. As a result of international support, a 
credible database of about 75,000 living and deceased veterans was established. To complement 
this, several legislations that recognized and helped to reintegrate veterans were enacted 
including the establishment of veteran recognition ceremonies. All of these enabled 
ex-combatants to achieve high degrees of social reintegration complete with improved social 
status. The combination of all these have ensured that veterans and ex-combatants no longer 
constitute potent threats to the peace and stability of society, unlike the situation in Nigeria. 
What this means is that the design of DDR programs must anticipate and actively encourage 
contributions from individuals, groups, and organizations across national boundaries. This would 
serve not only to integrate ideas and best practices that worked in order climes but also 
contribute funds and resources that are direly needed to plan and implement disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration programs and activities. This does not in any way suggest that 
that the impetus for action must come from outside the conflict zone; rather, it encourages 
networking and interaction on a much larger scale that helps to deepen understanding about the 
conflict , build trust in the process, and develop appropriate mechanisms for building the peace. 
3. The Niger Delta conflict is rooted very deeply in economic conditions that are associated 
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with oil production. For example, unlike other regions such as the northwest and south east 
regions with very high unemployment and poverty levels, the negative economic conditions of 
Niger Delta peasants is problematic because of the wealth produced from the region. Some of 
these negative economic conditions originate with pollution, which results from oil production. 
Yet, these deeper economic issues are left unaddressed. In a practice that instantly appears puny 
and trivial, the program focuses on individual combatants while ignoring the multiplicity of 
forces that created insurgents out of hapless peasants. Thus, instead of the simplistic, one 
dimensional conceptualization of reintegration that focuses solely on ex-combatants, DDR 
programs will have greater impact if they are conceptualized holistically with economic, 
political, social, and psychological features. More importantly, the Niger Delta DDR completely 
ignored the psychological strands of reintegration. Yet, Niger Delta people generally and 
ex-combatants specifically are at great risk for psychological impairments due to developing the 
siege mentality that goes with extreme aggression by the state/petrol-capital alliance. Over many 
decades, the state/petrol-capital alliance have waged an aggressively relentless war with forces 
(imagined and real) opposed either to oil production or the allocation of oil profits. To crush such 
opposition, the state/petrol-capital alliance typically deplored the military with a command to 
quell revolts “by all means necessary.” This has meant the brutalization, maiming, and killing of 
innocent peasants and the militarization of local communities leading to the development of a 
captive mentality, where Niger Delta peasants see themselves as slaves or prisoners in their own 
land. Parallel to the development of this mentality is the development of ideological and practical 
neutralizations of this mentality. One technique of neutralization is hostility towards all social 
objects including friends and family members. Once this neutralization takes root, it is difficult 
to discard or dispel. Youths at risk of this neutralization frequently go through life being 
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mean-spirited and desperate for outlets to vent their frustration and anger. Many such youths 
were involved in the insurgency and unless concrete steps were taken to deal with their extreme 
psychological impairments, long-term peace will remain elusive in the Niger Delta. Thus, I 
recommend culturally appropriate and community-based individual interventions to deal with 
symptoms of impairment. These interventions should be available not only to ex-combatants but 
also to members of Niger Delta communities that have suffered the cumulative negative impact 
of oil production as wells as the destructively aggressive impulses of the state/petrol-capital 
alliance. One of such interventions might be to engage the services of university trained 
counselors who have specialized training in mental health, trauma, and psycho-social 
interventions. These persons should be deplored to local oil-producing communities and the 
various rehabilitation centers as part of a broader program of community development.  
4. The survey and interview data show that Niger Delta insurgents typically manifest strong 
educational defects. The situation with insurgents mirror situations in the larger society where as 
much as 60% of the population is illiterate. The statistics also show that the Niger Delta youth 
population is growing, so also is the size of the illiterate population. Perhaps, in recognition of 
this, the government made skills and vocational training for ex-combatants a major part of the 
Amnesty program. While this is certainly commendable and should be encouraged, it does not go 
far enough to address the shocking gap in education among the larger Niger Delta population. 
Thus, government might do well to extend the vocational and skills training outside of the 
Amnesty program as a way to reduce the at-risk population who potentially may pursue violence 
as the only real opportunity for earning income. More importantly, the government must urgently 
identify the Niger Delta as a “disaster zone” for the purpose of developing alternative economic 
opportunities that are not oil driven. This will take pressure of oil as the only revenue earner and 
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unleash the creative entrepreneurial spirits of local peoples. It will also mean a return to the 
original productive base of the Niger Delta economy: fishing, agriculture, trade, and industry. 
Part of the strategy must be to make funds easily accessible in the form of soft loans, 
micro-credit loans, entrepreneurial development loans, agricultural loans, student loans, and 
grants to members of Niger Delta communities. Government can do this in partnership with oil 
majors and international organizations, including the USAID, UNDP, and World Bank. 
5. In order to sustain the Niger Delta peace process, dual sovereignty must be replaced by 
more amenable conditions in the Niger Delta. In order to bring about such conditions, all of the 
negative conditions such as pollution, poverty, unemployment, infrastructural deficits, resource 
deprivation, and marginalization that make insurgency desirable and inevitable must be 
redressed. Most importantly, dual sovereignty must be replaced by conditions antithetical to 
greed, corruption, triangulation, and our own brand of federalism, which this study implicates as 
conditions favorable to insurgency. All of these implies that in order for peace to be implanted 
and sustained in the long-term, all of the powerful political and economic interests whose 
machinations directly but unobtrusively produced both the negative conditions of the Delta and 
ultimately the violence, must be dismantled. Because of the persistence of these powerful 
political and economic forces, the interests of ordinary members of Niger Delta communities 
would not be incorporated into the Amnesty protocol. Unfortunately, the more these ordinary 
people are alienated from the peace negotiations and settlements, the more likely that the 
Amnesty program will breakdown into armed conflict. Sustaining the Amnesty or DDR-induced 
peace can occur only if deliberate effort is made to construct post-conflict institutional structures 
that completely dismantles the conditions of dual sovereignty and diminishes the incentives to 
continue to engage in armed conflict instead of accepting the peace.   
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Appendix A: The Questionnaire 
 
Paths to Peacebuilding: Amnesty and the Niger Delta Violence 
 
This survey is undertaken as part of a doctoral dissertation research. Its objective is to evaluate 
the implementation of the Amnesty program by collecting information on key actors, their 
personal and professional background, the objectives of their engagement, their opinions 
regarding the causes of the Niger Delta violence, and their perception of the Amnesty program.  
 
This questionnaire was developed in order to cover the remote and immediate causes of the 
conflict and the activities subsumed under the Amnesty program that aim to resolve the problem. 
We decided to broaden the scope of the study to include both the Amnesty program and the 
entire corpus of factors that have necessitated the implementation of this program because we 
want to assure comparability and completeness of this comparative research. You may indicate at 
the top of a question if you find it irrelevant to the conflict.   
 
We appreciate your time for completing this questionnaire. Your data as well as information 
provided will be treated with the utmost confidentiality.  
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A. ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
A1. Would you describe yourself as …? 
1. A Militant 
2  An environmental activist 
3  Resource control activist 
4  A community activist 
5  A freedom fighter 
6  A paid fighter/mercenary 
7  A political activist 
8  Other, please specify 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
A2. When did you get involved in the conflict? 
1. Between 1998 and 1999 
2  Between 2000 and 2001 
3  Between 2002 and 2003 
4  Between 2004 and 2005 
5  Between 2006 and 2007 
6  Between 2008 and 2009 
7  Between 2010 and 2011 
8  Don’t know 
 
 
A3. How many people where in your organization? 
1. Less than 300 
2  Less than 500 
3  Less than 1000 
4  More than 1000 
5  Don’t know 
 
 
A4. About how many of these people where women? 
1. None 
2  Less than 100 
3  100 to 200 
4  200 to 299 
5  300 to 399 
6  400 to 499 
7  Above 500 
8  Don’t know 
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A5. What was your main role within your organization? 
1. Officer/commander/general 
2  Combat soldier 
3  Work around camp/run errands 
4  Intelligence/spying 
5  Wife/lover/girlfriend 
6  Other, please specify 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
A6. What did you do to prove to your organization that you can be trusted? 
1. Nothing 
2  I had to go through training 
3  I had to swear to an oath 
4  I had to join a cult 
5  I had to do harm to somebody 
6  I had to participate in a dangerous mission 
7  I had to contribute morning 
 
 
A7. What was the main goal of your organization? 
1. Ethnic nationalism 
2  To make money 
3  To gain political power 
4  To end pollution 
5  To gain control of oil resources 
6  Constitutionalism 
7  Infrastructural development 
8  Other, please specify 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
A8. Which of the following best describes why you became involved with your group? 
1. I supported the groups ideological and political goals 
2  People inside the group lived better than people outside 
3  I was forced into the group 
4  To make money 
5  I joined to avenge the death of a relative/friend 
6  Thrill/excitement 
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A9. How did you join a militant group? 
1. A family member recruited me 
2  I joined through my membership of a cult group 
3  A member of my community recruited me 
4  A friend recruited me 
5  I am a founder of the organization 
6  I sought out the group myself and joined 
7  I was forced into joining the group 
8  A stranger recruited me 
 
 
A10. What did you expect to gain from your involvement with the organization? 
1. Employment 
2  Resource control 
3  Political power 
4  Pollution-free environment 
5  Community development 
6  Revenge 
7  Money 
8  Nothing 
 
 
A11. As a member of the group, did you feel that you were better of inside it than you would 
have been outside it? 
1. Yes, better 
2  No difference 
3  No, worse 
 
A12. What was the main ethnic group in your organization? 
1. Ijaw 
2  Okrika 
3  Ikwerre 
4  Urhobo 
5  Itsekiri 
6  Ogoni 
7  Other, please specify 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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A13. What were you promised for participating in your group’s activities? 
1. Money 
2  Revenge 
3  Access to oil 
4  Improve the situation 
5  Non-medicinal drugs 
6  Political power 
7  Justice 
8  Nothing 
9  Other, please specify 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
A14. When you went out for operation, who decide what the target would be? 
1. Officers/commanders/generals 
2  Combat soldiers 
3  Decision taken collectively 
 
A15. When you made gains from attacking a target, who decided what to do with it? 
1. Officers/commanders/generals 
2  Combat soldiers 
3  Decision taken collectively  
 
A16. Where did you get most of your guns and ammunitions from? 
1. We seized them from other groups 
2  We seized them from government forces 
3  We got guns from the army 
4  We got them from outside the country 
5  We got them from local dealers 
 
A17. Within your organization, which of the following behavior is most likely to put you in 
trouble? 
1. Being drunk 
2  Non-medicinal drug use 
3  Marijuana use 
4  Stealing from someone 
5  Raping someone 
6  Fighting with someone 
7  None 
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A18. Are you participating in the Amnesty program? 
1. Yes 
2  No 
 
A19. When did you enter the Amnesty program? 
1. Late 2009 (September to December) 
2  Early 2010 (January to April) 
3  Mid 2010 (May to August) 
4  Late 2010 (September to December) 
5  Not sure 
 
A20. Which of the following reasons best explains why you are participating in the Amnesty 
program? 
1. Tired of fighting 
2  Promise by government to address grievances 
3  Cash incentives for participants 
4  Order by leadership of organization 
5  Health/safety concerns 
 
A21. How would you describe the oil companies operating in the Niger Delta? 
1. Responsible corporate citizens 
2  Interested only in oil profit 
3  Committed to the development of local communities 
4  Insensitive to the needs of local communities 
5  Insensitive to the problems of pollution 
6  Racist 
 
A22. How would you describe the federal government in relation to the Niger Delta? 
1. Committed to the development of oil producing communities 
2  Insensitive to the problems of oil producing communities 
3  Corrupt 
4  Interested only in oil revenue 
5  Incapable of regulating the behavior of oil companies 
6  In cohort with oil companies 
7  Oppressive 
8  Committed to the equitable distribution of resources 
9  Exploitative 
10  Biased against minorities 
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A22. Where did your organization get most of its funding from? 
1. International sources 
2  Politicians 
3  Oil bunkering 
4  Ransom payments 
5  Oil companies 
6  Government 
7  Donation 
 
 
B. CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT 
 
B1. In your opinion, which of the following is the main cause of the Niger Delta conflict? 
  
1. Political instability 
2  Religion 
3  Poverty 
4  Unemployment 
5  Ancient hatreds 
6  Racism 
7  Pollution 
8  Resource control  
9  Federalism 
10  Exploitation by oil companies 
11  Infrastructural deficits 
12  Proliferation of weapons 
13  Corruption 
14  Greed/predation 
 
B2. Which of the following actors would you consider the most active in bringing about the 
conflict? 
  
1. Federal government 
2  State governments in the Niger Delta 
3  Local governments in the Niger Delta 
4  Armed forces and police 
5  Oil companies 
6  Politicians/political parties 
7  Western countries (UK, US, etc) 
8  Eastern countries (China, Russia, etc)  
9  Traditional institutions 
10  Oil bunkerers 
11  Religious groups 
12  Ethnic militias 
13  Militants 
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B3. How much did your community experience the effects of oil-based pollution? 
 
1  Very much 
2  Much 
3  Not much 
4  Not very much 
 
B4. Did you ever get involved in conflicts/disagreements involving politicians, community 
leaders, traditional leaders, and oil companies on an issue you did not feel concerned 
you? 
  
1  Yes 
2  No 
 
B5. How often did you enter such conflicts? 
 
1  Very often 
2  Fairly often 
3  Not very often 
4  Not at all 
 
B6. Who involved you in the conflict? 
  
1. Leader of my group 
2  Politician 
3  Community leader 
4  Traditional ruler 
5  Oil company officials 
6  Not applicable 
 
B7. Did you ever feel pressured to side with one or other party in the conflict? 
  
1  Yes 
2  No 
3  Not applicable 
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B8. Which of these emotions did you feel as a result of your involvement in other peoples 
disagreements? 
  
1. Anxiety 
2  Sadness 
3  Guilt 
4  Anger 
5  I did not feel any of these things 
6  Not applicable 
 
B9. Which of the following was your main strategy for defeating or neutralizing your 
opponents? 
  
1. Using arms to fight 
2  Civil litigation 
3  Voting at elections 
4  Peaceful protests 
5  Destruction of oil infrastructure 
6  Kidnapping 
7  Mass media 
 
C1. Did your organization submit any weapons to the Amnesty Committee? 
  
1  Yes 
2  No 
 
C2. What percentage of your weapons did your organization submit? 
  
1. 100% 
2  About 75% 
3  About 50% 
4  About 25% 
5  Less than 25% 
 
C3. Do you anticipate a future need to acquire more weapons to pursue your objectives? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
 
C4. Did you ever receive cash benefits for entering the Amnesty program? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
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C5. Was the cash benefit a one-time payment or a regular monthly payment? 
  
1  One-time payment 
2  Regular monthly payment 
3  Irregular payment (not one time) 
 
 
C6. Did you receive any type of training from at the demobilization/rehabilitation center? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
 
C7. Overall, how would you rate the materials and content of the training? 
  
1. Excellent 
2  Good 
3  Ok 
4  Poor 
5  Very poor 
 
C8. How would you rate the trainers? 
  
1. Excellent 
2  Good 
3  Ok 
4  Poor 
5  Very poor 
 
C9. Approximately what percentage of your reinsertion payment did you save? 
  
1. 0% 
2  25% 
3  50% 
4  Above 50% 
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C10. Approximately what percentage of your reinsertion payment did you give to other 
people? 
  
1. 0% 
2  25% 
3  50% 
4  Above 50% 
 
C11. Did you (are you) participate (participating) in a Amnesty funded vocational or 
educational program? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
 
C12. Which Amnesty funded vocational or educational program did you (are you) participate 
(ing) in? 
  
1. Artisanship 
2  Oil and gas 
3  Agriculture 
4  Transportation 
5  Information technology 
6  Maritime 
7  Culture/tourism/hospitality 
8  Environmental and sanitation management 
9  Small scale manufacturing 
10  Entertainment 
11  Creative arts and theater 
12  Building and construction 
13  Formal education 
 
C13. Have you completed your Amnesty funded vocational or educational program? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
 
C14. If no, why have you not completed training? 
  
1. I am still in training 
2  The Amnesty program stopped paying my benefits 
3  It is a waste of time 
4  I am going back to fighting 
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C15. If yes, what was the duration of training? 
  
1. 1 to 6 months 
2  6 to 12 months 
3  Above 12 months 
4  Not applicable 
 
C16. Do you agree with this statement: “the training I have received (I am receiving) has 
prepared (is preparing) me well for a life career? 
  
1. I agree 
2  I disagree 
3  I neither agree nor disagree 
 
C17. Since completing the training program, have you had a job? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
3  Not applicable 
 
C18. Do you think that you will ever use the skills and education that you have acquired from 
this program in the future? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
3  Don’t know 
 
C19. Following your participation in the Amnesty program, which of the following do you feel 
most connected to? 
  
1. Members of your militant group 
2  Family 
3  Non-militant friends 
4  Neighbors 
5  No one 
 
D1. Following the implementation of the Amnesty program, did you return to your 
community? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
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D2. Did you experience any problems gaining acceptance from your neighbors? 
  
1. Yes, big problems 
2  Yes, some problems 
3  No problems 
4  Not applicable 
 
D3. Did you experience any problems gaining acceptance from your family? 
  
1. Yes, big problems 
2  Yes, some problems 
3  No problems 
4  Not applicable 
 
D4. Did you return to the same community you left to join the conflict?? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
 
D5. Who do you now spend most of your time with? 
  
1. Members of your militant group 
2  Family 
3  Non-militant friends 
4  Neighbors 
5  No one 
 
D6. In the event of a personal problem, who are you likely to turn to as your primary source 
of support? 
  
1. Members of your militant group 
2  Family 
3  Non-militant friends 
4  Neighbors 
5  No one 
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D7. If you were to start a business today, who will you partner with? 
  
1. Members of your militant group 
2  Family 
3  Non-militant friends 
4  Neighbors 
5  No one 
 
D8. In your opinion, what is the most effective way to deal with oil-related community 
problems? 
  
1. Approaching government officials 
2  Approaching traditional rulers 
3  Approaching oil company officials 
4  Dialogue and negotiation 
5  Peaceful protests 
6  Litigation 
7  Taking up arms to fight 
8  Destroying government property 
9  Destroying oil infrastructure 
 
D9. How active are you in the monthly sanitation exercise? 
  
1. Very active 
2  Fairly active 
3  Note very active 
4  Not at all active 
 
D10. Did you register to vote in the monthly sanitation exercise? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
 
D11. Overall, do you believe that the training you received will make you a better person 
socially? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
 
E1. Think about the unemployment situation in the Niger Delta. Do you think the situation is 
better today than now the conflict? 
   
1. Better 
2  About the same 
3  Worse 
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E2. Think about access to medical care in the Niger Delta. Do you think the situation is better 
today than now the conflict? 
   
1. Better 
2  About the same 
3  Worse 
 
E3. Think about access political access in the Niger Delta. Do you think the situation is better 
today than now the conflict? 
   
1. Better 
2  About the same 
3  Worse 
 
 
E4. Think about the problem of oil-related pollution in the Niger Delta. Do you think the 
situation is better today than now the conflict? 
   
1. Better 
2  About the same 
3  Worse  
 
E5. Think about oil revenue allocation in Nigeria. Do you think the situation is better today 
than now the conflict? 
   
1. Better 
2  About the same 
3  Worse  
 
E6. Think about the condition of schools in the Niger Delta. Do you think the situation is 
better today than now the conflict? 
   
1. Better 
2  About the same 
3  Worse  
 
E7. Think about the way conflicts are resolved in the Niger Delta. Do you think the situation 
is better today than now the conflict? 
   
1. Better 
2  About the same 
3  Worse  
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E8. Think about the problem of corruption in the Niger Delta. Do you think the situation is 
better today than now the conflict? 
   
1. Better 
2  About the same 
3  Worse  
 
E9. The issues raise in the last 7 question (E1 through E8) fall into 8 categories. In which of 
these categories would you like to see progress made? 
  
1. Education 
2  Medical care 
3  Political participation 
4  Employment 
5  Resource allocation 
6  Pollution 
7  Conflict resolution 
8  Corruption 
 
E10. If you had the opportunity, which of the following actions will you take to address some 
of the issues in E9? 
  
1. Complain to government officials 
2  Complain to traditional rulers 
3  Vote at elections 
4  Appeals for assistance from the international community 
5  Take up arms to fight 
6  Approach the courts 
7  Organize peaceful protests/demonstrations 
 
F1. Overall, how satisfied you with the disarmament aspect of the Amnesty program? 
  
1. Very satisfied 
2  Fairly satisfied 
3  Not very satisfied 
4  Not at all satisfied 
 
F2. Overall, how satisfied you with the demobilization aspect of the Amnesty program? 
  
1. Very satisfied 
2  Fairly satisfied 
3  Not very satisfied 
4  Not at all satisfied 
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F3. Overall, how satisfied you with the reintegration aspect of the Amnesty program? 
  
1. Very satisfied 
2  Fairly satisfied 
3  Not very satisfied 
4  Not at all satisfied  
 
F4. Overall, how would you rate the costs and benefits of the Amnesty program? 
  
1. Benefits only 
2  Costs only 
3  More costs than benefits 
4  Equal costs and benefits 
5  More benefits than costs 
 
F5. Overall, who would you say is likely to benefit most from the Amnesty program? 
  
1. Militants 
2  Government 
3  Oil companies 
4  Oil producing communities 
5  Amnesty officials  
 
G1. Were there women in your organization? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
 
G2. What was the main role women played in your organization? 
  
1. Officers/commanders/generals 
2  Combat soldiers 
3  Work around camp/run errands 
4  Intelligence/spying 
5  Wife/lover/girlfriend 
5  Not applicable 
 
G3. Based on your knowledge of the involvement of females in militancy, should female 
militants participate in the Amnesty program?? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
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G4. What percentage of the population of female militants do you believe is participating in 
the Amnesty program? 
  
1. About 10% 
2  About 20% 
3  About 30% 
4  About 40% 
5  About 50% 
6 About 60% 
7  About 70% 
8  Not applicable 
 
G5. Compared to male militants, what type of treatment did female militants receive at the 
rehabilitation center? 
  
1. Better treatment 
2  Worse Treatment 
3  Same treatment 
4  Not applicable 
 
G6. How involved were female militants in the planning of the Amnesty program? 
  
1. Very involved 
2  Fairly involved 
3  Not very involved 
4  Not at all involved 
 
G7. In your opinion, how likely is it for the Amnesty program to succeed if female militants 
do not participate? 
  
1. Very likely 
2  Fairly likely 
3  Not very likely 
4  Not at all likely 
 
G8. Did the Amnesty program treat single or widowed ex-militants as heads of households 
and given special assistance? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
 
G9. Under the Amnesty program, are there special funds allocated to women? 
1. Yes 
2  No 
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G10. During the conflict, were female militants victims of sexualized violence? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
 
G11. Who are (were) the perpetrators of sexualized violence against women? 
  
1. Male militants in the same organization 
2  Male militants in a different organization 
3. Members of the Joint Task Force 
4  Police 
5. Military 
6  Not applicable 
 
G12. Does the Amnesty program have facilities for the treatment, counseling, and protection of 
female ex-militants who were victims of sexualized violence? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No  
 
H1. Think about the ongoing Amnesty program. How successful do you think the program is 
likely to be in the short term (1-3 years)? 
  
1. Very successful 
2  Fairly successful 
3. Not very successful 
4  Not at all successful 
 
H2. Think about the ongoing Amnesty program. How successful do you think the program is 
likely to be in the mid-term (4-5 years)? 
  
1. Very successful 
2  Fairly successful 
3. Not very successful 
4  Not at all successful 
 
H3. Think about the ongoing Amnesty program. How successful do you think the program is 
likely to be in the long term (5-10 years)? 
  
1. Very successful 
2  Fairly successful 
3. Not very successful 
4  Not at all successful 
  
308 
 
H4. Based on your experience with the Amnesty, do you intend to stay in the program till the 
end? 
  
1. Yes, I intend to stay till the end 
2  No, I will drop out but will not go back to fighting 
3. No, I will drop out and go back to fighting  
 
H5. Considering the ongoing Amnesty program, how likely are you to continue to use 
violence to pursue your objectives? 
  
1. Very likely 
2  Fairly likely 
3. Not very likely 
4  Not at all likely 
 
I1. What is your age? 
  
1. 18 to 24  
2  25 to 34 
3. 35 to 44 
4  45 to 54 
3. 55 to 64 
4  65 and over 
 
I2. Please, choose the category which most closely satisfies your view of your ethnic origin? 
  
1. Igbo 
2  Yoruba 
3  Ijaw 
4  Edo 
5  Urhobo 
6  Itsekiri 
7  Ikwerre 
8  Ogoni 
9  Kalabari 
10  Efik 
11  Okrika 
12  Other, please specify 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
I3. What is your gender? 
  
1. Male  
2  Female 
  
309 
 
I4. What is your marital status? 
   
1. Single 
2  Married/living with partner 
3  Divorced 
4  Separated 
5  Widowed 
 
I5. What level of education have you completed? 
  
1. No school 
2  Primary school 
3  Secondary school 
4  Trade/technical school 
5  Polytechnic/university 
6  Graduate school 
 
I6. Do you currently have children 17 or younger living in your household? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
 
I7. What was your occupation before you entered the conflict? 
  
1. Farmer/fisher 
2  Trader 
3  Civil servant 
4  Artisan 
5  Teacher 
6  Medical worker 
7  Domestic servant 
8  Housewife 
9  Student 
10  Odd jobs/part-time 
11  Business 
12  No employment 
13  Other, please specify 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
I8. Have your occupation changed now? 
  
1. Yes 
2  No 
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I9. If yes, did it change because of the training you received from the Amnesty program? 
 
1. Yes 
2  No 
 
I10. What was your monthly household income in the year before you entered the conflict? 
(Income measured in Naira) 
  
1. No income 
2  Less than 50,000 
3  50,000 – 99,999 
4  100,000 – 149,000 
5  Over 150,000 
 
 
I11. Outside of the Amnesty program, are you in any form of paid employment at the 
moment? 
 
1. Yes, self-employed 
2  Yes, full-time 
3. Yes, part-time (casual worker) 
4  No 
 
I12. Would you describe yourself as disabled? 
 
1. Yes 
2  No 
 
I13. In what section of society do you live? 
 
1. Inner city 
2  Sub-urban area (GRA) 
3. Rural area 
 
I14. What is your religion? 
 
1. African Traditional Religion 
2  Christian 
3. Muslim 
4  Atheist 
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I15. What is your state of residence? 
 
1. Bayelsa 
2  Delta 
3. Rivers 
 
I16. What is the name of your organization? 
  
1. MEND 
2  NDV 
3  TO 
4  NDPVF 
5  FNDIC 
6  EE 
7  NDSF 
8  MB 
9  PLF 
10  MONDP 
11  NDSM 
12  NDCDF 
13  JRC 
14  COMA 
15  NDEEF 
16  NDLF 
17  URA 
18  UYBF 
19  UVF 
 
 
Thank you! 
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 Appendix B: Interview Schedule 
 
1. What are the remote and immediate causes of the armed conflict in the Niger Delta? 
Please explain in detail. 
 
2. What efforts have been made in the past to resolve this conflict?  
 
3. What is your opinion about the amnesty program?  
 
4. Who is responsible for the implementation of the amnesty program?  
 
5. How is the amnesty program implemented?  
 
6. What is your opinion about participation in the program?  
 
7. What do you think is the main reason(s) militants are participating in the program?  
 
8. How much weapons, arms, and ammunition have been submitted by militants since the 
program started?  
 
9. In your opinion, who is a militant and what do you think is their prime motivation?  
 
10. What does rehabilitation and reintegration incorporate?  
 
11. How is the reintegration being done?  
 
12. What is economic reconstruction?  
 
13. What facilities, structures, institutions, activities, events, and policies have been created 
to stimulate the economic development of the region?  
 
14. What is the role of women in the conflict? 
 
15. What has been the role of the international community in resolving the conflict?  
 
16. What does peace in the Niger Delta mean to you?  
 
17. Who benefits from peace in the region? Who benefits from the conflict?  
 
18. Overall, what is your opinion about the amnesty program? Has it been successful in 
mitigating the conflict?  
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19. Is there anything else you wish to tell me about the Niger Delta violence and the amnesty 
program?  
 
